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Theoretical Background
CRISMART and the Crisis Management
Europe Research Program1
Iulian Chifu
With regard to NATO and EU expansion, effective and legitimate civilian
crisis management and civil protection are becoming important items on the
public policy agendas of individual nations as well as international
organizations. Civilian crises can all too easily escalate into political crises
or lead to the outbreak of violent domestic or international conflicts. The
Crisis Management (CM) Europe program is a research project that aims to
produce scientific knowledge that can be used to train practitioners to cope
more effectively with national, regional and transnational crises. 
Initiated in 1997 with a focus on the Baltic Sea Area, the CM Europe
Program, directed by the Center for Crisis Management Research and
Training (CRISMART) at the Swedish National Defense College, engages
more than one hundred scholars from different parts of Europe and North
America. The program systematically documents and analyzes specific
cases of national and regional crises. It relies upon a contextually grounded
process tracing method for case reconstruction and dissection derived from
relevant literature in political science, psychology, and organizational
sociology. In 2002, the Romanian research team joined this international
research team and this book represents the tenth published CM Europe
volume focusing on national crisis management.2
These case studies reflect an attempt to apply a scientifically informed,
systematic, and “user friendly” methodology in a uniform fashion to a set of 
1 The CM Baltic research program was originally established in 1997. In July 2000, it was
re named the CM Europe program. All reports prior to July 2000 are therefore referred to
as CM Baltic/Europe reports, whereas those after July 2000 are referred to as CM Europe
reports.
2 In addition, volumes focusing on Poland and Ukraine are forthcoming, and one on
Kaliningrad is currently in progress. 
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cases focused on various policy sectors and countries. In this volume, we
seek to compare the challenging events documented in the so-call
“Breakthrough crisis” in order to examine the ways in which the
governments and the societies from the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and
Romania perceived and have coped with this crisis. The general purpose of
this type of research is to encourage scientists and researchers on the one
hand and a wide circle of practitioners on the other to engage more
deliberately and holistically in the field of crisis management. By way of
such studies, we hope to encourage greater acceptance and more systematic
use of theoretical tools and research methods in the field of crisis
management in general and case studies more specifically. Moreover, the
trilateral approach enable us to see differences of perceptions and of
systems of decision-making in crisis in the three countries as well as
patterns for the decision in crisis. This, we believe, will result in the
production of new and useful knowledge and will create better conditions
for civil crisis planning and crisis management, both in this trilateral region
and elsewhere. 
The original formation of a Romanian-Swedish original research group was
undertaken in this spirit, with a group consisting of professionals from the
spheres of academia and national security. The cross-disciplinary nature of
the group helped bridge the gap between theorists and practitioners,
allowing not only for the transformation of theory into practice, but equally
important, the transformation of practice knowledge into theory. The
Romanian research team, in particular, hoped not only to apply new crisis
management research methods and insights gained during the project in
future crises in Romania, but also to exchange experiences and strengthen
contacts with corresponding crisis management institutions abroad, to
enhance crisis management practices in Romania to the level of most
developed EU and NATO countries, to create a more unified crisis
management methodology for research on future crisis cases, and to
develop new proposals and suggestions for national practices in the field of
crisis management. 
Thereafter, the Romanian CRISMART team, represented by the Conflict
Prevention and Early Warning Center, took as an objective to multiply the
knowledge and the methodology by training and using it in the relation with
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the countries situated in its East – the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine,
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Taking profit of the old and well
established think tank trilateral group, the Conflict Prevention and Early
Warning Center proposed this project financed by the Black Sea Trust of the
German Marshall Found as a step towards understanding the perception of
the decision makers in the region on crisis, the way they react, in order to
improve the trilateral relations and to show to the practitioners of one’s
country which are the reactions of the others at their gestures and decisions.
Method3
The basis for the comparative analytical approach applied in this volume, is
presented in Stern et al. (2002) and Stern and Sundelius (February 2002).
This method entails: 
a) Detailed reconstruction of the crisis events using available government
documents and reports, mass media sources (broadcast and print),
previous scholarly treatments and interviews with involved decision-
makers, stakeholders, and citizens. 
b) Dissection of the case into a series of crucial occasions for decision – a
series of pressing, “what do we do now?” problems that arise during the
period of the crisis, challenging the coping capacity of decision-makers.
The selection criteria for identifying decision occasions include: 
• The problems/dilemmas which most preoccupied decision-makers 
• Issues which were not emphasized by the crisis actors but which in
retrospect had the potential to change the course of crisis
development, or affect the management of the crisis 
• Problems that were recognized by decision-makers but coped with as
“routine decisions”—problems that escalated at a later stage of the
crisis, causing unforeseen problems 
• Episodes of particular pedagogical value – those that point to “best”
or “worst” practices that are of interest beyond the particular case in
question 
3 This section borrows from Stern and Hansén (2000: 8-9).
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c) Thematic analyses of phenomena pertinent to crisis management (see
the following sections on analytical themes and propositions) 
d) Comparing and contrasting findings with other cases documented in the
CM Europe case bank and the international literature. 
The trilateral cases will be compared with each other in order to explore the
national crisis management style of each country. In addition, the trilateral
findings will be juxtaposed, at the end of the work, that should include
several crisis, with findings from other countries participating in the CM
Europe research program. This is done in order to better illustrate the
particular crisis management predicaments faced by transitional states (and
new democracies) in Europe (Stern et al., 2002). With its greater focus on
processes and less on structures, the CM Europe series adds to the rich
literature available on transitional states (e.g. Miller, White and Heywood,
1998; Lawson, 1993; Elster, 1993; Pridham and Vanhanen, 1994). However,
these volumes complement the conventional literature with examples taken
from real life and extraordinary situations—when the structures are put to
the test and societal hardship is a given. 
A caveat of methodological character concerning the case studies in this
volume should be brought up in this context. As described above, the
approach provides the instruments to dissect a course of events in a very
detailed way, unveiling processes on the institutional as well as individual
levels. Although the politics of those countries are rapidly moving towards
democratic consolidation and transparency, political life in the Republic of
Moldova and Ukraine is still largely closed to the public and our researchers
could not always pry open the ‘black box’ of decision making. That’s why
the approach in Ukraine and Republic of Moldova are based on a limited
number of interviews and much of the empirical material was derived from
media sources and official documentation. Nevertheless, these in-depth case
studies of crisis management experiences in this particular case will
contribute to research on developing experience based capacity building
within the field. 
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CM Europe Analytical Themes4
The authors in this volume explore a number of set themes in relation to
their empirical findings. The analytical themes serve as tools for the CM
Europe analysts in their analysis of crisis management experiences and only
a few of them will typically be applied to an individual case study. These
themes have also been explored in previous CM Europe volumes focusing
on national crisis management in the countries of Sweden (Sundelius, Stern
and Bynander, 1997), Estonia (Stern and Nohrstedt, 2001), Latvia (Stern
and Hansén, 2000), Russia (Porfiriev and Svedin, 2002), Poland (Bynander
et. al. forthcoming), Slovenia (Brändström and Malesic, 2004), Bulgaria
(Engelbrekt and Förberg, 2005), Lithuania (Buus et. al. 2005) and Iceland
(Bernharðsdóttir and Svedin, 2004), and also in the EU (Larsson, Olsson
and Ramberg, 2005). These themes are as follows: 
• Crisis preparedness, prevention, and mitigation 
• Leadership 
• Decision units 
• Problem perception and framing 
• Value conflict 
• Politico-bureaucratic cooperation and conflict 
• Crisis communication and credibility 
• Transnationalization and internationalization 
• Temporal effects and crisis management 
• Learning 
Crisis preparedness, prevention and mitigation: This theme focuses on
the extent to which crisis managers and their organizations are prepared to
respond to extraordinary events. Have they experienced serious crises
before? Have they cultivated an “it could happen here” attitude and
prepared themselves psychologically for the rigorous demands involved in
managing crises? Are there efficient and legitimate structures and plans in
place for crisis management and are these easily adapted to a variety of 
4 This section borrows from ‘CM Baltic/Europe Analytical Themes’ in Stern and Hansén
(2000:9-13) and “Crisis Management Europe: An Integrated Regional Research and
Training Program” by Stern and Sundelius (February 2002). This set of themes was first
introduced in Sundelius, Stern and Bynander (1997). 
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situations? Are decision-makers able to identify potential threats and act
quickly to prevent these threats from escalating? Are there windows of
opportunity available in the crisis management structures and organizations
studied that allow actors to limit the damage or contain the situation at
lower levels?5
Leadership: This theme focuses on the leadership styles displayed by key
actors during the given crisis situation. Leadership may be operative, in the
sense of taking charge of crisis management activities and coordination. It
may also be symbolic, in the sense of declaring and showing that the
leading figures are participating in the crisis effort and empathizing with the
victims of a crisis or those still at risk. Leadership may be concrete and
personal or more abstract and distant. In deliberations, leaders may be
hierarchical or collegial. Leadership should be seen as relational; as
inextricably linked to those who are being “lead” and influenced by factors
such as power, affect, culture, organizational structure, access to expertise,
and context. Finally, leaders vary in their propensity to become involved in
the details and the operative process, or to delegate and decentralize when it
comes to critical decisions (see, for example, Bass, 1998; Gardner, 1995;
Hermann and Hagen, 1998). 
Decision units: This theme focuses on the question of how and where
decisions are made in the complex institutional systems typically engaged
in managing a national crisis. For example, crucial decisions may be made
by a variety of decision-making groups ranging from a single individual to
small groups to entire organizational networks. Decision-units can be
located in different political/administrative and public/private systems and
play different roles within those systems. Such units may be strategic or
operative in nature and may be located at local, regional, national, or supra-
national (e.g. EU or UN) levels. Decision units may also vary during a
given crisis in terms of composition, mode of operation, and where they are
placed, and it is not uncommon to see a certain shift of authority upwards
(so called up-scaling) or downwards (down-scaling) in the escalation 
5 On crisis prevention and mitigation, see e.g. Ender and Kim (1988), Waugh (1988) and
Lund (1996). For more skeptical examinations of the potential for risk elimination and
accident prevention, see Wildavsky (1988) and Perrow (1999). 
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process (see Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, 1963; Hermann, Hermann, and
Hagen, 1987; Rosenthal, ‘t Hart, and Kouzmin, 1991; Stern, 1999). Finally,
what are the criteria for determining which individuals or organizations will
be included in (or excluded from) the decisional ‘loop’ and the decision
unit? 
Problem perception and framing: This theme focuses on the subjective
and socially constructed aspects of crisis management. All actors engaged
in managing a crisis will act upon a perceived picture of events, one that
might not necessarily be understood and interpreted the same way by all
parties involved (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, 1963; Sylvan and Voss, 1998;
Stern, 1999). While problem framing often takes place at a sub-conscious
level (at least with “naive” decision makers), defining the problem entails
the exertion of enormous influence on choices. In the act of identifying and
framing a problem, many possible alternative interpretations and prospects
of action are discarded, and the way forward is narrowed. Framing is
influenced both by political considerations and cognitive processes, such as
analogical (historical) and metaphorical reasoning, as well as social
structures such as culture, information flows, and the organizational context
(Vertzberger, 1990; Larson, 1985; Khong, 1992). There are important
questions to ask when it comes to why actors frame problems in a certain
way at critical junctures in a crisis. 
Value conflict: This theme focuses on potential tension and conflict among
different values at stake in a crisis situation. An integral part of problem
framing is identifying which values are perceived to be at stake in a given
situation. Identifying these values is often a demanding analytical task, and
it can be difficult for decision-makers to see the range of values involved in
a complex issue if they do not engage in rigorous critical analysis (see e.g.
Steinbruner, 1974:16-17; Keeney, 1992). Crises, by definition, present a
serious challenge to fundamental values, including the preservation of
human life, national sovereignty/autonomy, economic well-being,
democracy, rule of law, and so forth. More parochial values, such as the
personal and political future of individuals and careers, also influence the
decision making process. Good crisis performance makes careers; poor
performance can “break” them. Due to the stress of balancing values that
are sometimes in competition with each other, decision-makers often face
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painful dilemmas and tragic choices (Janis and Mann, 1977). Decision-
makers may choose to ignore value conflicts or to accept them, which tends
to generate unbalanced policy-making. They may choose to procrastinate
and hope for better times, or they may seek to resolve the conflict and find a
solution that protects those values at stake.6 These dynamics influence the
decision-making process and eventually the crisis process itself. How do
different crisis actors cope with the very real and tangible dilemmas that
occur when value conflicts emerge in a crisis situation? 
Political and bureaucratic cooperation and conflict: This theme focuses
on the issue of patterns of convergence and divergence as well as
parochialism and solidarity among actors and stakeholders during a crisis.
There are a number of well-document dynamics that tend to create and exert
pressures towards cooperation and solidarity in a crisis (e.g. the “rally
around the flag” effect, leader attentiveness, and “groupthink”).7 However,
there are also a number of countervailing tendencies. Crises are often
perceived as threatening situations that sometimes lead actors to engage in
defensive and antagonizing behaviors. Following failures or setbacks, for
example, actors often engage in “blame games” to decide who is to be held
accountable for a particular problem. A crisis presents not only problems
but also opportunities, and actors are often likely to end up competing with
one another for credit for one or more particular outcomes. Moreover,
situation and contextual factors are often influenced by personal
relationships and by the strength of national cultural norms opposing
opportunism in critical situations (see Rosenthal, ‘t Hart, and Kouzmin,
1991; Stern and Verbeek, 1998; Alllison and Zelikow, 1999). 
Crisis communication and credibility: This theme focuses on the
relationship between crisis managers, the media, and elite/mass publics (see
e.g. Edelman, 1988; Nohrstedt and Tassew, 1993; Nordlund, 1994; Pearce,
1995; Regester and Larkin, 1998; Boin et. al., 2005). In democratic polities,
maintaining credibility and legitimacy with the media and the public is an
essential task of successful governance in crisis and more normal situations
alike. Crisis managers enter crises with varying degrees of credibility and 
6 On value conflicts, see George (1980) and Farnham (1998: 26-39).
7 See, for example, Rosati (1981) and Janis (1982).
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may gain or lose over the course of the crisis. Actors vary considerably in
their approach to crisis communication. Some take a defensive/closed
stance, which can easily antagonize the media and cost credibility. Others
take a more proactive/open stance and seek to maintain the initiative in
providing information and establishing friendly relations with the mass
media. Actors also vary considerably in ways in the degree to which they
coordinate crisis communication and in the information strategy and tactics
developed. Similarly, some actors closely monitor how their messages are
being received and act to correct problems, while others – focusing on other
aspects of crisis management and distracted by stress – are oblivious to
growing credibility problems. There are a number of recurring credibility
“traps” – the creation of a perceived gap between words and deeds,
expectations and performance – that can cost crisis management dearly, as
can neglecting the symbolic aspects of crisis management (Boin et. al.,
2005; Hansén and Stern, 2001; Stern 1999; 201-202). 
Transnationalization and internationalization: This theme focuses on the
tendency of crises to spill over national boundaries in a world that is
increasingly interdependent—politically, economically, socially and
ecologically. While some crises may arise within a single country, many
actual and potential threats do not respect national borders. Infectious
diseases, natural disasters, financial disturbances, and terrorism are just a
few examples of such “borderless” threats. For this reason, coping with
contemporary crises often requires transnational collaboration – ad hoc or
institutionalized, bilateral or multilateral – in order to deal with these cross-
border threats (‘t Hart, Stern and Sundelius, 1998; Buzan, Weaver, and De
Wilde, 1998; Steinbruner, 2000; Buzan, 1991). Since crises often have
international repercussions, actors participating in international 
affairs during times of crises may also attempt to exert influence upon the
decision-making processes of countries which are not their own (Cf.
Zielonka and Pravda, 2001; Keohane and Milner, 1996). In turn, the
international sphere may become an arena for rallying support of certain
new policies and regulatory tools (Haggard, Levy, Moravcsik, and
Nicolaidis, 1993). 
Temporal effects: This theme focuses upon sequencing and synchronicity –
temporal effects that may have a profound effect on how a crisis is
managed. Sequencing refers to the path-dependent nature of crisis decision-
making. Choices made early in crises tend to constrain the possibilities for
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later action and steer crisis management along a particular trajectory that
may be difficult to change later (e.g. see Levy, 1991; Sundelius Stern, and
Bynander, 1997; Billings and Hermann, 1998). Often feedback – especially
negative feedback – from earlier decisions will necessitate additional
decisions, which, together, form a sequence. Synchronicity, in turn, refers to
the tendency of simultaneous events to influence each other via
psychological and organizational mechanisms such as “availability”,
opportunity cost, cumulative stress, and distraction (Snyder, Bruck and
Sapin, 1963; Haney, 1997; Stern 1999). Synchronicity may appear within a
single crisis (when multiple problems must be solved at the same time),
between two simultaneous crises (as in the case of Hungary/Suez in 1956
and Watergate/War in the Middle East in 1973), or between a crisis and
other highly prioritized coincident activities such as elections, state visits,
crucial legislative negotiations, etc. 
Learning: This theme focuses upon the extent to which actors are capable
of analyzing their experiences and using the conclusions drawn as a basis
for change. As noted above in the section on problem framing, actors may
attempt to use “lessons” from past experiences (encoded as historical
analogies or as experientially-based “rules of the thumb”) as a guide for
current action. Similarly, actors may respond to positive or negative
feedback regarding performance during a crisis, by drawing lessons and
modifying beliefs and practices. Actors commonly attempt to reflect upon
crisis experiences after the fact, draw lessons for the future, and formulate
reform projects on the basis of interpretations of crisis experiences. Crises
present considerable opportunities for learning, but post-crisis learning
attempts are often undermined or even derailed by a variety of typical social
and psychological dynamics that may result in distorted collective
memories of the crisis in question (Porfiriev and Svedin, 2002; Lagadec,
1997; Stern, 1997b; Levy, 1994; Breslauer and Tetlock, 1991; Lebow,
1981). 
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Rising high unrealistic expectations 
and cutting the bridges back 
Iulian Chifu
1. Early warning signs
On the 8th of August 2006, in a bilateral meeting, President Vladimir
Voronin proposed to his counterpart, President Vladimir Putin, to address
the problem of finding a solution for the Transnistrian issue on a
bilateral bases, with negotiations between the two parts, in a so-called
“package” that would solve, at the same time, all the issues related to the
frozen conflict. The idea was that Russia could obtain more in bilateral
negotiations than by supporting the separatist regime in the Eastern districts
of the Republic of Moldova. 
This move made a huge change in the situation by putting aside the 5+2
official format of negotiations, but, at the same time, excluding the
separatist non-recognized authorities from the discussions. The side effect
was that the balanced format away, Russian Federation used its high
strategic weight and its capabilities in applying a solution through which the
Republic of Moldova’s interests were not defended and attracted Chiºinãu
away from the support of its partners and mediators – EU, US and Ukraine
– those who could make a balanced result. Moreover, Vladimir Voronin
found himself in a position of a new format, so called 2+1, where the initial
advantage of not having Igor Smirnov and the unrecognized separatist
authorities as partners were annuled , with the costs of a huge reservation
from the other members of the official format, including both of its
neighbors, Romania and Ukraine.
On the 22nd of June 2007, at the official visit of President Voronin to
Moscow, the entire world gets knowledge of the existence of bilateral
negotiations between Russia and the Republic of Moldova outside the
5+2 format based on a “package deal” proposed by Chiºinãu. The activity
of the two countries and the very often visits proved to be more than
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“consultations”, “exchange of views”, they were in fact real negotiations
outside the official format.
On the 19th of December 2007, President Vladimir Voronin stated that “the
Transnistrian issue is solved economically and practically, in the minds
of the principal participants in the process, and that in the next short
period the problem will be officially closed”. This statement created a
huge feeling of insecurity and uncertainty in Romania, in Ukraine and in the
society of the Republic of Moldova since Chiºinãu never presented the form
of the “package deal” and was far from having a sum of understandings in
the 5+2 format. 
Moreover, such a clear and strong statement was rising the level of
expectation of the public very much and deprived Chiºinãu from a way out,
burning the way back, creating an excess of vulnerability for the authorities
of the Republic of Moldova in front of the Russian counterparts, even more
important than the ones already assumed by the consistent symbolic signals
offered before, by tensioning the relations with Romania, basically breaking
the relation with NATO, creating ambiguity in the relations with the EU and
GUAM partners.
2. The “breakthrough crisis”
The crisis was there, unavoidable, officially confirmed in terms of a
solution without any transparency and official knowledge of the steps
forward known by the EU, US, Romania and Ukraine and without
involving all those parts in the process.
The end of the crisis was on the 6th of June 2008 when the meeting
between Voronin and Medvedev at the CIS summit was not a trilateral one
and no document was signed. The diplomatic world acknowledged that
there was no time for a solution until the elections in March 2009 and that
the window of opportunity for a “quick solution” in the Transnistrian
issue was out of the question. The project was still on the table, but the
favorable moment was lost and, due to the begin of the electoral period, it
proved to be impossible to achieve. 
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The secondary crisis born now was how to get out of the high expectation
period without provoking excessive loss of support for the existing
officials from Chiºinãu, since the elections were too far away for
maintaining the idea of a possible, imminent solution in Transnistria. The
secondary crisis was accentuated by both the unilateral declaration of
independence of Kosovo and its recognition by some of the Western states,
as well as by the use of “this precedent” by the Russian State Duma in
relation with the breakaway regions from Georgia, as well as by the
counter-posing of the situations in Georgia and Republic of Moldova (with
a possible “betrayal feeling” and unspoken accusations from Georgia,
Azerbaijan and the West).
The moment when everybody knew that the crisis had stopped was
when Georgia was attacked, on the 8th of August 2008, consecrated on
the 12th of August by the official declaration of Tiraspol in this respect.
Only in the most optimistic dreams the reintegration possibility was still on
the table, as long as the conflictual situation was there. Moreover, the use of
Transnistrian separatist territory and the troops located there moved over
night from a the stage of a figure existing on the chessboard to a zone with
a real strategic and geopolitical value for Moscow.
The crisis was to be managed in Romania by the President and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs – as Executive branches responsible with the
foreign affairs and security matters - as well as by the Supreme Council of
Defense of the Country, the institution responsible for the decision-making
during crisis, in security and strategic issues.
For the Romanian decision makers this was a crisis because it filled up all
the conditions for a crisis:
1. It was a sudden change of the existing situation.
2. It represented a threat to the basic values: in the vicinity, a solution to
the Transnistrian issue, to this frozen conflict, without a clear
transparent knowledge of the situation, could represent a threat to the
security of Romania – if the solution would be obtained with the
sacrifice of the sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova, with the
control of the foreign policy, security options or defense solutions by
a foreign state - Russia - or by a third actor - the separatist regime
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from Tiraspol with a veto right –, a threat to the viability of the
neighbor state, to the stability of the region and to the control of the
trans-border trafficking.
3. It introduces a sense of emergency – the very quick resolution of the
issue in a period in which the 5+2 format was practically blocked made
the sense of an emergency in terms of knowing what the proposed
solution was, a solution that could be achieved and signed, and what
costs would there be for Chiºinãu in the case of such a solution.
4. The institutions asked to solve the problem were in an acute situation of
uncertainty due to the absence of the transparent discussions on the
future solution, the negotiations taken outside the 5+2 format, the
absence of the instruments for the official authorities of the Republic of
Moldova on the ground for a reintegration, as well as a dead-end
position for the authorities from Chiºinãu at the dawn of the general
elections.
3. The context of the crisis
Transnistrian issue
The Transnistrian conflict is one of the frozen conflicts from the fall of the
Soviet Union period that took place in the Eastern districts of the Republic
of Moldova. The difference there was that the conflict had no ethnic bases,
but the format of negotiations – lease in 1994 to Russia, as responsible in
the post soviet space – was similar: the “two parts”, including the separatist
one, Russia as guarantor and a mechanism for negotiation under an
organisation where Moscow had veto power – in this case, OSCE. The
other characteristic was the presence of Russian troops on the separatist side
and, in this particular case, a huge storage of ammunitions and weapons
secured by another component of the Russian army. The separatist got
Russian passports and their leaders were already Russian citizens,
representatives of the Russian special services. This 2+2 format replaced
the previous original 4 side format containing Romania, Ukraine, Russia
and the Republic of Moldova, established after the short war.
On the 8th of May 1997, the Memorandum “On the basis for the
Normalisation of Relations between the Republic of Moldova and
Transnistria (TMR)” was signed in Moscow. The concept of a “common
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state” was then introduced for the first time by the Russian Foreign Minister
Yevgeny Primakov. Because of a rather dubious meaning of this very term,
further negotiations were blocked by attempts of interpreting and defining
the legal sense of it, and therefore, they have never even reached the point
of discussing a division of competences between Moldova and the
“Transnistrian Moldavian Republic”. This step brought back Ukraine,
excluded from the original format, as “guarantor” of the negotiation
process, together with Russia.
In June 2002, a new approach to conflict settlement was articulated in the
so-called “Kyiv Document”, and under the pressure exercised by the three
mediators, Moldova rejoined the negotiations. This document proposed a
federal structure as the main basis for Chiºinãu – Tiraspol relations; it
outlined divided and shared competences, new federal institutions, and a
system of international guarantees. However, the incompatible positions of
the “two parties” made any serious progress impossible (over six months,
only four of forty-two articles were discussed).
In 2003, some new factors at the international, European and regional level
gave hopes for a substantial advance in the resolution of the Transnistrian
problem. They included: more international attention to this conflict; the
involvement of the EU (related, perhaps, to the appearance of its Security
Strategy and the first three EU civil/military missions deployed in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Macedonia and Congo). Taken together, these developments
have also had a stimulating effect on the discussions between Chiºinãu and
Tiraspol. 
On the 16th of November 2003, the positive trends mentioned above were
reversed by the unilateral Moscow initiative known as the “Kozak
Memorandum” (the full name of the document is “Memo on the Basic
Principles of the State Structures of the Unified State”). The international
community, including the OSCE and the CoE, expressed strong disapproval
towards the document and the very initiative, which hadn’t been
coordinated or discussed with any other party (except the RM). Acute
protests made by Moldova’s political opposition and civil society, together
with an overtly negative reaction by the powerful international organisms,
forced President Voronin to withdraw his support for this project, and
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eventuated in a previously unbelievable consolidation of Chiºinãu’s central
authorities and society, united for the first time in ten years by their
resistance to the Russian proposal. 
Stormy events of late 2004 – early 2005, related mainly to presidential and
parliamentary elections in Ukraine, Romania and the Republic of Moldova,
have changed the regional context of the Transnistrian conflict and created a
new window of opportunities for its eventual resolution. Ukrainian
proposals, first presented schematically at the GUAM Summit in Chiºinãu
on 22 April, and then developed into the so-called “Yushchenko Plan” on
May 2005, although criticised for obvious flaws and dubious points, they
have been accepted as a framework for developing a new approach to
conflict settlement, based on the idea of democratisation of the
Transnistrian region as a cornerstone of its further reintegration into the
Republic of Moldova. 
Over June – July 2005, Ukrainian proposals have been further developed
and supplemented by a number of important legal acts and documents
adopted by Moldova’s Parliament and Government. Focusing on the
processes of democratisation and demilitarisation, these documents
provided convincing arguments for well advanced democratisation to
precede the first local elections, which had to be prepared and carried out
under the international (OSCE) aegis. Only in this case did the elections
have a clear prospect of being internationally recognised and for the first
time, bringing to power legitimate local authorities to represent the
Transnistrian region in further negotiations concerning status problems,
division of competences, etc. At this point, the format of negotiations won
two new members, as “observers”, the EU and the US.
Russian troops
At present military forces on the territory of Eastern districts of the
Republic of Moldova include troops that are subordinated either to the
regime of the “Transnistrian Moldavian Republic” – like the Transnistrian
army, Transnistrian ministry of internal affairs, Transnistrian ministry of
state security - , or represent Russia – the Operational Group of Russian
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Forces (OGRF), also the units of guardians of ammunition stocks and 
other units.
The Operational Group of Russian Forces, as well as the 14th Army
heavy equipment in Transnistria, are subject to limitations set by the
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE). The process was
initiated first in 1990 and then in 1992 at the CSCE Ministerial in
Stockholm, where Russia committed itself to withdraw from the Republic
of Moldova. In 1994, after 9 rounds of negotiations – process begun in
1992, after the Snegur-Eltsine agreement that replace the 4 sides format of
negotiations with a bilateral one -, Moscow and Chiºinãu signed an
agreement for the retreat of troops and equipment in a period of 3 years. In
1997 the troops were still there. 
At the OSCE Istanbul Summit in December 1999, Russia accepted
deadlines for the withdrawal or destruction of all CFE-related equipment by
2001, and the withdrawal of troops by the end of 2002. The OSCE Porto
Ministerial (2002) extended the deadline for the withdrawal of the
remaining troops and the remaining equipment to the end of 2003.
Regrettably, the commitments mentioned above have not been fulfilled as
well. Moreover, according to Ambassador’s Hill report to the OSCE
Permanent Council, on the 5-th of February 2004, Transnistrian authorities
had, in several instances, failed to honour a signed agreement on the
destruction of ammunitions on site. 
Approximately 1,400 members of the Russian military are still present on
this territory. Thus a major question of the official status of the Russian
military based on this territory, in particular in regard to international
law, as well as the question of perspectives of the CFE Treaty in the region,
remains open. 
Another military force on the territory of Eastern districts of the RM is a
peacekeeping structure established by the ceasefire agreement of July
1992. The peacekeeping force is under the supervision of the „Joint Control
Commission“ which also oversees key security and administrative
operations in the Security Zone. There are strong doubts that a
peacekeeping force composed of representatives of the „conflicting parties“
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complies with the idea of „traditional peacekeeping“, which makes the issue
even more complicated. In addition, Russia has staffed its peacekeeping
forces with troops from the OGRF, establishing in such a way the
inappropriate link between the Russian military and the peacekeeping
forces.
The situation was getting even more complicated because of other
paramilitary structures, either functioning under the umbrella of the
regime of the “Transnistrian Moldovan Republic” or formed by some
officers and military personnel formerly attached to the 14th Army, who
remained in Transnistria after demobilisation and established their „own
private armed militias“, possibly interacting with the Transnistrian troops
from the local ministry of internal affairs. Such militias, according to the
NATO Parliamentary Assembly Sub-Committee on Democratic Governance
1-4 March 2004 Mission Report, could be responsible for the trafficking
of small arms and other weapons. 
International context
Some international changes occur that rose the concerns that the crisis could
develop in a secondary crisis with huge implications for the security and
stability of the region, with direct impact upon Romania. First, Russia had
signaled for some 4 years that she was back. The leadership of President
Putin made the economy boom, based on the rise of the international oil
price. EU proved to have entered for good in a fatigue crisis, both for the
enlargement and for the integration process of the member countries – the
rejection of the Constitutional Treaty and the rejection of Lisbon Treaty
after that. 
The NATO summit planed to take place in Bucharest was prepared to
realize the global role assumed by the Alliance, but also to solve the lack of
capabilities and means of the Alliance in Afghanistan because of the low
budget of the Army in the European countries. Last but not least, the system
of security in Europe was at steak since the ABM Treaty was suspended by
the US, before launching the Missle Defense, the CFE Treaty was not
observed and was put under question by Moscow who wanted a new deal, a
new European conference on security that would grant her a special status.
28 Iulian CHIFU, Oazu NANTOI, Oleksandr SUSKHO
The ups and downs of the bilateral Chiºinãu-Bucharest
relations
The issues of the bilateral relations
Romania is concerned with one issue related to the perception of the
societal security in the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine and the
programmes of enforcing and increasing societal security in its neighbour
countries. This is linked to ethnical Moldovenism1.
The normative and administrative-institutional stipulations in order to
introduce and support a state-building image, built on ethnical
Moldovenism, by imposing this identity belonging to the Soviet heritage
and attempting to separate the majority of inhabitants of the Republic of
Moldova from their natural identity, the Romanian language and critical
historical vision of the past, is considered to be a security threat to the
Romanian society. The reasons are as follow:
– The succession to the principality of Moldova claimed by the Republic of
Moldova is raising problems because a regional identity of Romania,
that of Moldovans, is raised at the level of a national identity in the
Republic of Moldova and even at the level of an ethnical identity,
different from the Romanian one. This means that there are claims related
to the territory and people leaving in the province Moldova of Romania
(already expressed in 1994, at the Congress “Casa Noastra Republica
Moldova”, and reiterated in 2001, during the elections, by the Communist
Party). 
1 “Moldovenism” is the theory of the existence of a Moldovan ethnicity and Moldovan
language that is different from Romanian ethnicity and language. It was used by the
Russian Empire and USSR to justify the annexation of territories that were part of feudal
Moldova and Romania. In the view of the promoters of this idea, “Moldovans,” in
comparison with “Romanians,” were formed under a strong Slavic cultural influence. 
In the former SSRM this policy was applied using all the instruments of the soviet political
regime, such as maximum possible isolation from the neighboring Romania, physical
extermination of some social segments, forced Russification, premeditated change of the
ethnic structure and implementation of Romania-phobia, including by using the education
system. This instrument is highly exploited in political confrontations in the Republic of
Moldova; despite the deficiencies of the democratization process, “Moldovenism” in its
Stalinist version is slowly eroding.
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This revisionism is creating problems with both of the Republic of
Moldova’s neighbours, Romania and Ukraine, each of which
incorporated parts – larger than the one included currently into the
Republic of Moldova – of the former principality of Moldova. Moreover,
the original “game” has been accentuated by recognizing a “Romanian
minority” in the Republic of Moldova and by pronouncing claims of
discrimination of a “Moldavian minority”, not recognized and not
represented in Romania.
– Applying Soviet means in a country that was supposed to join the EU,
falsifying the census by imposing the “Moldavian identity” and the
name of the language, “Moldavian”. The “Moldovan” was never
considered by non-Soviet experts an ethnical identity, different from the
Romanian one, but at most a regional identity. Also, the language is the
same, displaying less differences (mainly confined to the pronunciation
and to regionalisms used in the whole region of Moldova, including the
one in Romania, clarified as regionalisms since hundreds of years in the
dictionaries of Romanian) than those existing between dialects of the
same language, yet alone between different languages.
– Actions incompatible with EU values, provisions that contradict the
human rights, sanctioned in particular by the CoE, the EU and the Venice
Commission, by imposing an “official identity” through
administrative means and sanctioning the alternative self-identification
“Romanian” as criminal offences, by the means of the law on the
“Concept of national policy”. The provisions were never applied, but the
law was not withdrawn.
– blocking the electoral rights, part of the fundamental political rights,
lately with the law on election that prevents citizens with double
citizenship – legal in the Republic of Moldova – to have access to public
positions, at the national and local level, and to be elected. Other sectorial
laws are preventing double citizenship owners to occupy public servant
positions, juridical and administrative positions in the state. This refers
specifically to the Romanian second citizenship, as shown by the
debates in the commissions of the Parliament, and could be applied only
to this second citizenship, since the phases of regaining the Romanian
citizenship are published in the Romanian Official Monitor. The
parliamentary debates showed that it is not the case of the Russian,
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Ukrainian, Bulgarian, Israeli, German, American and other citizenships
owned by the citizens of the Republic of Moldova.
– creation of a wave of pressures for illegal migration on the basis of
political discrimination: even if Romania was the subject of repeated
false claims of having granted citizenship status to numerous inhabitants
of the Republic of Moldova, the total number of new citizens coming
from the Republic of Moldova is slightly more than 100.000, in the last
17 years, far less than new citizens in Spain, Italy or even Bulgaria. The
policy of the Romanian state is not to depopulate the Republic of
Moldova from its Romanian majority, but on the contrary, to stabilize
them on the left bank of the Prut river, by offering them a personal
guarantee for their future and for the free move in the EU, through
Romanian citizenship, a guarantee that they request. Since there are more
than 700.000 persons to request Romanian citizenship and more than
500.000 files already registered by the Romanian authorities, in spite of
the low level of admission of those requests (a bit more than 100 the last
years), applying the law and blocking political access to elected positions
by the owners of double citizenship is a discrimination that is considered
one of those for granting the political asylum. 
Since any person that has requested the Romanian citizenship can obtain the
asylum and the citizenship very quickly just by arriving in Romania and
filing for political asylum, claiming the discrimination in the Republic of
Moldova, this could announce a huge number of immigrants. Moreover, if
the politics of forced identification as “Moldavian”, speaking “Moldavian
language”, with a “Moldavian history” continues, this will further entice the
Romanian majority to flee the Republic of Moldova and to file for political
asylum and Romanian citizenship, this time directly in Romania.
This is not even on the best interest of the authorities of the Republic of
Moldova that will remain depopulated by the highly educated, younger and
active part of its majority population. The same trend could come from the
maintenance of the rules of teaching the minorities in Russian, and not in
their native language and culture, or by introducing Russian as a second
official language, in an environment where the natural circulation of this
language is creating troubles in the consolidation of the identity of the
Republic of Moldova as a state.
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On the contrary, an open Declaration of conciliation that will support the
fact that both of the identifications as “Moldova citizens” - inhabitants of
the Republic of Moldova - and Romanian ethnic for the majority is
acceptable and everybody could identify oneself as she/he wants, according
to European rules, this would enable the population of the Republic of
Moldova to give up their quest for Romanian citizenship (because they
can be openly Romanian in their own country), would ease the tensions
between self-identified Romanians and Moldovans, and would consolidate
the identity of the majority and the relations with Romania, but also
with Ukraine, the other big neighbour. The conclusion of a need for a
Declaration of conciliation is embraced also by the Republic of Moldova’s
counterparts.
Out of respect for Ukraine, Romania thinks that the separation between the
minority declared Romanian and the one declared Moldavian should be
erased, since the difference is not an ethnical or national one, but a
difference between a national and a regional self-identification, or one
between an ethnic identity and a civic one (because of the residence in the
same country). Since Ukraine wants to join the EU and NATO and since it
is one of the countries that suffered from Soviet policies of divisions,
Romanian authorities think that, in principle, it should act this way. 
Another issue concerns the Bessarabian Church, the Orthodox Church in
line with the Romanian Orthodox Church, established in parallel with the
existing soviet period, Russian Church. The officials from the Republic of
Moldova rejected the formal recognition of the Bessarabian Church but
were forced to reconsider after several trials at the European Court of
Human Rights. The official authorities of the Republic of Moldova still act
as if the Russian Church would be the official one.
The bilateral treaty between Romania and the Republic of Moldova
represents another issue. The document evolved in several forms
reprezenting the evolution of the bilateral relations, beginning with a
“brotherhood and reintegration agreement draft” and ending with a
“bilateral friendship document”. Since the document was used in order to
obtain some kind of recognition for the Moldovenism theory, Romania
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dropped out the document as being unnecessary in today’s relations.
Chiºinãu insisted in having a formal bilateral basic Treaty and an explicit
border Treaty, blocking even the signature of the small traffic Treaty that
would enable the persons residing near the border region to freely cross the
Romanian/EU border.
Ups and downs
The ups and downs of the bilateral relations in time were connected to two
types of behaviors: the strategic choice and need of assistance from the
West or the East (linked to political leadership or to the international
context) and the need for a negotiation with Russia – the authorities of the
Republic of Moldova believed that for preparing a good negotiation with
Moscow, they need to prove their new orientation by quarrelling with
Romania and by frozen bilateral relations.
In 1989-1993, with a pro-Romanian leadership and the emotion of the
liberation from the Soviet Empire, the relations were as close as possible,
preparing the “reintegration”/unification of Romania until 1991, then the
“friendship and reintegration Treaty” was prepared with the relations
quantified as two independent states. On the 6-th of March 1994, after the
elections that brought to power the Agrarian Party, the theory of
Moldovenism came in the forefront with a new Constitution and one year of
frozen bilateral relations. The change in the position of President Snegur in
1995, with the proposal for the revision of the Constitution didn’t help
changing the trend until the end of the mandate.
Between 1997-2001 the relations were mostly pragmatic and friendly, with
the new Alliance for Democracy and Reforms. But from 2001, the
Communist party came in power with the program of joining the Russia-
Belarus Union, introducing the Russian language as an official language
and the return to centralized economy and nationalization of the companies
privatised by Western investors. This behavior lasted until November 2003,
when the last minute changes in the agreement for solving the Transnistrian
issue, the so-called Kozak Memorandum, was dropped by president Voronin
basically after President Putin enter his airplane to came to Chiºinãu.
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The change of the trend was also supported by the so-called “orange
revolutions” held in Georgia, Ukraine and the change of leadership in
Romania. This made president Voronin and the Communist party revise all
his policy and return to the European integration process as a target, to the
democratization and reforms for the electoral campaign 2005, where he was
supported in his change of orientation towards the West based on the
support of all “orange leaders”, including the Presidents of Romania and
Ukraine, both his neighbors, Traian Bãsescu and Viktor Yushcenko. The
same trend and process enabled him to get a second mandate as President of
the Republic of Moldova.
But even this trend changed beginning with 2006 and old attacks to its
Romanian neighbors began at the same time with the new launch of the
negotiations for Transnistrian settlement in a bilateral direct process with
the Russian Federation. A new wave of bilateral attacks started but, this
time, Romania was already member of NATO and the EU and had also
learnt its lessons from the previous big bilateral crisis from 2001-2002
which enabled it to avoid any public and press exchange of words that
could harm the bilateral relations and the faith of the Romanian/Moldavian
majority in the Republic of Moldova.
Romanian decision making system in Foreign Relations and
Security matters
The constitutional and legal stipulations acting at the time of the crisis
clearly present Romania’s position towards Romanian minorities outside its
borders, in particular towards the Romanian majority within RM’s
population. The latter is actually considered a second Romanian country in
the Council of Europe and therefore, relations between the two states are
special, with respect to this historical basis. Even Romania’s national
security strategy, the country’s most important document approved in
Bucharest for drawing security priorities, has the same opinion and
demands special considerations for Romanians outside its borders
(Romanian Parliament, 2000). 
The essential matter was and is an overlap of competencies and the large
number of institutions involved in foreign policy and relations with RM. In
this regard, Romania has a President with foreign policy attributes (who
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draws the general framework for the country’s foreign policy), the
Parliament (with its foreign policy commissions and ability to ratify all
international treaties and agreements) and the Government led by the Prime
Minster (including the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a
specialized foreign policy organization). Also under the Prime Minister,
there is the Office for Special Relations with RM, whose role is to
coordinate the interrelation agencies and inter-ministerial committees with
the RM, as well as the Directorate for Relations with Romanians from
Everywhere. 
An important issue is the fact that several institutions formally participate in
the foreign affairs decision process. The overlapping effect of attribution is
doubled; on the one hand there are many possibilities and reaction
instruments with different stages of intensity, but on the other hand there are
conflicts of opinion and uncoordinated reactions. 
In the security matters, the institutional framework made the Supreme
Council of Defense of the country, under the authority of the president,
responsible for the decision-making process on security matters.
4. The moments of the crisis
21st-22nd of July 2006, 
At the Sankt-Petersburg, informal CIS summit, Vladimir Voronin convinced
Vladimir Putin to have a meeting in Moscow. It was the first after the
refusal of the President of the Republic of Moldova to sign the „Kozak
Memorandumul”, on the 25-th of november 2003. 
08th of August 2006
Vladimir Voronin proposed to Vladimir Putin to find a solution to the
Transnistrian conflict in a bilateral dialogue Chiºinãu – Moscow, based on a
„package deal” supposed to set all the issues at the same time. 
17th of September 2006
The Electoral Commission from Tiraspol announced the results of the
“referendum” with 77,63% participation and 97% responding “Yes” to the
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question “Do you support the course for independence of the Transnistrian
Moldavian Republic and the future reunification with the Russian
Federation?”
10th of December 2006 
Igor Smirnov was declared the winner (82,4%) of the „Presidential”
elections in Tiraspol, all the other competitors obtained only 14,1%. 
31st of January 2007
The Supreme Soviet from Tiraspol canceled its own laws „regarding the
Moldavian Confederation” and „regarding the principles of the mechanism
of elaboration and aprouval of the project of Constitution of the federative
state, created by Transnistria and the Republic of Moldova on a contractual
bases”, aproved in 1993 and 2003. Evghenii ªevciuk stated that any change
of status should be realized through referendum. 
10th of February 2007
Vladimir Putin’s statement at the Munich Conference. It shows the will of
Russia to be a superpower again with a sphere of interests outside its
territory recognized by everybody.
11th of April 2007
Vladimir Voronin presented in a close cercle, with the participation of the
Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Popular Party, the key
elements of the „package deal”, proposed for the negotiations with the
Russian Federation. The bases was disolving both of the parliaments, in
Chiºinãu and Tiraspol and anticipated (in November 2007) the common
parliament, with a reserved purcentage for the separatists. 
07th of June 2007
During a phone discussion with the High Representant of the EU for
Foreign Policy and Security, Javier Solana, President Vladimir Voronin told
the European official that the Transnistrian settlement would be reached in
the existing 5+2 format.
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18-19th of June 2007
Presidents and high officials from 25 states and 8 international
organizations (UN, EU, NATO, CoE etc.) attended the GUAM Summit in
Baku. The President of the Republic of Moldova, Vladimir Voronin didn’t
attend this summit. 
19th of June 2007
During the Council for cooperation EU-Republic of Moldova, President
Vladimir Voronin, announced the support for replacing the peacekeapers
from the region with civilian observers. 
19th of June 2007
The EU representative for the conflict in the Republic of Moldova, Kalman
Mizsei, declared that the negotiations in the 5+2 format should resume as
soon as possible and that the „package deal” is a good compromise solution. 
22nd of June 2007
At the official residence from Novo-Ogareovo, Moscow, Vladimir Putin
and Vladimir Voronin discussed for three hours Chiºinãu’s proposals from
the „package deal”for solving the Transnistrian conflict. 
29th of June 2007
Romanian Prime Minister Cãlin Popescu-Tãriceanu met president Vladimir
Voronin in Chiºinãu and stated that Romania was offering a wide support to
the Republic of Moldova in the process of European integration.
14th of July 2007
The Russian President, Vladimir Putin, signed the decree notifying the
suspension of the participation of Russian to the CFE Treaty. According to
the Treaty, the suspension acts 6 month after the notification. 
04th of September 2007
At the annual meeting of the Romanian Diplomacy, Romanian Foreign
Minister, Adrian Cioroianu, stated that Bucharest was against any unilateral
solution imposed in Kosovo because Romania considered that a risk of
repeating the scenario in Transnistria.
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01st of October 2007
The Ministery of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Moldova issued a
statement underlyining that the CFE Treaty would be ratified only after the
complete evacuation of the Russian troops from its territory.
08th of October 2007
The Reintegration minister of the R.M. send the Transnistrian “MFA” the
proposal to begin the implementation of President Voronin’s initiatives from
the “package deal”.
26th of October 2007
The Romanian Orthodox Church adopted a decision to create 7 new
canonic high constituencies, including the one for Dubasari and the entire
Transnistria, based in Dubasari. 
12th of November 2007
Vladimir Voronin acused Romania of imperialism and involvement in the
internal affairs of his country through the financement of the political
parties and the media, claiming that Bucharest policy is to “transform
Moldavians into Romanians”.
13th of November 2007
Chiºinãu refused to take part of the reunion of the „parties”, mediators and
observers at the permanent meeting on political problems in the negotiation
process for solving the Transnistrian issue in a 5+2 format in Madrid..
12th of December 2007 
The Russian MFA announced that the Russian Federation had suspended
itself from the CFE Treaty. 
12th of December 2007
Two employes of the Romanian Embassy in Chiºinãu have been declared
persona non grata. The Ambassador of the Republic of Moldova in
Romania, Lidia Gutu, was retired to Chiºinãu for consultations. 
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19th of December 2007
Vladimir Voronin stated that the Transnistrian problem is already solved
from the economic point of view and practically solved in the minds of the
principal participants in the negotiation process. 
15th of January 2008
Vladimir Voronin presented in Bruxelles, in details, the plan for solving the
Transnistrian Conflict, and received guarantees from the President of the
European Comision, Jose Manuel Durao Barosso that the EU will support
the process financially. Vladimir Voronin told the EU that Romania is
harming the process and tentioning the bilateral relations with Chiºinãu and
asked for help. 
21st of January 2008
After meeting th Patriarch of the Russian Church, Alexei the II-nd,
Vladimir Voronin stated that Romania’s activity of creating its own canonic
sructures in the Republic of Moldova is an aggression. 
25th of Janury 2008
During the reunion with the foreign diplomats from Chiºinãu, Vladimir
Voronin stated that the solution for the Transnistrian issue is the principal
problem for the Republic of Moldova in 2008. 
17th of February 2008
Kosovo declared its independence, soon recognized by a number of EU and
NATO states.
13th of March 2008
The State Duma of the Russian Federation declared that, after that, Russia
had the right to defend its citizens from Abkhazia and South Osetia that are
against Georgia’s accession to NATO. The recomendation for recognising
the independence of separatist regions was not extended to Transnistria.
17th of March 2008
Serghei Lavrov, Russia’s Foreign Minister, told Igor Smirnov, during his
visit in Moscow, that all Russian political efforts for solving the
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Transnistrian issue are based on the international principles and laws and on
the principles ellaborated by OSCE. Igor Smirnov agreed to negotiate
directly with Vladimir Voronin. 
2-4th of April 2008
At the NATO summit in Bucharest, in the final declaration, NATO stated
the support for the sovereignty integrity and independence of Republic of
Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan and the future accession to NATO of
Ukraine and Georgia.
11th of April 2008
Working meeting between Vladimir Voronin and Igor Smirnov in Bender,
the first meeting ever between the separatist leader Smirnov and a President
of the Republic of Moldova. Smirnov presented to Vladimir Voronin the
project of the friendship and collaboration Treaty between the Transnistrian
Moldavian Republic and the Republic of Moldova. 
08th of May 2008
The Parliament of the R.M. aproved, in the first lecture, the National
Security Conception. Its basic principle was „permanent neutrality”. The
Army of the Republic of Moldova should be reduced to a professional army
used only in international peace keeping operations.
14th of May 2008
In Bruxelles, Marian Lupu, the President of the Parliament of the Republic
of Moldova met Evgheni ªevciuk, the speaker from Tiraspol. 
27th of May 2008
Javier Solana, the High representative of the EU for foreign affairs and
security issues, met president Voronin. The final statement mentioned the
importance of resuming, as quick as possible, the negotiations in the 5+2
format. 
6th June of 2008
At the informal summit of the CIS chiefs of state, in Sankt Petersburg, the
President of the Republic of Moldova, Vladimir Voronin, met the Russian
President, Dmitri Medvedev. The expected trilateral meeting with Igor
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Smirnov and the conclusions of any agreement for solving the Transnistrian
issue did not occur. 
23rd of July 2008
During a press conference, President Voronin stated that „the neutrality is
an internal problem of each state and doesn’t rely on any international
organization”, meaning that the idea of guarantees for the neutrality was
abandoned by the Republic of Moldova, an essential part of the package
deal. 
08th of August 2008
The separatist MFA of Transnistria issued a declaration asking for a firm
intervention of Russia for stopping the Georgian aggression. Transnistria
announced that the volunteers for helping Sounth Ossetia in the war would
not be stopped by the authorities of Tiraspol. 
11th of August 2008
The separatist MFA from Tiraspol asked the Republic of Moldova to
“firmly and quickly” condemn Georgian’s aggression against “the Republic
of South Ossetia”.
12th of August 2008
The separatist MFA issued a communique acusing Chiºinãu of „a trial to
diminish Russia’s role in solving the Transnistrian conflict, following
Georgia’s exemple and creating the conditions for the use of force. The
seapartists announced a moratorium on all contacts with Chiºinãu until the
condemnation of Georgian’s aggression against South Ossetia. 
5. Decision making occasions
Resuming the negotiations in a bilateral format
After the 2003 rejection of the Kozak memorandum by the President of the
Republic of Moldova, Vladimir Voronin (subject of western pressure),
several signs showed that bilateral Chiºinãu-Moscow relations were frozen.
The blockage of the exports of wine and agricultural products made the
Republic of Moldova adapt to a new market, the European one.Hostile
movements in the Eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova were not
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blocked by the so-called Russian peace-keepers. Together with the “orange
revolutions” in Georgia, Ukraine and Kîrgîstan, the repressions of the
unrests in southern Uzbekistan made Vladimir Voronin and his Communist
party choose the European integration as a target of their political strategic
orientation.
The first signs of an unfrozen relation with Russia came on 21-22 of July
2006 in Sankt Petersburg, at the informal CSI meeting, when Vladimir
Voronin convinced Vladimir Putin to receive him in a first meeting after
more than two years and a half. But the real change in the bilateral relations
was the moment when President Vladimir Voronin proposed Vladimir
Putin, on the 8-th of August 2006, to resume the negotiations in Transnistria
on a bilateral format. At this moment President Voronin put on the table the
„package deal” which means that all the problems regarding the solution in
the Eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova should be solved at the
same time in one package of documents. 
Vladimir Voronin convinced the Russian President that he could have more
advantages in a Republic of Moldova reintegrated actor than in a breakeway
region in its eastern districts. The meeting went further: the parts designated
the representatifs to maintain the dialog and the negotiations. Chiºinãu was
represented by Mark Tkaciuk, the councelor for internal policies of
President Voronin and Vasili ªova, the Reintegration Minister, and Moscow
was represented by Iuri Zubakov, deputy secretary of the National Security
Council of the Russian Federation.
The background of this new line of proposals was the folowing:
- it helped President Putin to show himself as a providencial leader, that
solved the separatist issue in the Republic of Moldova, and let President
Voronin enter the history of his country by solving the reintegration.
- it solved the dilemma of having the retreat of Russian forces linked with
the solution in the separatist region
- it put out of the deal the separatist leaders from tiraspol, especially Igor
Smirnov, that were under an international ban regime in the EU and US.
- it gave Russia a bigger and recognized partner in the region, promoting its
interests, instead of the unrecognized leadership in the separatist region.
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- the deal was to elliminate from the stage the EU and US, observers in the
5+2 official process of negotiations, as well as the other participants in the
process, avoiding their involvement like in the 2003 agreement –the
Kozak plan.
The two players established together that those negotiations were just
„bilateral consultations” between two members of the official format, in
order to unblock the official process and to resume the official negotiations.
In real terms, the process was still blocked (like it was for the whole period
after the change of the format with the involvement of the US and EU as
observers) and negotiations would have to last until reaching a solution in
the bilateral form with a consecration afterwords in the 5+2 format, when
everything was set .
Meanwhile, those secret negotiations were developed in a covered format,
since all the other actors were playing as if nothing was going on: Russia
and the separatist authorities were inaugurating on the 13-th of September a
new center for issuing the Russian passports in the separatist region (under
the activity of some NGO’s that were helping the locals get their Russian
citizenship “restored”, like every “former Soviet Union citizen”). Both the
separatist leader Igor Smirnov and Russia’s Ambassador in the Republic of
Moldova, Nikolai Reabov participated at the inauguration. 
After that, on the 17th of September, a so-called referendum (one of the
many) was held in the separatist region where 77,63% of the electors
participated and answered “Yes” to the first question which meant the
support for the independence of the Transnistrian Moldavian Republic and
the consequent reunification with the Russian Federation”. 
On the 21st of September, after a visit to Moscow and a meeting with
President Putin, Igor Smirnov stated that the separatists established a
harmonizing process with the Russian legislation. Moreover, Smirnov asked
Russia to increase the number of „peace-keepers” in the separatist region.
Any effort for the reintegration of the region in the Republic of Moldova
was „senseless”, according to Smirnov. In this same line, on the 13th of
November, the „diplomatic delegation” of the separatists stated that, after
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consultations with Moscow, the model of the bilateral relations between
Russia and Tiraspol would be the one between the US and Taiwan. 
At the same time, the criticism against the EUBAM mission at the border
between Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova (including the separatist
region-was criticised as „economic blocade” by both separatists and
Moscow Minister of Foreign Affairs, Karasin, on the 18 of November. The
document invoked for the „free economic activity of Transnistria” was the 
8 may 1997 Memorandum „on the bases of normalisation of the relations
between Republic of Moldova and Transnistria”, a document based on the
„common state” approach introduced by Evgheni Primakov and refused by
Chiºinãu as a base for any further discussions. A new „presidential election”
was organised in the separatist region on the 10-th of December and Igor
Smirnov won with 82,4% when all the other participants got only 14,1%.
In the official format 5+2, nothing was moving on. That’s why, the
designated representatives from the Republic of Moldova and Russia had
„consultation” on the 9-10 of November. The official statement named the
meeting “moldo-russian consultations” and the issue was “the options for
resuming as soon as possible the negotiations in the”5+2” format: The
statement mentioned that the participants discussed about „the perspectives
of a common bilateral search for a comprehensive stable solution model of
the Transnistrian settlement”. 
In all this period, Romanian officials and responsible for the Foreign Affairs
policies felt that some things were moving and that the bilateral
„consultations” between Russia and the Republic of Moldova were more
than that, and had consultations in this respect with the EU and US. The
official answers of Chiºinãu were in the framework of the normal bilateral
relations and a continuous statement that the solution was to be reached
only in the 5+2 format. The security issues were not at stake, at this point.
The revival of Russia as a superpower
What really began to be a problem in the international relations and the
balance of the region was the revival of Russia that began to claim a
superpower role and became more and more agressive in its positions. On
the 4th of December, at the OSCE Summit in Bruxelles, the Russian Foreign
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Affairs Minister, Serghei Lavrov, worn the NATO countries - that refused to
ratify the Treaty on the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) until the
retreat of the Russian troops from Georgia and the Republic of Moldova,
according to the Istanbul summit OSCE final declaration – that the viability
of the treaty could be questionable to Russia since it is not ratiffied. 
On the 22nd of January 2007, the Russian president Vladimir Putin stated
that Kosovo will represent a universal precedent for solving the similar
frozen conflicts in the CSI space. And on the 10th of February, President
Vladimir Putin has his famous declaration in Munich, at the Security
conference, where he had a highly aggressive presentation claiming the
superpower status for Russia as well as a new sphere of influence and the
exclusive respect for its own interests. 
Negotiations „under the table” exposed
The real content of the negotiations was on the way of being exposed when
some gestures warned that important changes happened in the Transnistrian
conflict that the 5+2 format was not aware of. On the 31st of January 2007,
the Supreme Soviet from Tiraspol vote for canceling the action of the two
laws related to the relations between Tiraspol and Chiºinãu, the law
„regarding the Moldavian Confederation” and the one „regarding the
principles of the mechanism of elaboration and aproval of the project of
Constitution of the federative state, created by Transnistria and the Republic
of Moldova on a contractual bases”, the laws dating from 1993 and 2003.
Evghenii ªevciuk stated that any change of status should be realized
through referendum. Transnistria. 
This change gave an important hint that huge changes occured concerning
the Transnistrian solution and gave also Chiºinãu the sense of seriousness of
the negotiations with Russia. Then, on the 11th of April 2007, President
Vladimir Voronin presented in a close cercle, with the participation of Iurie
Roºca, president of the Christian-Democratic Popular Party and Dumitru
Diacov, the president of the Democratic Party-both voting the reelection of
Vladimir Voronin as president, in april 2005 - the key elements of the
„package deal”negotiated with Russia including the dissolution of both the
parliament in Chiºinãu and the Supreme Soviet in Tiraspol and anticipated
elections in Novermber 2007 in the whole territory of the Republic of
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Moldova for the common Parliament, with an over-representation of the
separatists and the withdrew of the Russian forces from the Eastern
Districts of the Republic of Moldova.
It was the moment when everybody, including the Romanian diplomacy,
learnt about the content of the package because of the alarm that the CDPP
president gave to the whole world. From his point of view, the “package
deal” proposed by President Voronin was against the Constitution of the
Republic of Moldova (anticipated elections could not be provoked in such a
way) and especially against the stipulations of the laws from 2005, that
conditioned any step forward by the democratization and demilitarization of
the East side of the Nistru river. At this point, it was just learning about the
content of the proposal and not about the existence or the stage of the
bilateral Chiºinãu-Moscow negotiations.
This moment launched a real sense of emergency and put the US and the
EU under alert, because they were not consulted and did not count in the
process. On the 7th of June, President Vladimir Voronin was forced to hold
consultations with the representatives of the EU and US, including a phone
conversation with the High Representative for Common Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy of the EU, Javier Solana. Confronted with the direct
concerns about negitiating outside the format and without consulting the
observers in the process and the other members of the official format about
the content of the proposal, Vladimir Voronin explained that it was just
about consultations and efforts to have Russia on bord for the resuming of
the 5+2 negotiations. 
In the official declaration about this exchange of views, Voronin told the
public that he had explained Javier Solana that „any acceptable model for a
solution of the Transnistrian issue would be reached only in the existing
5+2 format of the negotiations”. President Voronin had, at the same time,
consultations with the US Ambassador, Michael Kirby and with the chief of
the European Commission Delegation in the Republic of Moldova, Cezare
de Montis.
46 Iulian CHIFU, Oazu NANTOI, Oleksandr SUSKHO
At this point, the Romanian officials from the Ministery of Foreign Affairs
had the conviction about the fact that the early warning signs were
complitly true. Taking advantage of the precedent developments, in the
2001-2002 crisis of the bilateral relations, it became obvious that the
continuation of the negotiations with Russia will bring back a worsening of
the bilateral relations with Chiºinãu, with new attacks towards Romania and
a revival of the Moldavianism with changes against the Romanian language
and history as well as against those declaring themselves Romanians.
The game of pleasing EU and US
Exposed with a lie and bilateral negotiations with Russia outside the official
format, president Vladimir Voronin had to deal with his relations with the
EU and the US. He was more concerned with the relations with the EU
since the Action Plan in the ENP framework was poorly applied and critics
were coming both from the domestic political scene and from abroad.
That’s why some gesture should be made in terms of pleasing the
Europeans and the Americans, without endangering the negotiations with
Russia. 
From the Romanian MFA point of view, it was also the moment where
Vladimir Voronin crisis began. First, with the international community that
he misslead about his separate negotiations with Russia and second with the
domestic political class and civil society, shoked by the lack of transparency
and kept in the dark about the new proposalsfrom the „package deal”.
The first opportunity to please EU and US, and to support his own interests
was on the 13th of June 2007, when the Republic of Moldova demanded the
evacuation of the Russian troops and specially the request for changing the
format of the contingent of the peace-keepers in the region, from a military
Russian one into one of civilian observers, mostly a police multinational
one (official propositon presented by the US on the 7th of June). This
became a usual behavior any time when Chiºinãu wanted to prove the
support for European/US efforts to change the situation on the ground that
would enable Chiºinãu to solve the question in the Eastern districts of the
Republic of Moldova. The same position was reiterated on the 19th of June
at the Council for EU-Republic of Moldova Cooperation by President
Voronin.
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The vice-minister of the Republic of Moldova Minister of Foreign Affairs
and European Integration, Eugenia Chistrugã, stated this position in Viena,
at the extrordinary conference of the CFE treaty. Mrs. Chistrugã stated that
the complete, ordered and transparent evacuation of the Russian troops
from the transnistrian region will enable the authorities to begin the
ratification procedures of the adapted CFE Treaty. 
The reaction to this statement lasted only two days: on the 15-th of June, in
a press conference in Tiraspol, Igor Smirnov asked Russia to increase its
contingent of peace keepers because of „an accute situation in the region”.
He strongly opposed any change of the peace keeping operation format,
previosly proposed by EU and the US. He accused Chiºinãu of a tentative of
„economic strangulation” of Transnistria and stated that Transnistria will
not join the negotiations until the pressures on him will not be lifted.
Recognising the official negotiations
After the exposure of the existence of the bilateral negotiations between
Moscow and Chiºinãu, no tricks were possible anymore. Republic of
Moldova ontinued with the signals of their path away from the West and
from the subjects that could make Russia nervous – like the absence of
President Vladimir Voronin from the 18-19 GUAM summit in Baku
attended by the presidents and representatives from 25 states and 8
international organizations. 
The EU continued to warn the Republic of Moldova and Russia about
maintaining the negotiations into the official format. At the EU+Republic of
Moldova Council, of the 19-th of June, the special representatif of the EU
for the conflict in Transnistria, Kalman Mizsei, made the statement that the
negotiations in the 5+2 format should resume as soon as possible,
mentioning that „we know the plan of the package deal, proposed by the
Republic of Moldova on bilateral bases to Russia, last year”, and claiming
that this is a solid ground for future compromise. Through this statement,
both parts were invitetd to continue the dialog in the official 5+2 format.
In this context, on the 22nd of June 2007 in Moscow, at the Novo-Ogareovo
residence, Vladimir Putin and Vladimir Voronin met and discussed for 
3 hours Chiºinãu’s proposals for a solution of the Transnistrian conflict, the
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so-call „package deal”. This was the official consecration of the
negotiations, accepted as such by both parts. It was also a negative answer
to the requests of the EU and US to transfer the whole process in the official
format. Chiºinãu was claiming that they needed to continue the process
which proved to be successfull and that, anyway, any decision was to be
made in the 5+2 format. He promissed the officials and diplomats from the
EU states and the US of a constant consultation and communication of the
evolution of this process. 
The Romanian authorities took notice of the official aknowledgement of the
existing bilateral negotiations and of the continuation of this process in spite
of the warnings sent by the EU countries, the EU officials and the US
representatives. It was the moment of an evaluation of the package and of
the side effects or wrong developments of the negotiations that could lead to
huge problems. The Romanian officials warned the EU about these possible
developments, even though they prove to be very skeptical about the
positive output since in Transnistria, on the ground, the development were
far from supporting a real and dramatic change of situation in the
reintegration process. After this warning, the EU officials tried to make
President Voronin promiss to avoid any signature on any paper (like he
previously signed the Kozak original form) before having the agreement of
the Western partners.
At the same time, Romanian authorities realised the danger of focusing on
the reintegration process made to the EU integration process of the
Republic of Moldova and the acomplishment of the commitments from the
Action Plan. That’s why they warn both Chiºinãu and Bruxelles to continue
the push for the reforms in the Republic of Moldova, with a special
emphasis on the back tracks appeared in the domestic policies.
Romania-Republic of Moldova bilateral worsened relations
The year 2007 began with an important change, the visa regime for the
citizens of the Republic of Moldova. The level of voyages was, in 2008, of
2 millions per month, more than the Romanian consulate in Chiºinãu could
take. In this respect, Romanian authorities rose the number of employees to
help dealing with the enormous pressure on the office and prepared, at the
same time, an alternative place for the Consulate, larger and more suitable
“THE BREAKTHROUGH CRISIS” OF A QUICK SOLUTION IN TRANSNISTRIA 49
for the number of requests. In January President Bãsescu went to Chiºinãu
to talk to the people in front of the Consulate and proposed to the Chiºinãu
authorities to help in opening two new consulates in Bãlþi and Cahul, to
deal with the amount of requests for the Romanian visa. The request was
initially accepted, than, without any explanation, the agreement was
retracted because the local authorities fear of the pressure for citizenship
(recorded at some 800.000 requests).
This type of differences of view came to complement the very complicated
period in bilateral negotiations with Moscow. Rumors came that the turism
companies and other officials in the Republic of Moldova helped solving
the requests, with some money involved for the Romanian visas. At this
point, several officials from Romania checked the way in which the
procedures were observed and it was visible that a huge problem was rising,
especially with the students and their relatives as well as with the buisness
representatives. 
In the same framework, the general consul of Romania in Chiºinãu was
caught on the camera with alleged money received for visas from a turism
company and a big scandal followed in the media and through diplomatic
channels. The consul was retrait, but the pressure on the Romanian
employees working with visa continued since several attacks to the
computer system blocked the automatic visa delivery (with identified IP’s
close to the Internal Ministery of the Republic of Moldova involved). 
The decision-makers from Bucharest did their best in preventing any type
of wrongdoing since Romania was also under the EU scrutinity for the anti-
corruption system and all these succesive attacks were received as direct
threats to the succesive monitoring reports done by the EU Commision in
the framework of the CVM (Control and Verification Mechanism) for
Romania and Bulgaria.
On the 29th of June 2007, the Romanian Prime Minister Cãlin Popescu-
Tãriceanu had an official visit to Chiºinãu where he met President Vladimir
Voronin and prime Minister Vasile Tarlev. He stated that Romania was
offering the Republic of Moldova full suppport on its way to European
integration. This was the policy towards the Republic of Moldova: in order
50 Iulian CHIFU, Oazu NANTOI, Oleksandr SUSKHO
to avoid any attack regarding the involvement in internal affairs or
blockages in their negotiations with Russia, the Romanian authorities
established to offer all the needed help for humanitarian affairs and for
European integration - money, know how, consultancy, support in the
bilateral negotiations with the EU. 
On the other hand, Romania was completly oposing a declaration of
indepencence of Kosovo for two good reasons: the pressure from their
neighbor, Serbia, and the need to maintain the support for the
democratisation process and European integration in Belgrade and the
possibility that such a precedent would be used in Transnistria. That’s why
Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Adrian Cioroianu, stated his position
against the unilateral declaration of independence in Kosovo and the
consequent recognition by some states on the 4-th of September, at the
annual reunion of the Romanian diplomacy.
Serious developments to an eventual bilateral solution
The seriousness of the trend towards a bilateral solution for the
Transnistrian issue was there. In spite of the fact that on the 14th of July the
Russian President issue a decree of notifying the decision of „suspending”
Russia from the CFE Treaty, the negotiations went on. On the 15th of
August, the president of the Presidium of the Council for foreign Policy and
Defense of Russia, Serghei Karaganov, declared for „Komsomoliskaia
Pravda” newspaper that the integrity of the Republic of Moldova could be
re-establish, but the separatist region would have to have a special status of
autonomy with Russian troops on its territory. „We have already reached a
consensus in this respect with the Republic of Moldova”, said Karaganov.
But the EU and especially the US were oposing it. 
The statement showed two points, according to the Romanian authorities
evaluation: first, the possibility of the package that would include the retreat
of the Russian troops was no longer possible, a situation that put the whole
negotiations at stake. Second, the questionable agreement that the
authorities from Chiºinãu gave to the deal without the retreat of the forign
troops. In this moment it was unusual to see the big efforts that continued
and the promisses made to the public about a future solution in Transnistria.
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These reserves were enforced on the 1st of October 2007, when the Foreign
Affairs and European Integration Ministery of the Republic of Moldova
stated again that a ratification of the CFE Treaty is not possible since the
Russian troops are still on its territory. At the same time, on the 8th the same
month, the minister for reintegration asked the authorities in Tiraspol to
begin to work and to apply „the initiatives of President Voronin”, with a
common working group for the timetable for the working reunions for each
subject. 
It was not a surprise that, in this respect, the statement made on the 12th of
November by the president of the Republic of Moldova whom accuses
Romania of involvement in the domestic affairs of its country through
financing some parties and media. “Romania is the last empire of Europe
and this country wants to transform Moldavians into Romanians”, he stated.
These harsh accusations were part of the usual strategy of accusing
Romania when negotiating with Russia. But it also gave a hint on the
problems that Chiºinãu had in the negotiations with Russia. 
On the 13th of November Chiºinãu refused to participate in Madrid at the
reunion of the representatives of the 5+2 format, because the separatists
were invited and accepted. At the same time, this refusal was a new sign for
Moscow about the trust in the bilateral negotiations and the fact that
Chiºinãu avoided any other form of negotiation. The second message was
that the officials from the Republic of Moldova are still committed to
bilateral negotiations with Russia and refused all the negotiations with
Tiraspol representatives.
But the situation was further complicated and the escalation of the situation
happen on the 12th of December. The same day Russian Federation
announced the “self-suspention” from the CFE Treaty – meaning the
rejection of any retreat of its forces from Georgia and the Republic of
Moldova. The same day, two of the employees of the Romanian Embassy in
Chiºinãu were declared persona non grata and asked to leave the country in
24 hours. At the same time Republic of Moldova’s Ambassador to
Bucharest, Lidia Guþu, was recalled for consultation.
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The idea was to diminish the Romanian representation on the ground, as a
sign for good negotiations with Russia. Romania didn’t react and avoid
sending back any diplomats. In less than a week, on the 19th of December,
president Voronin launched the big coup: The Transnistrian problem was
already set from the economical point of view and practically solved in the
minds of the principal participants at the process. He stated that it is a
question of months to have everything set.
This raise of the game put the Romanian officials in a big dilemma. They
assess that President Voronin was putting himself in a delicate position for
the election, that he would need something to deliver and since the EU
integration was down and the Transnistrian reintegration was not possible,
he has to blame somebody. In this respect, Romania felt as a possible target
for the blame game after the evident fall of the reintegration process.
The end of the game: Kosovo’s independence
As long as the magnificent march towards a final solution in Transnistria
continued, in the declarations and diplomatic shows held by president
Voronin, the window of opportunity for solving the transnistrian problem
closed rapidely. After the retreat from the CFE Treaty, a new international
event happened and put a fullstop to the negotiations: the kosovo
independence.
On the 15th of January 2008 in Bruxelles President Vladimir Voronin
presented in details his plan and obtained full support from the EU officials,
including the technical and financial one, for his endeavour. He complained
that Tiraspol didn’t answer his proposals yet and had a huge complaint
about Romania, who „tentioned the bilateral relations” at this particular
moment. Except for the truth about who tentioned the bilateral relations, the
gesture was expected in Bucharest and for the European leaders (except
some lobby countries), this situation was not a surprise and no reaction was
done after this observation.
A second attack, that was percieved by the Romanian officials in the
framework of preparing the failure of the negotiations, did happent on the
21st of January 2008, after the meeting in Moscow with Russian Patriarch
Alexii the IInd. Vladimir Voronin stated that the Romanian activity in
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creating the Romanian Church in the Republic of Moldova (activity
qualified as liberty of beliefs, according to the ECHR was a decision against
the state of the Republic of Moldova). 
On the 25th of Janury 2008 President Voronin stated, in front of the foreign
diplomats acredited in Chiºinãu, that the solution of the Transnistrian
question is the top pripority of his country in 2008. His statement also
mentioned that both the EU and Russia would support the solution.
On the 17th of February, Pristina declared the independence of Kosovo that
was recognised in the next days by a number of European countries and the
US. This put a huge question on the possibility of further negotiating the
reintegration of the Republic of Moldova. On this matter, the Romanian
Supreme Council of the Country established a special meeting and debated
the evolution of the situation in the Western Balkans and in Transnistria, as
well as measures to avoid Romania taking the blame from the stake raised
by President Voronin and the unaccomplishing of the promisses of
reintegrating the country soon.
Russia further supported the image and perception of the public from the
Republic of Moldova of a possible resolution in Transnistria when, on the
13th of March 2008, the State Duma of the Russian Federation has
discussions on the subject “Concerning the stage of solving the conflicts in
the CIS space and the request to the Russian Federation about recognition
of independence of the Republics Abkhazia, South Ossetia and the
Transnistrian Moldavian Republic”. The Duma stated that after the
independence of Kosovo, there came a need of revision of the Russian
policy towards those unrecognized territories taking in consideration the
will of the local population. The State Duma considered that those countries
established de facto,states and demoncracies and had all the reasons to
claim the international recognition of their independence. If the resolution
called for recognition in the Georgian separatist republics – „because of
Georgia’s will to join NATO”, the separatist region of the Republic of
Moldova does not get the same appreciation for the moment.
Moreover, in the meetings with the separatist leader Igor Smirnov, on the
17th of March 2008, Serghei Lavrov mentioned that “all the efforts made by
Russian leadership for solving the situation in Transnistria are based on the
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international law and the principles of OSCE, which can mean both the fact
that the integrity of the Republic of Moldova is observed, but also that
Russia kept the possibility of coming back on the subject using other
documents accepted in time like the “common state” approach from 1997, a
possibility to get back to the pre-existence of a “Transnistrian State” that
agreed to join, in a confederative form, with the Republic of Moldova state.
The options opened, the Russian Federation was still in the position of
offering Chiºinãu the alternative to claim the continuation of the negotiation
process according to the “package deal”. 
At the same reunion, Igor Smirnov accepted to meet directly president
Voronin for „bilateral negotiations”. This happened less than one month
after, on the 11 of April 2008 in Bender. At the „workshop” of the two
presidents, the perspectives of the solution in Transnistria have been
discussed. Igor Smirnov gave President its own canonic Voronin a draft
project of the „Treaty of friendship and collaboration betweeen the
Transnistrian Moldavian Republic and the Republic of Moldova”. 
This gesture was annalised by the Romanian authorities, a new concrete
sign that the solution was no longer possible since first, Voronin was sent to
negotiate directly with Smirnov by Moscow and second, Smirnov was
continuing his position of the pre-existence of his state, to be recognize as a
first stept before any type of „confederation”. 
Erare humanum est, perseverare diabolicum
As if they could not lecture these messages, the international trend and the
signs that showed very clearly that any window of opportunity was closed,
if it had ever existed, the authorities of the Republic of Moldova continued
to rise the expectance of the public about a quick solution in Transnistria on
one side and continued to addopt all necesary documents to prove their
continuous commitment to the proposed solution. On the 8-th of May 2008,
the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova adopted, in the first lecture, the
National Security Conception, where the basic principle was the
„permanent neutrality”, which changed over night the proposed draft of the
Ministery of Foreign Affairs and European Integration into a weak,
unsubstantiated and unclear document that could not answer to the question
of how the Republic of Moldova will ensure its security. The same
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document claimed that the armed force, based on professional officers,
would be reduced to a minimum average and used only for the international
missions. Nobady was set to defend the national territory and the evaluation
of riscks and threats was under-considered and missunderstood.
The signals of openess from the part of the Republic of Moldova continued
in Bruxelles where, on the 14-th of May, the president of the Parliament of
the Republic of Moldova, Marian Lupu, met the speaker of the Supreme
Soviet from Tiraspol, Evgheni ªevciuc. In spite of the fact that the EU and
US representatives insisted in coming back to the 5+2 format of
negotiations, having in mind the risks that the Republic of Moldova was
facing in the direct negotiations with Russia – like at the direct reunion on
the 27th of May between president Voronin and Javier Solvana, in Bruxelles
– all the hopes were put on the 6-th of June informal meeting of the chiefs
of state from the CIS, where president Vladimir Voronin expected that he
would sign with Igor Smirnov, under the auspices and guarantees of
President Dmitri Medvedev, the „package deal”. Even if they met in the
waiting room, the two „presidents” were invited separatly and nothing
happened.
The Romanian authorities, together with the European ones, evaluated that
this was the last chance for having common elections in 2009, accepting
that the Parliament would fully support the „package deal”
stipulations(which contradicted the constituion and the laws from 2005).
The first signs that president Voronin understood the fact that his package
was not a solution appeared on the 23rd of July 2008 when President
Voronin publicly aknowledged that his idea of an international „guaranteed
neutrality” (understanding by that an international guarantee of security for
the RM, as he searched in 2002 with the „Stability Pact for the RM”) but
even the international „recognised guarantee” was not possible. He stated
that the „neutrality is declared by one country and is its internal problem,
not by an international one”. With this statement, one of the key points of
the „package deal”, requested by Russia, felt down from the negotiation
table. 
Anyway, on the 8th of August events in Georgia closed the whole story of
this trial since the so-called “Foreign Affairs Ministery” of Transnistria
supported the Russian and separatist Ossetian side, offered volunteers in the
56 Iulian CHIFU, Oazu NANTOI, Oleksandr SUSKHO
war (8th of August) than claimed that it had problems with observers and
guarantors in his 5+2 process that didn’t condemn Georgia’s actions (11 of
August) and suspended any relations with Chiºinãu because of its European
position of Georgia and the trial “to diminish the Russian stance in the
process on Transnistria” fact that offered “the conditions for the use of force
in Transnistria”.
At this point, any attempt to continue the game of the „quick solution” by
the authorities of the Republic of Moldova was subject to the lack of
credibility internationaly, first, but also at the domestic level. Moreover, the
Romanian authorities assessed that President Vladimir Voronin was in a
desperate search for „a way out” trying to show to everybody that
everything in his capacity for a solution has been made, any compromise
was addressed, but the result is negative because of the „other part”. Since
the European integration was in a very bad shape, the Action Plan was not
complete in spite of the prolongation of one year, and the new negotiations
were not yet prepared, when Ukraine was already negotiating and
Assosiation agreement with the European Union.
In these conditions, for avoiding a new electoral campaign with the anti-
Romanian trend or the blame on Romania for the lack of solution in
Transnistria, Romanian authorities were pushing for viable and consistent
comitments by the EU refering to the Republic of Moldova. Unfortunately,
the authorities from Chiºinãu didn’t realise the need to change the subject
and to cope with the big expectation in the Transnistrian issue, and arrived
in the position that they feared the most, in a 2+1 format of negotiations
prepared by Russia, instead of the official 5+2 format. This equalised the
position of the Republic of Moldova legitimate authorities with the
separatist ones from Tiraspol, with Russia as a unique mediator. This game
of the ”negotiations under the table”, outside the official format, gave
enormous costs to Chiºinãu in both the perspective of the parliamentarian
elections and in the perspective of a solution in Transnistria. Even the
position of shifting the priorities between the reintegration of the country
and the European integration was not acknowledge officialy by Chiºinãu, so
that a new sign from Burxelles could help the current officials and offer
them a way out.
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6. Thematic analysis
6.1. Prepardness, prevention and diminishing the effects of the crisis
The existance of the previous crisis in 2001-2002 in the bilateral relations
between Romania and the Republic of Moldova was already assessed and
the lessons learnt from thas moment are still present in the bahavior and
procedures of reaction in the case of the direct attacks. First, Romania did
not react to these attacks, on the contrary, in one ocasion, President Bãsescu
tried to take the defense of President Voronin that „has to deal with
tremendous problems in Transnistria and with the dependence of its country
of ressources from Russia”. 
The Romanian authorities also act for avoiding the effects of this reactions
by first avoiding escalating the declaration game and second, trying to find
„a way out” for president Voronin with consistent solutions and statements
taken by the EU for the road ahead for the Republic of Moldova. 
Taking in consideration the lessons learnt from the previous crise, 2001-
2002, the only insitution that had the decision and reaction was the
Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and no other body was involved. On
two ocasions, the Romanian President was requested to support, based on
his authority, the reaction, once when he went to Chiºinãu to calm the
requests for visas, that pressed the Romanian mission and to discuss
directly with the people waiting for their turn, at the Romanian Consulate.
In the security matters, the Supreme Council of the Country assessed the
situation once after the Kosovo independence and consecutive recognitions
and twice during the Georgian crisis. The reactions of Romania were
coordinated through the decisions of those reunions.
The Romanian position was coordinated directly with Bruxeles, including
at the moment when President Voronin addressed directly the presidency of
the EU for claiming the missbehavior of Romania. A reaction was directly
prevented, in spite of the pressure of some EU member states that fond a
moment to put pressure on Romania, for different other reasons. The
prevention of such attack worked, even if some aditional contacts,
consultations and position sharing with the Baltic states representatives –
especially Lithuania -, with Poland and Sweden, with suitable explanations
why Romania refused to sign the bilateral treaty, for instance, in the form
sent by Chiºinãu, would be necessary.
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6.2. The leadership and the decision units: MFA and the President
Responsible for the reactions on the acusations of the Republic of Moldova,
alerting the EU about the sudden moves and risks that such moves outside
the 5+2 format could mean, was the Romanian MFA. It was the same
institution responsible to deal with the declaration of Persona non grata in
the Romanian Embassy and with the set up of the Romanian Consul. 
In several cases, the Romanian President played the essential role: at the
moment of the visa crisis, when he visited Chiºinãu and talk to the people in
front of the Consulate, when he warned through the process of consultation
and information sharing the EU countries and EU Council and Comission
about the separate negotiations between Chiºinãu and Moscow, outside the
5+2 format and the assesment of the risks of such a move, when he warn
through the same system about the perspectives in Georgia and the future
war and when he payed the visit, right after the Russian-Georgian war in
South Ossetia, to Chiºinãu, Kiev, Tbilisi, Baku and Ankara, with a clear
message and a package for the consultation with the Wider Black Sea
Region States, with the threats and opportunities that this moment gave to
all of the countries in the region. Last but not least, he had an important
balanced position at the 1-st of September EU extraordinary Council.
Being very volunteer and a good decision maker in times of crises, he did
well, even though some of his statements during this very period, specialy
when they were improvised positions in the talk show or responses to the
set up questions, rised some question and proved some human personal
reaction that passed over the normal diplomatic and well thought positions.
The Romanian MFA has to give explanations about an unfortunate
statement, cut by the newspeper who printed it, that rose problems in
Kiev(being commented as a support to Putin’s alleged statement in the
NATO summit – Nato-Russia Council, claiming that Ukraine is an artificial
state that would broke into peaces). 
In another occasion, another Presidential statements, altered by the media,
created reactions in Chiºinãu. In another moment, the balanced and nuanced
position of Romania after the Russian-Georgian war was seen and
comented as „betrail” of the unity of the „New Europe”, or as „a deal with
Russia”. Since the visit around the region happent one week after the 8 of
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August events in Georgia, and president Bãsescu did not join baltic states,
Polish and Ukrainian leader to support President Saakashvili days after the
Russian attack in Georgia.
6.3. Framework of the crisis: perception and problem framing
Taking advantage of the previous experience with the Republic of Moldova,
Romania had two major problems with the crisis: first, the missperception
of the Republic of Moldova that in order to prepare good and fruitfull
negotiations with Russia, it had to quarell with Romania; second, the anti-
Romanian feeling rose and exploited by the Chiºinãu authorities for this
purpose.
What was new was a letter addressed by the Republic of Moldova
authorities to all the EU member states and to the EU headquaters in
Bruxelles acusing Romania of unfair play and blockages in the negotiations
with the Republic of Moldova that harmed the reintegration process, as well
as the repeated declarations in the same blame game framework, that were
repeated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Stratan, his deputy
minister Valeriu Ostalep and the Ambassadors of the Republic of Moldova
to EU states, whom were instructed to do the same. Fortunately, except for a
few states that knew less about the current situation on the ground or were
directly interested, no serious harm to Romanian position in the EU came
from these repeated claims by the Chiºinãu authorities.
Last but not least, the security situation was framed in the sense that after
the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo, Romania was
expecting that Russia would take advantage of this and use it as „precedent”
to the frozen conflicts and the recognition of the separatists regions from
Georgia and the Republic of Moldova. The fact that the statement was made
in that sense helped Romania in consolidating the „moral bases” in this
discussion but put its US and EU partners that recognized Kosovo’s
independence in a bad position. Moreover, since Romania was right about
the anticipation of Russian behavior, the costs of the recognition of the
Kosovo independence are now felt by several leaders of those countries.
Romania had another perception that was put on the table in the
consultations with the other countries: Republic of Moldova’s position of
negotiating directly with Russia made her in the position of theoreticaly,
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solving the problem,as a „model” oposed to the one in Georgia, but at the
same time, since this proved to be just a game, it came for the Republic of
Moldova with additional costs, outside those infliged by Russia when it put
„the parts” to negotiated and assessed the 2+1 format: puting the Republic
of Moldova in a direct oposition to Georgia position and harming the
credibility of the country, seen as a „separate and selfish actor” that let the
other members of GUAM work alone for their future in NATO and EU, by
its direct, bilateral, negotiations with Moscow.
In the security field, Romania perceived the security of the Republic of
Moldova as directly linked to its own. It is not indifferent for the Romanian
establishment if the solution in the Republic of Moldova gives a viable
democratic state, able to join the EU or a no man’s land with Russian troops
forever stationed there, a country controled by the separatist regime through
veto powers. At the same time, there is a true concern about maintaining the
idea of neutrality and avoiding the security sector reform in the Republic of
Moldova together with the trial to concede the security of the country to
somebody else. The lack of a true security solution for the Republic of
Moldova rose the concern on the impact on the security of all its neighbours
– Romania, Ukriane, NATO and the EU – and about the lack of seriousness
for the European goal of the Republic of Moldova without an assumed
security solution.
6.4. The conflict of values
The most important conflict of values is the one between the low level of
fulfilling of the commitments taken through the Action Plan by the
Republic of Moldova and the need to support Republic of Moldova to
enter the EU as soon as possible for the sake of its citizens, in majority
Romanian ones, with relatives in Romania. In this conflict of values,
Romania chose to defend Republic of Moldova’s road to the EU in spite of
the unfair attacks, the lack of performance, the set backs in democratic
behavior, the communist authorities promoting through administrative
means the Moldavianism.
The second conflict of values is between the anti-communist fundamental
stance of the Romanian authorities and the need to support indirectly the
communist authorities in the Republic of Moldova, since they govern the
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countries in this period. The president Traian Bãsescu was the one who
supported President Vladimir Voronin in spite of his ideological orientation
and his repeated attacks towards Romania, and this support was assumed
including in front of the domestic political class and public opinion. The
Romanian public had the maturity of realising the need of this gesture, in
order not to punish the citizens of the Republic of Moldova, especially the
Romanian majority, and did not challenged this official position of the
Romanian authorities and nobody from the political class questioned this
position.
6.5. Lessons learnt
One of the most important lessons learnt from this crisis is the need for
strong conditions for a sustainable reform in the relations with the
neighbour states and the need to wisely invest the Europen founds in real
reforms with results, in functioning institutions and in stable democratic
environment.
The second lesson learn is the one related to the need to have a credible
and sustainable orientation towards the EU and the democratic values of a
country before opening the incentives and dividens of the access into the
common market, as well as a suitable „stick” tool that can act directly any
time one country fails to fulfill its commitments.
The third lesson learn is to find suitable tools for linking a country where
the EU invest trust and money for a democratic transformation to the
convergent agreed common positions in the Foreign Affairs, security
matters and defense options. An aditional mechanism of consultation for the
choices of the country with the EU should be also put in place to avoid any
surprises.
Last but not least in the order of importance is the need to go on with the
democratic changes, the market reforms and integration together with the
Security Sector Reformof a country from our vicinity. Conserving the old
Soviet security system can overthrough all the efforts in the other fields
over night and spoil the achievements and the founds invested. At the same
time, the country in question should offer a sustainable solution for its
own security before proceeding with the changes in the domestic system.
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The Eu presence and deals with a country that does not have a solution for
its own security could lead to a false message of support and this could
misslead the investors.
7. Conclusions
The breakthrough crisis was anticipated by the Romanian authorities and
well managed through the experience and lessons learnt from the previous
crisis in its relations with the Republic of Moldova. All anticipated moves
proved to develop that way in the real life. 
The reactions of the Republic of Moldova authorities put Romania in the
bad position of losing its legitimacy to support the European cause of
Chiºinãu’s and its way towards the EU since, on the other way, Chiºinãu
attacked Romania. 
At the same time, the anticipation and the communication of the steps to the
EU partners, as well as the side effects of those steps taken by the Republic
of Moldova put Romania in a good position of being recognized as an actor
that knows the region and the expected developments. On the other hand,
there is a discrepancy between Romania’s will of being involved in the
region and the pression from some EU members countries to take the
responsibilities, on the one side, and the lack of direct means for this
purpose, on the other side.
The road towards a sustainable and correct solution in the Eastern
districts of the Republic of Moldova could be reached only through solid
and stable steps like the ones included in the confidence building
procedures, with the negotiations in the 5+2 format and contacts with the
separatist authorities from the region, but specially through direct actions on
the ground, work done with the local authorities and with the individuals,
building a way of life consistent with the RM reintegration. 
Another important point for a way towards a sustainable solution should be
made through stable reforms and democratization of the regions of the
Republic of Moldova under the legitimate authorities, but also through a
real integration process, in the official framework and legislation, of the
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Gagauz autonomy. All these could play the role of soft power, of the
natural force of attraction of the Republic of Moldova, as well as the force
of the example of a better life for the citizens of the Republic of Moldova.
The step by step approach, consolidated and supported by a clear
Security Sector Reform and a cohesive and consensual solution inside
the political forces of the Republic of Moldova is the road towards
achieving the reintegration of the country, with the help of the
democratization and institution building, as well as with the EU
perspective, rather than bilateral miraculous processes of negotiations
or the reintegration target at all costs.
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“The breakthrough crisis”- as a limited 
crisis for Ukraine’s unstable political
establishment
Oleksandr Sushko
The Ukrainian approach towards newly appeared developments regarding
“The breakthrough crisis” and the related Moscow-Chiºinãu talks launched
in July 2006 were determined by the following circumstances:
1. Domestic developments in Ukraine in the year 2006, which directly or
implicitly had an impact on Ukrainia’s position and policies regarding
Transnistria (March parliamentary elections followed by long-term
attempts to create the “Orange” coalition, which finally failed in July,
opening the path towards the creation of a new government under the
leadership of Victor Yanukovych (Party of Regions) – “Anticrisis
coalition” and the new government were formed in July-August).
2. Ambitions to continue the implementation of the Yushchenko Plan (of
2005) which proved to be unrealistic in terms of timeframe (very short
transitional period etc.) however remained actual with its specific
priorities such as an urgent need for democratization of the Transnistrian
region, internationalization of mediation and peace-keeping activity, and
gradual reintegration of the legal space of RM including Left Bank.
3. Ukraine’s commitments in the 5+2 format, and the desire to play an
important role in it, which was questioned by the de-facto suspension of
5+2 meetings after the introduction of the new customs regime between
Ukraine and RM in March 2006.
4. Implementation of EUBAM and the experience obtained by such a form
of cooperation in the triangle EU-Ukraine-RM
5. Appearance of new persons on the stage, influencing the decision
making process. In particular, the appointment of the new Ukrainian
Ambassador of the Republic of Moldova, Serhiy Pirozhkov and new
special representative for Transnistria, deputy foreign minister Andriy
Vesselovsky, strongly pro-western diplomat, fully committed to continue
a close cooperation with the European Union and the United States on
Transnistrian solution. 
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In addition to the abovementioned factors, Ukraine’s policy on
Transnistrian issue during the “Breakthrough crisis” should be analyzed
taking into account these main dimensions:
1. The legacy of the Orange Revolution, determined Ukraine’s ambition to
provide a qualitative alternative (on the basis of European values) to
Russian influence in post-soviet area; 
2. Ambition of Ukraine to pursue a role of regional leader;
3. Substantial connection between Ukraine-RM and Ukraine-EU relations,
reflected in the EU-Ukraine Action Plan;
4. Seeking for efficient methods to secure the interests of ethnic Ukrainians
living in the RM (including Transnistria).
Was the “Breakthrough crisis” a crisis for Ukraine?
In order to understand the logic behind the behavior of Ukrainian political
elites regarding the Breakthrough crisis, it is important to refer to the
dominant perceptions of the events that took place since the summer of
2006. For Ukrainian authorities, it was rather a continuation of the
crisis that took place in 2005-early 2006, connected to the failure of the
initial Yushchenko Plan implementation (failed timeframe and
forthcoming suspension of talks within newly established 5+2
negotiation format). 
The overall positive assessment of Ukraine’s Plan was followed by its
different interpretations. Referring to the Plan the RM Parliament adopted
in the June-July 2006 legislation,with the frames of Constitution stipulating
a special status for Transnistria. However, this legislation was totally
refused by Tiraspol and strongly criticized by Russia as not corresponding
to the logic of negotiations and “previously achieved agreements”. 
The establishment of EUBAM and, especially, new customs regime
between Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova in March 2006, on the one
hand, led to substantial progress at the border in customs issues and created
legal framework for Transnistrian enterprises to access foreign markets. On
the other hand, unwilling of Transnistrian authorities to accept new customs
regulations challenged the progress of 5+2 negotiations and finally led to its
suspension. Tiraspol de-facto introduced self-blockade, calling for
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international (meaning Russian) support, accusing Ukraine and RM with
blocking the economy of the region and provoking “humanitarian
catastrophe”. 
In the Spring of 2006 Ukraine’s government was under strong and
permanent attack by not only Russia and Transnistria, but also domestic
opposition (Party of Regions, Communists), which used this case on the eve
of March 2006 parliamentary elections to accuse President Yushchenko,
Primer Minister Yekhanurov and foreign minister Tarasyuk of violating
human rights of Transnistrian population (a substantial part of which are
ethnical Ukrainians). In terms of domestic developments the attempts to
attack new customs regime in Spring 2006 generated a feeling of crisis
and pushed again active debates concerning Ukraine’s policy towards
Transnistrian “frozen conflict” (see “Ukraine’s initiatives and
commitments”)
It took several months to normalize the situation on borders, but in the
Summer of 2006 the negotiations were blocked and the whole process of
finding a solution in Transnistria was brought into a stalemate. Under these
circumstances, Ukraine’s role in the Transnistrian process was limited to the
continuous calls to resume negotiations in 5+2 format, consultations with
Russian MFA, the EU Special representative on Transnistria, RM officials
and representatives of Tiraspol authorities. 
When the first signals of the “Breakthrough crisis” emerged after the direct
discussions between presidents Voronin of RM and Putin of RF, for
Ukrainian authorities it was just a part of a wider crisis indicated by the
inability to proceed with Yushchenko’s plan. Anyway, the new elements
became obvious some months later, when the details of the “package
approach” were disclosed.
For the Ukrainain decision makers this was a crisis, but not a separate
one – connected to a deeper context of the Transnistrian agenda:
It was a change of the existing situation, as Ukraine found itself removed
from the real negotiation process. The 5+2 format has been blocked several
months before, however the negotiations were resumed without Ukraine,
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OSCE and 2 observers (the EU and USA) which were previously included
into the process due (in particuliar) to Ukraine’s initiative. 
It represented a threat to the basic values: as for post-Orange Ukraine the
transparency of international relations, especially in the vicinity became an
important principle. Removal of Ukraine and the West from the real
solution posed a threat to direct a whole process into the shadow, where a
sustainable solution based on European balanced principles could not be
achieved.
Uncertainty was there; as the parties released only general information - it
was not clear how far could Moldova’s leadership go with concessions in
order to ensure Moscow’s guarantees of RM’s reintegration.
On the other hand, in Ukraine, decision makers did not feel the sense of
the vital emergency. Different sources indicated at that time that despite
promising rhetoric of president Voronin, in reality the parties (RM and RF)
were quite far from full-fledged consensus, so the chances of a fast solution
(as Ukrainian official stressed referring to their sources) were quite small. 
Therefore, for Ukraine the breakthrough crisis was a crisis, but in a
limited sense, as it was considered an element of a wider crisis
connected to the dead end of the 5+2 format and the devaluation of
Ukraine’s stake in the process of Transnistria solution after the year
2005.
Specific concern of Ukraine: GUAM membership of the
Republic of Moldova challenged
Ukraine’s concerns regarding the crisis were mostly similar to those of
Romania, the EU and the USA. However, there were some specific
concerns, and GUAM membership of the Republic of Moldova was the
most important of them.
GUAM was and is a testing case of Ukraine’s capacity to perform a role of
regional leader. After the Orange revolution Ukraine paid special attention
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to strengthen GUAM as a regional organization committed to promote
democratic values, as well as security and economic cooperation. 
The Republic of Moldova experienced different “cycles” regarding its
standing towards GUAM. It is obviously proven by history that the
Republic of Moldova’s interest in GUAM is strongly determined by the
context of its current relations with Russia. Each example of “warming”
relations with RF coincided in time with a diminished interest in GUAM
regardless of the current GUAM agenda. On the other hand, reviving
activity of the RM in GUAM was usually the reflection of the growing
crisis in the relations with Moscow.It was the 2001-2003 period, when
newly elected president Vladimir Voronin demonstrated evident skepticism
and even ignorance towards GUAM. Rhetoric of that time was concentrated
on the stressing on “economic pragmatism” instead of security component
of GUAM (which was the top priority at the establishment of organization
back in 1997). 
Breakthrough crisis brought no exemption from the rule indicated above.
However, this time it was not about the traditional informal decline of the
RM’s activity in GUAM, but about the possibility of full withdrawal of
Moldova from GUAM as an integral part of political “package”,
negotiated with Moscow, in combination with insurances of permanent
neutrality of the state.
Last time President Voronin took part in a GUAM summit was in May 2006
in Kyev, when the statute was signed and the name of organization was re-
formulated as the “Organization for Democracy and Development –
GUAM”. In 2007 President Vladimir Voronin ignored the GUAM summit
in Baku (18-19 June) attended by the presidents and representatives from 25
states and 8 international organizations.The official explanation was that at
the same time Voronin had appointed meetings in Brussels (EU-Moldova
Council) 
2008 GUAM summit took place in Tbilisi in June, and RM was represented
there by minister of interior and deputy foreign minister. The contrast was
especially evident due to the presence of Presidents of Lithuania and Poland
at the summit – countries which are not GUAM full members. 
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RM is the only member country that had not ratified a Statute of GUAM
signed back in 2006.
In his interview to Russian daily newspaper “Kommersant” on March 12,
2007 Persident Voronin said, answering the question on GUAM: “There
should be a benefit from the participation in any organization. There is no
interest if there is no benefit. There are unclear perspectives regarding
GUAM. If there is no economic interest, we don’t need it as a
counterweight to somebody”. It is clear that the meaning of “somebody”
was Russia. It is not a secret that Kremlin considers GUAM as a purely
anti-Russian project and tries to undermine it by any available means.
Therefore the crisis of Moldova’s participation in GUAM was evidently the
component of the “Breakthrough crisis”. The future of RM’s role in this
organization remains unclear posing by this a specific threat to Ukraine’s
regional priority. 
Ukraine’s initiatives and commitments 
In 2005-2006 Ukraine issued its own plan of Transnistrian solution
(Yushchenko’s Plan) and committed itself to some substantial (practically
suggested by the West) policies aiming better border management, counter-
trafficking and ultimately – searching for a sustainable solution on
Transnistria’s “frozen conflict”. Following those plans and commitments (as
well as debates around them) determined the very substance of Ukraine’s
policies in these areas. 
1. “Seven points” Yushchenko Plan
The seven-point proposal, known as “Yushchenko Plan”, issued in April
2005 stipulated the following: 
1. „Ukraine proposes to the Administration of Transnistria to create
conditions for the development of democracy, civil society, and a
multiparty system“;
2. „Elections to be held soon to Transnistria’s Supreme Soviet, the
representative body of the Transnistrian region of Moldova, on the basis
of a legal status of Transnistria“; 
3. „The European Union, OSCE, Council of Europe, Russia, the United
States [listed in that order] to participate alongside Ukraine in
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monitoring the free and democratic elections to Transnistria’s Supreme
Soviet“;
4. „Ukraine supports the intentions of the European Union and the United
States to contribute to the solution to the problem of Transnistria“;
5. „The existing peacekeeping format to be transformed into an
international mechanism of military and civilian observers under OSCE
aegis“;
6. „The Administration of Transnistria to allow an international monitoring
mission, with the participation of Ukrainian specialists, to military-
industrial enterprises in the region“; and
7. „Ukraine is prepared to consent to short-term monitoring of the Ukraine-
Moldova border by OSCE teams from Ukrainian territory, with a view to
checking the movement of goods and people. We call on Transnistria to
take similar steps.“
The United States, the EU and the RM and Tiraspol itself welcomed the
initiative and expressed some level of agreement with the project, despite
some criticism also emerged (Socor, 2005)1. 
Further efforts of Ukraine within the period of 2005-2007 were aimed to
fulfill this initiative with some modifications caused by changing political
dynamics.
2. EUBAM
EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) was
established as a reaction to the joint letter of the presidents of Moldova and
Ukraine dated June 2nd 2005, calling for additional EU support for
improving border management capabilities, including customs, along the
entire Moldova-Ukraine border. On October the 7th 2005, a Memorandum
of Understanding on the Border Assistance Mission was signed between
Moldova, Ukraine and the EU. According to the Memorandum of
Understanding, the Mission is an advisory, technical body with no executive
powers. 
Its aims are: 
- to assist Moldova and Ukraine to harmonise their border management
standards and procedures with those prevalent in EU member states; 
1 http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2369652.
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- to assist in enhancing the professional capacities of the Moldovan and
Ukrainian customs official and border guards at operational level; 
- to improve risk analysis capacities; 
- to improve cooperation and complementarity between the border guard
and customs services between each other and with other law enforcement
agencies.
More than 40 recommendations have been put forward to Ukrainian and
Moldovan services in the Initial Assessment Report and other EUBAM
documents. They include, among other things: 
Structural Issues: A major effort is required in all services to actively
promote information exchange. Information technology is a key element,
but equally important is an institutional willingness to exchange
information. This is the only way to be one step ahead of organised
criminals who adopt increasingly sophisticated methods. Good information
exchange cuts across almost every aspect of a modern system of border
management. 
Risk Analysis System: Building up a modern Risk Analysis System in
order to deploy resources effectively to preview the threat of illegal
activities. This is a major area of focus in the Assessment Report and one of
the objectives set out in the Memorandum of Understanding. 
Investigatory Powers: Both services need to have investigatory powers
(currently these are only enjoyed by the Moldovan Customs Service). This
will provide information for risk analysis; improving risk analysis should
improve targeting, result in more detections and thereby create a virtuous
circle. 
Infrastructure: Most border crossing points require infrastructural work to
increase their capacity. One of the key needs is IT and communications
equipment, but some of the requirements are more basic, such as a proper
lighting. This is to ensure proper, effective border control in a safe
environment for citizens and operators. 
Working practices: Even with the available resources in terms of
manpower and equipment, border control is not as competent as it could be.
While there are some exceptions, for most of the parts the controls carried
out do not meet EU standards.
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Training: There are some training gaps which need to be addressed. In
particular, EUBAM sees a need for more expertise in the identification of
false documentation (especially documents required from EU states) and
linguistic skills.
Illegal activities on the border: The issue of illegal border crossings has to
be urgently addressed and supervision should be stepped up. The Mission
welcomed the measures taken by Ukraine’s authorities to increase control
of the green border by the deployment of more staff and the surmount
physical obstacles. EUBAM further recommends the use of trained mobile
teams to target illegal crossings.
3. The New Customs Regime
With a Joint Declaration on December 30 2005, the prime ministers of
Ukraine, Jury Yekhanurov, and the Republic of Moldova, Vasile Tarlev,
committed themselves to introducing a new customs regime on the basis of
practical recognition of the integrity of Moldova’s customs territory.
According to the new regulations, all Transnistrian economic agents are
obliged to register in Chiºinãu in order to conduct trade across the Ukraine-
Moldova border. A similar regime had already existed before, from May
2003 to August 2004 but had been cancelled after Moldova suspended the
issue of licenses in retaliation for Transnistria’s attempt to close down
Chiºinãu-governed schools on the left bank of the Nister River. Ukraine
then gave Transnistrian enterprises permission to trade without Moldovan
customs stamps.
The Joint Declaration of 30 December 2005 was a new step ahead. EU’s
support for the new customs regime was evident for the Ukrainian
diplomats involved in the negotiations with Brussels on different levels.
Implementation of the new regime was initially scheduled for January 18
2006. Due to a lack of preparatory work on the Moldovan side and strong
pressure from Transnistrian lobbyists in Kyiv on the eve of implementation,
however, the Ukrainian government postponed it without setting a new
date. Additional consultation made it possible to solve most of the technical
problems and the new customs regime was finally implemented on March
3rd 2006. 
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Nevertheless, Transnistrian authorities, supported by Russia, immediately
blamed Ukraine for blocking the border to prevent Transnistrian business
from having any kind of legal foreign trade possibilities and by that set an
economic pressure on Tiraspol to change its political position in favor of
reintegration with the rest of Moldova. Transnistrian authorities organised a
real border blockade, impeding all cargo and even local trains from crossing
the border. Tiraspol continued such a policy till May 2006, after which self-
blockade was substantially relaxed.
On March 14 2006, the European Union sent out a strong message in
response to Tiraspol’s attempts to establish a blockade and presented the
new customs regime as the cause of a “humanitarian catastrophe“ in the
region. 
We call on the self-proclaimed Transnistrian authorities not to block this
registration. We condemn any efforts by the self-proclaimed Transnistrian
authorities to impede the free flow of international trade, which harms the
interests of Transnistrian economic agents, which are thus deprived of their
export possibilities. The EU expresses her hope that in the future the
conditions will be put in place for Moldova to grant all registered
Transnistrian companies access to the trade preferences for the EU that
other Moldovan companies now enjoy.“2
According to an EUBAM official, “the new customs regime in place since
March has created a step-change in the effectiveness of the border control
system. There is more transparency about import and exports flows to and
from the so-called Transnistria”.3
Ukrainian decision making system in Foreign Relations and
Security matters
According to the Ukrainian Constitution the President of Ukraine is a key
figure to manage and coordinate the state’s policy in emergency and crisis
cases, being responsible for security and defence policy.
2 Council of the European Union, Declaration by the Presidency, Brussels, 14 March 2006
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/cfsp/88802.pdf>.
3 The European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine Press Pack,
June 2006., p. 11, press-release of 11.05.2006 ww.tvlink.org/pdf/EUBAM_press_pack.doc
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President implements his power in different cases either directly or via
decisions of The National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine (being
a Chairman of NSDC and having an authority to appoint and dismiss most
of the NSDC members)
President’s direct authority
The powers of the President of Ukraine are stipulated by , which defines the
rights and responsibilities of the President as Head of State, the election
procedure, and provides for the possibility of his/her dismissal from office
and termination of his/her powers. 
President is due to prevent any actions of the legislative, executive and
judicial branches of power that directly or indirectly infringe the
fundamental Law of Ukraine. With the aim of fulfilling this duty the
President is vested with corresponding authorities. He is empowered to
suspend decisions of government bodies and veto laws passed by the
Verkhovna Rada. 
President is the Guarantor of state sovereignty and territorial integrity
of Ukraine. In these terms his powers are stipulated by Article 102 of the
Constitution of Ukraine and impose on him the duty of making decisions
and acting in order to defend and consolidate the state sovereignty, to secure
the integrity and inviolability of Ukraine’s territory within the limits of the
existing borders. 
According to Article 102 of the Constitution of Ukraine, as the Guarantor of
citizens’ rights and freedoms, the President is empowered to revoke acts of
government bodies and branches of power in order to protect citizens’ rights
and freedoms. 
Presidential powers within domestic policy are stipulated by Article 106 of
the Constitution of Ukraine. According to the Constitution and the laws of
Ukraine the President of Ukraine issues decrees and orders, which are
binding on the territory of Ukraine. President cooperates with all branches
of power, appoints and dismisses Government officials and executive
authorities, attends the Government’s meetings and has his/her
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representatives in the Constitutional Court of Ukraine and the Verkhovna
Rada. 
In terms of foreign policy the Presidential powers are stipulated by Article
102 and 106 (items 3, 4 and 5) of the Constitution of Ukraine. The
President, as Head of State, acts on behalf of Ukraine, represents Ukraine
on the international scene, negotiates and signs international treaties and is
in charge of foreign policy of the state. 
President is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
according to Article 106 of the Constitution of Ukraine. In the event of an
armed aggression against Ukraine, the President makes decisions on the use
of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. President heads the National Security and
Defense Council of Ukraine. 
President submits to the parliament nominees for the position of MFA,
MOD and Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) Chairman which gives him
control over these bodies (in emergency and crises cases as well). If
parliament doesn’t agree on nominee for SSU Chairman, President can
appoint him (or other person) for the position of Acting Chairman.
Authority of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine
In accordance with article 107 of the Constitution of Ukraine, the The
National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine (NSDC) is the
coordinating body in matters pertaining to national security and defense
under the President of Ukraine.
The NSDC of Ukraine coordinates and supervises the activities of executive
bodies in the sphere of national security and defense. The President of
Ukraine is the Chairman of the NSDC of Ukraine.
In terms of rank and position, the membership of the National Security and
Defense Council of Ukraine shall include the Prime Minister of Ukraine,
Minister of Defense of Ukraine, Head of the Security Service of Ukraine,
Minister of the Interior of Ukraine, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
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Ukraine. The President of Ukraine appoints the other members of the
National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine.
Decisions made by the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine
are being implemented through the Degrees issued by the President of
Ukraine. NSDC decisions are binding for the Cabinet of Ministers
(government) and other central and regional executive bodies.
The principles and tasks of the NSDC activity are developed and
determined in details by the Law of Ukraine “On National Security and
Defense Council of Ukraine” adopted on 05.03.1998 and the Concept (basis
of public policy) of National Security and Defense of Ukraine, approved by
the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in 1997. The Law defines functions and
authorities of the Council in peaceful time as well as at wartime, its
membership and structure, order functioning, members’ functions etc. The
Concept covers those spheres of vital activity of the society that are under
influence of the national security policy.
Authorities of Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) and the Cabinet of Ministers
are rather limited in crises situations. However they can block President’s
and NSDC decisions if the ruling coalition and the president belong to
different political forces.
Authority of the Parliament 
Article 85 of the Constitution. The authority of the Verkhovna Rada of
Ukraine comprises:
22) confirming the general structure and numerical strength, and defining
the functions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the Security Service of
Ukraine and other military formations created in accordance with the
laws of Ukraine, and also the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine;
23) approving decisions on providing military assistance to other states, on
sending units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to another state, or on
admitting units of armed forces of other states on to the territory of
Ukraine.
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Authority of the Cabinet of Ministers
Article 116 of the Constitution. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine:
1) ensures the state sovereignty and economic independence of Ukraine,
the implementation of domestic and foreign policy of the State, the
execution of the Constitution and the laws of Ukraine, and the acts of
the President of Ukraine;
With regards to the Breakthrough crisis, however, abovementioned
mechanisms were not fully activated. In particular, the situation was not
put on the formal agenda of NSDC sittings. Most of the decisions and
efforts were made on the level of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (in
consultations with the President’s Secretariat), without the involvement of
top level emergency decision making mechanisms. The reason of this, on
the one hand, was that for Ukrainian authorities the events analysed have
not been perceived as full fledged crisis threatening vital security
interests of the country (as described in Was the “Breakthrough crisis” a
crisis for Ukraine?). On the other hand, at that time political forces and
leaders were preoccupied by strong domestic political crises in Ukraine (see
next chapter).
Political developments in Ukraine affecting its foreign policy4
In Ukraine the events of the Summer of 2006 in the bilateral relations
of RF and RM were in focus of limited number of politicians, diplomats
and experts, professionally involved in Moldova-Transnistria related
issues. The main reasons for a declined interest were domestic
developments in Ukraine after the parliamentary elections took place, on
March 26, 2006.
In order to understand the connection between overall political
developments and some specific policies (such as the policy on
Transnistria) one should refer to Constitutional changes introduced in 2006
followed by parliamentary elections and further developments that led to
establishment of Anticrisis coalition in July 2006.
4 Author's analysis prepared for Freedom House "Nations in Transit" 2006 and 2008
reports were in some parts used in this chapter.
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Beginning with January 1st , 2006, a new constitutionally mandated model
of governance was introduced in Ukraine, following earlier constitutional
amendments approved by the Parliament on December 8, 2004. The new
model stipulated a substantially stronger role for the Parliament and
government and limitations on the president’s powers. At the same time, the
new model introduces a risky “dual executive” approach that lacks an
efficient system of checks and balances. This dual executive led to creation
of de-facto divided government preoccupied by the internal fight for real
power and incapable of implementing sustainable policies. Therefore,
despite the fact that the new wording provides a more pluralistic and
democratic model of power than what was previously enshrined in the
Constitution from 1996 to 2005, the overall system of national governance
may lead Ukraine further away from the principles of good governance and
efficient checks and balances.
This trend became visible during April–July 2006, when political parties
failed to create a democratic and sustainable government based on a
majority coalition. The political forces that supported the Orange
Revolution in 2004 reconfirmed their credibility during the parliamentary
election in March, securing a majority of seats in the new Parliament, but
the lack of trust between President Yushchenko (leader of the Our Ukraine
bloc) and former prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko (whose Bloc of Yulia
Tymoshenko [BYT] took the lead among the “Orange” part of the political
spectrum with 22 percent of votes) made it impossible to create a
sustainable coalition despite long-term official negotiations and informal
consultations.
Parliament of 5th convocation elected on March 26, 2006
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Party/Bloc % Votes Number of Seats
1 Party of Regions 32.12 186
2 Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko 22.27 129
3 Our Ukraine 13.94 81
4 Socialist Party of Ukraine 5.67 33
5 Communist Party of Ukraine 3.66 21
Ultimately, the three “Orange” forces - Our Ukraine, the BYT, and the
Socialist Party -signed a late June coalition agreement and stipulated the
appointment of Yulia Tymoshenko as prime minister and the representative
of Our Ukraine as Speaker of the Parliament. However, after unofficial talks
some days later, the Socialist Party changed its position, and party head
Oleksandr Moroz was appointed Speaker of the Parliament on July 6, with
support from the largest fraction in the Parliament, the Party of Regions.
The Socialists withdrew their signatures in the coalition agreement with the
BYT and Our Ukraine and created the Anticrisis Coalition together with the
Donetsk-based Party of Regions and the leftist Communist Party of
Ukraine. The unexpected shift of the Socialist Party towards an alliance
with the Party of Regions, led by Viktor Yanukovych, opened a way for the
political group to return to power after it was thrown out of the government
in the dawn of the dramatic events of late 2004. 
On August 4th, the Parliament appointed Viktor Yanukovych, leader of the
Party of Regions, as prime minister of Ukraine. Prior to the formation of the
new government, the president, future prime minister, and Speaker of the
Parliament signed the so-called Universal of National Unity, an informal
consensus-based memorandum with a list of national policy priorities,
including fast accession to the World Trade Organization, closer
cooperation with NATO, and integration into the European Union. Later,
the president, who initiated the document, accused his counterparts of
ignoring its provisions.
With the president and prime minister belonging to different political
camps, the formation of Yanukovych’s government posed the challenge of
“cohabitation.” This was the first time that Ukraine had experienced this
particular political phenomenon in the country’s history, and the
Constitution and existing laws provided insufficient mechanisms to deal
with it. This inconsistency in national governance was clearly indicated in
the different positions taken by the president and prime minister on the
issue of Ukraine’s hypothetical NATO membership. President Yushchenko
urged the government to submit an application to join NATO’s Membership
Action Plan. However, while in Brussels in mid-September 2006, the prime
minister refused to do so, arguing that the Ukraine public was not ready for
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NATO membership for the time being – indicating by this lack of joint
consolidated position of Ukraine on international arena.
In 2007, political actors focused their energies on power struggles and
pushed legislative reforms from which they stood to benefit (such as the
draft law the Cabinet of Ministers adopted in January that introduced
further limits to the president’s power), instead of advocating for
sustainable policy and reforms. Furthermore, at the outset of 2007,
continuous attempts by the ruling coalition (Party of Regions, Socialist
Party of Ukraine, and Communist Party of Ukraine) to strengthen its
position within the Parliament by recruiting “hesitating” members of
Parliament (MPs) from the opposition (Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko [BYT]
and Our Ukraine Bloc by President Yushchenko) also disrupted political
processes. The coalition gained a victory in March when the Party of
Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, led by Anatoly Kinakh, left Our Ukraine
Bloc and joined the ruling coalition. Kinakh later became the minister of
economics. At the same time, in a move considered an indication of
political corruption by the opposition, a group of BYT MPs also joined the
coalition. Founders renamed the group the Coalition of National Unity.
Leaders of the coalition declared it their aim to gain a constitutional
majority, or 300 votes, by summer. The president responded by issuing a
decree on April 2, 2007, announcing the dissolution of the Parliament
(Verkhovna Rada) and scheduling pre-term elections for May 27, 2007.
This launched the “active phase” of the political crisis as Yushchenko’s
opponents immediately challenged the legitimacy of his decree.
Furthermore, accusations of corruption disabled the Constitutional Court,
the independent arbiter assessing presidential decrees dissolving the
Parliament. The duties of the Constitutional Court were suspended by the
president. 
The next two months were marked by permanent debates, negotiations, and
ambivalent decisions that led to a “compromise” that dissolved the
Parliament. The final presidential decree on this issue set September 30 as
the date for early parliamentary elections. These events demonstrated that
major political actors did not follow constitutional norms, but rather played
with legislative gaps and manipulated the law. 
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Throughout the crisis, the Cabinet of Ministers led by Viktor Yanukovych
continued its work, but permanent disputes with the president’s secretariat
proved that the system of checks and balances did not work efficiently.
The political forces that supported the Orange Revolution in 2004 gained
again a small victory in the early parliamentary elections of September 30,
winning a slim majority in the new Parliament (228 MPs out of 450). The
election, however, did not solve the political crisis as such but provided the
potential for consensus on further constitutional and legal transformations,
if the majority coalition could be sustained. 
And on December 18th, a new government of Ukraine was formed,
replacing Victor Yanukovych’s government, whith the newly established
Coalition of Democratic Forces (Block of Yulia Tymoshenko and Our
Ukraine – People’s Self-Defence) - led by Prime Minister Yulia
Tymoshenko. The pace of governance remained largely stagnant even after
the formation of the Coalition of Democratic Forces. 
Parliament of 6th convocation elected on September 30, 2007
The new parliament also failed to sustain its fragile majority due to evident
personal conflicts between the President and the Prime Minister. This
conflict finally led to the collapse of the coalition in early September 2008
and President Yushchenko decided to dissolve the Parliament on October
8th, 2008, scheduling new pre-term elections in December.
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Party/Bloc % Votes Number of Seats
1 Party of Regions 34.37 175
2  Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko30.71 156
3 Bloc “Our Ukraine–People’s 14.15 72
Self-Defense”
4 Communist Party of Ukraine 5.39 27
5 Lytvyn’s Bloc 3.96 20
Personal dimension of decision making changes
Obstacles, which did not allow the implementation of the Yushchenko plan
within its ultimate timeframe, limited the capacity of Ukraine to take a lead
in the Transnistrian solution. Since the summer of 2006 Ukraine is mostly
concentrated on its commitments regarding the EU and, in particular,
EUBAM, considering relations with the Republic of Moldova as one of the
milestones in the EU-Ukraine cooperation in regional and international
affairs. In these circumstances the role of officials appointed to specific
positions became more important. 
In 2005 the key communication persons on the positions responsible for
Transnistrian solution were Ukraine’s ambassador to the RM, Petro Chaly
and President’s special envoy on Transnistria Dmytro Tkach. However, in
2006 President has changed persons in these important posts.
New ambassador of Ukraine to the Republic of Moldova, Serhiy
Pirozhkov was appointed in 2006, indicating high importance of RM for
Ukraine: before this appoinment Pirozhkov served a Deputy Secretary of
National Security and Defense Council and director of the National Institute
for International Security Problems (operating under auspice of the National
Security and Defense Council). 
Ambassador Pirozhkov, high-weightier of the Ukrainian diplomacy,
demonstrates serious interest towards the Transnistrian issue, he is a
frequent guest to Tiraspol and other places on the left bank, while the
visitors from Tiraspol regularly attend meetings and official receptions in
Ukrainian embassy (sometimes irritating officials of Chiºinãu). His close
contacts and relations with separatist leaders make him the main
communicator in the informal triangle Kyiv-Chiºinãu-Tiraspol. Serhiy
Pirozhkov represents long-lasting approach of Ukrainian diplomacy aiming
the support and consolidation of Ukrainian community on both banks of
Nistru river by promoting education and cultural events. He argues for
continuation of traditional position of Ukraine on the issue of citizenship –
considering the increase of Ukrainian passport holders in Transnistria as a
mean to strengthen Ukraine’s positioning in the region. 
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At the breakthrough crisis, ambassador Pirozhkov proved to be one of the
most reliable sources of insider’s information from Chiºinãu. It was the
Embassy of Ukraine, which suggested Kyiv not to overestimate the chances
for a fast solution in Transnistria under the existing circumstances , which
finally proved to be true.
Pirozhkov and his staff have personally done a lot to strengthen the
consolidation of the Ukrainian minority in Transnistria, taking initiative out
of Russia. The indication of the success was, in particular, a decision
(October 2008) of the local authority to set the monument of Ukrainian
Hetman of late17-early18 centuries, Ivan Mazepa in the city of Bender – the
figure of this Hetman is still an extremally irritating one for Russia as he
conducted an alliance with Swedish king Charles the 12th to fight against
the Russian tsar Peter the 1st in 1709. All attempts to honour the memory of
Mazepa are treated in Russia as anti-Russian demarches. 
However, taking into account officially declared objective to support re-
integration of the RM, support of the current leaders of Ukrainian
community is to be considered controversial, as those leaders (such as
Volodymyr Bodnar) openly support Transnistrian separatism and argue
against the territorial integrity of the RM.
New Special Representative of Ukraine’s President on Transnistria,
Andriy Vesselovsky was appointed on March 30, 2006, and held this
position until the summer of 2008, when he was appointed a Ukrainian
ambassador to the EU. Being in the capacity of Special Representative of
Ukraine’s President on Transnistria, Vesselovsky held, at the same time a
post of deputy foreign minister responsible for Ukraine’s European
integration. This fact indicates rather high priority demonstrated by Ukraine
in the isuue of Transnistria solution (his predecessor Dmytro Tkach was not
a deputy foreign minister), and also strong connection between RM-
Transnistria policy of Ukraine and its European integration policy.
Vesselovsky promoted close cooperation and coordination between Ukraine
and the EU on Transnistria. He represents a generation of western-oriented
intellectuals at diplomatic service of Ukraine. His opinion and
recommendations were the core element of MFA of Ukraine decision
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making on Transnistria in the period of “Breakthrough crisis”, keeping
Ukraine in the practical alliance with the West. 
Ukraine’s steps during the crisis period
30th of August, 2006.
Kyiv, Ukraine Consultations between Russia and Ukraine on the
Transnistrian problem. From the Russian Foreign Ministry, special
ambassadors V.Keneaikin and V. Nesterushkin, from Ukraine – the
president’s special representative and deputy foreign minister Andriy
Vesselovskiy, discuss their approaches regarding negotiations, in the
presence of observers with participation from the Republic of Moldova and
Transnistria.
22nd of September, 2006
Moscow, the meeting between Russia’s deputy foreign minister G.Karasin,
and Ukraine’s deputy foreign minister A.Vesselovskiy at Russia-Ukraine
consultations regarding Transnistrian problem. According to the official
release, there was an exchange of opinions on relations between Republic
of Moldova and Transnistria, prospects for further negotiation (5+2 format)
were discussed. 
15th of October 2006
The GUAM Parliament assembly at the session did not manage to approve
measures to fight „aggressive separatism”. It was decided that the GUAM
Commission for political and juridical problems will prepare its
recommendations for the fourth session of Parliament to be held in March
2007 in Kyiv. 
17-18th of October 2006
Odessa, Ukraine. Consultations between Russian, Ukrainian and OSCE
mediators and observers from US and the EU took place, regarding
Transnistrian settlement. On the 18th of October, the observerrs and
mediators had separate meetings with Republic of Moldova and Transnistria
representatives.
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The mediators and observators expressed their availability for reaching a
viable solution in the Transnistrian problem. The Transnistrian part
underlined the importance of respecting the mutual agreement regarding
external economic trade, according to the Memorandum of the 8th of may
1997, which regulates the relations between Moldova and Transnistria.
20th of March 2007
The meeting in the 3+2 format that took place in Vienna. A call to restore
contacts between Moldova and Transnistria was launched during the
negotiation process. OSCE, Russian and Ukrainian mediators and US and
EU observers manifest their concern regarding the lack of dialogue between
the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria. 
29th of March 2007
In Moscow took place the political consultations between Russian Foreign
vice-minister, and Ucrainian Foreign vice-minister, Andriy Vesselovskiy.
During the meeting regional security problems were discussed. 
23th of April 2007
Ukrainian Foreign minister, Arseniy Yatseniuk, said in Kyiv that Ukraine
considers the settlement of Transnistrian conflict to be a priority for the
GUAM peacekeepers. Yatseniuk promissed that Ukraine would consider
every part involved in the conflict. 
11th of May 2007
Andriy Vesselovskiy and Valerii Nesterushkin noticed at the meeting the
necessity of the “5+2”negotiation format to be resumed. 
22nd of May 2007
The Supreme Soviet`s delegation led by Evghenii ªevciuk,is heading to
Moscow on celebrating Transnistrian Days suffered abodily search at the
Ukrainian customs, on its way to Odessa`s airport. 
29th of May 2007
The meeting between Valeriu Liþkai and Andriy Vesselovskiy, Ukrainian
Foreign deputy minister and presidential special envoy on Transnistrian
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problem has been held. The parties got to an agreement that will allow the
dialogue and constructive decisions. 
Transnistrian part express its concern about Moldavian Government
Decision no. 301 (custom control from Moldova on the imports from
Transnistria ) from the17th March 2007 and with regard to its possible
result on the situation in the area. 
3rd of June 2007
Serghei Pirojkov, the new Ucrainian ambassador in the Republic of
Moldova visited the Tiraspol’s State University named after T.G.
Shevchenko. As a result of his meeting with the University rector, Stepan
Beril, he decided that a cultural centre should be oppened at the University. 
04th of June 2007 
Valerii Liþkai, Transnistrian „foreign minister” met Serhiy Pirozhkov,
Ukrainian ambassador to the Republic of Moldova. They talked about the
current situation and previous agreements. The Transnistrian part expressed
its concern about Moldavian Government Decission no. 301 S. Pirozhkov
said that it is necessary to hold consultations between all parts involved. He
also said that Ukraine intends to protect the rights of its economic agents.
7th of June 2007
Victor Yushchenko,Ukraine’s President, during his meeting with Andrei
Stratan, MAEIE of R.M., stated that Ukraine`s position remains unchanged
– Kyiv sustains a peaceful solution based on Republic of Moldova`s
sovereignty and integrity. Ukraine’s President underlined the necessity of
bilateral disussions and Ukraine`s interest in „developpment on all
directions for a colaboration between Moldova and Ukraine, on the level of
cultural and humanitarian understanding”. Yushchenko suggested that the
minoritiy rights should be protected. During the press conference, after the
meeting, Andrei Stratan denied the possibility of signing separate
documents between Republic of Moldova and Russia on CIS summit on
10th June 2007 in Sankt-Petersburg.
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25th of June 2007
Istanbul. Vladimir Voronin had a meeting with Viktor Yushchenko, and
restated the Moldovian authorities` interest in the resume of negotiation in
the „5+2” format. The head of the state mentioned Ukraine`s contribution to
Transnistrian settlement and his gratitude to Viktor Yushchenko. 
12th of July 2007
Alexandr Chaly, Deputy Head of the President’s secretariat stated in Kyiv
that the situation of Transnistrian settlement will be discussed at Viktor
Yuschenko`s visit in Moldova. 
10th of September 2007
Vasile ªova, Reintegration minister had a meeting with the Ucrainian
abassador in Moldova, Serghei Pirojkov. The parties talked about the
Transnistrian settlement and negotiations in the 5+2 format. The parties
exchanged opinions regarding Moldavian-Ukrainian colaboration and
border transparency, with EUBAM support.
19th of September 2007
Ukraine’s Foreign vice minister, Andriy Vesselovskiy and Russian special
ambassador Valerii Nesterushkin discused in Moscow about the resume of
negotiation process regarding Transnistrian settlement. 
30th of September 2007
Pro-Russian parties of Ukraine won at polling station at the Ukraine’s
Embassy in RM. 70% of Ukraine citizens voted for Viktor Yanukovich
Party of Regions 10% – for Progressive-socialist party of Natalia Vitrenko.
Yulia Tymoshenko`s block gained 5%, pro-presidential „Our Ukraine” –
4%. 
16th of November 2007
Andriy Veselovskiy, in his brief at Kyiv stated that informational
consulation regarding Trasnistrian settlement in 5+2 format will be
resumed. He said that this format was going to a change. 
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29th of November 2007 
Igor Smirnov met Ukrainian ambassador, Serhiy Pirozhkov. One of the
main theme was bilateral cooperation for humanitarian area, especially
teaching in Transnistria in the Ukrainian language.
20th of December 2007 
Tiraspol. Ukrainian cultural centre visited by Serhiy Pirozhkov, Ukrainian
ambassador to Moldova..
17th of January 2008
Ukrainian Foreign minister, Volodymyr Ogryzko and OSCE president, Ilkka
Kanerva, said that the negotiation process in 5+2 format must be unblocked.
The parties suggested that an international mission should be created with
Russian, Republic of Moldova and Trasnistria’s participation. 
29th of January 2008
The meeting beetween Valerii Liþkai and UKrainian ambassador, Serhiy
Pirozhkov. The parties talked resuming of full-fledged political
consultations. Ukrainian part initiated the common examination regarding
demarcation of the Trasnistrian segment of Ukrainian border. 
02nd of  April 2008
Ukraine`s joining NATO is a strategic objective and a priority to Ukraine`s
foreign policy, said the ambassador Serhiy Pirozhkov. But today’s problem
is represented by the Trasnistrian settlement. Ambassador underlined the
fact that the conflict must be solved as soon as possible. Ukraine as a
guarantor-country is doing everything possible so that the negotitaion
process in 5+2 format to be resumed. In the diplomat’s opinion, the
Trasnistrian settlement will be done based on “Republic of Moldova`s
integrity, taking into account intrests of people who live on both banks of
Nister”.
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Yanukovych’s return to power in 2006: how it affected the
decisions of Ukraine
Political shift of RM’s president Voronin to close cooperation with Russia
in the Summer of 2006 coincided in time with the return to power of Victor
Yanukovych in Ukraine as a Prime Minister. Maybe this fact was one of
those which returned Voronin to the path of seeking concessions with
Putin’s Russia.
Yanukovich was preoccupied to revive Ukraine’s relations with Moscow.
As he told the Russian government daily Rossiiskaya Gazeta “Ukraine-
Russia ties will run on an altogether different track than under the “orange
regime”. We need to stop quarrelling with our neighbors and learn to have
respectful discussions ... The new government is not going to foster anti-
Russia sentiments in Ukraine”. In return, the chairman of the Russian
duma’s International Affairs Committee, Konstantin Kosachyov, underlined
Moscow’s cautious approach not to raise hackles in the West. He
commented: „Yanukovich stands for a balanced foreign policy of Ukraine.
Russian-Ukrainian relations now have a chance to overcome the crisis and
start gradual development.“ The emphasis of Russian politicians was on the
„de-ideologization“ of Russian-Ukrainian relations and their pragmatic
development.
Yanukovich tried to create a change in Ukraine’s relations with Russia,
especially at the political and diplomatic level. He was not enthusiastic
about the regional groupings such as the GUAM group (Georgia, Ukraine,
Azerbaijan and Moldova) or the Community of Democratic Choice. 
On the eve of the 2006 March elections, the Party of Regions supported the
Kremlin-staged theatrical show under the title of “Rendering Humanitarian
Assistance to People of Transnistria”. At that time Yanukovych’s key
foreign policy advisers negatively assess the existing customs regime
although in their official statements they declared their readiness to
continue to conduct the EU- and US-backed policy on that issue. Political
analysts close to Yanukovych’s camp argued at that time that Ukraine made
a mistake by introducing new customs regime in March 2006: “Instead of
backing up their compatriots, Ukraine’s authorities participated in the so-
called “blockade” of Transnistria: blocked the Transnistrian railway, limited
90 Iulian CHIFU, Oazu NANTOI, Oleksandr SUSKHO
the activity of Transnistria and Ukraine’s economic agents in spite of
incurred losses” (Kulyk, 2006)5.
RM’s leadership had some concerns regarding changes of power in Kyiv.
Even though the officials of Chiºinãu did not express their position over the
political crisis in Ukraine, the Moldovan leadership hoped that the new
government would continue the policy of the previous one on the trade
embargo over Transnistria. But Viktor Yanukovych remembers that
Moldova was one of the first CIS countries not to recognize his victory in
the presidential election of 2004, while the leader of Transnistria, Igor
Smirnov, on the second day after the elections congratulated him with the
victory… I suppose that the trade embargo over Transnistria, established by
Moldova and the previous Cabinet of Ukraine, will not last long. Moldova
hoped that Ukraine would continue seeking accession to the EU and thus
maintaining the current trade regime over Transnistria. 
However, after returning to power, Yanukovych reconsidered his position
regarding customs regulations. After new government of Ukraine formation
in August 2006, customs regime remained in force. The tightened controls
on its border with Transnistria also remained intact. The government also
joined the EU in declaring illegitimate a referendum on independence held
by the Transnistrian administration in the Autumn of 2006. 
At the same time there was no evidence for the RM that Ukraine had
enough power in Transnistria (comparable to Russia’s power) to rely on. 
Due to the uncertanty in 2007 and 2008 (new pre-term parliamentsry
elections are to be held in December 2008) we can foresee further balancing
of RM leadership between Russia, Ukraine and the EU (with specific stress
on Russia) in order to secure if not “breakthrough” - at least positive
neutrality of Moscow on reintegration of the RM.
Anyway we may assume that political developments in Ukraine were
among the factors determining President Voronin to seek
understanding and support in Moscow. 
5 http://www.eurasianhome.org/xml/t/expert.xml?lang=ru&nic=expert&pid=808
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Conclusions
Lesson learned by Ukraine from the “Breakthrough crisis” are following:
1. Ukraine has not enough positive incentives and levers to be a
unilateral “agenda-setting” actor for the parties of Transnistrian conflict.
Both Chiºinãu and Tiraspol do not see Ukraine as a real guarantor of
possible solution and even proper mediator. Level of confidence between
the major players is rather low. Therefore, the best solution for Ukraine
is to proceed with collective activities: being a leader of GUAM, at the
same time strongly connected with the EU.
2. Lost of dynamics (from Ukraine’s and the EU sides) after 2005 led to
emergence of vacuum of initiative and influence, which was
immediately filled by Russia. At the same time Russia isn’t necessary
eager to transform its evident impact into the fast-track positive and
sustainable solution of Transnistrian problem. Russia is more likely
rather to manipulate with the hypothetical opportunity of finding
solution than to try to achieve a solution in real practice. After
Georgian crisis (August 2008) Russian policy towards the RM is aimed
to demonstrate difference between “bad case” of Georgia (aspiring to
join NATO) and relatively “good case” of Moldova (preferring to keep
permanent neutrality). As a reward for the RM, Russia may not
necessary guarantee the solution, but at least avoid unilateral recognition
of Transnistria’s “independence”.
3. The foreign and security policy of the Republic of Moldova remains
unstable, vulnerable and dependent on conjuncture (electoral,
economic etc). Moldova’s European ambitions can be easily challenged
by Russia. At the same time Ukraine didn’t secure yet its credibility to
sustain as a permanent center of gravity for those nations in the Eastern
Europe, which see their future in the EU (for Republic of Moldova in
particular).
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Playing with the statehood and the future 
of the Republic of Moldova 
as an aprentice wizzard
Oazu NANTOI
1. Introduction
The Transnistrian conflict represents a direct threat to the Republic of
Moldova’s statehood and at the same time it is a cross point of interests of
different actors. Some of these interests, such as those of the EU and the
USA, coincide with those of the Republic of Moldova and are objectively
oriented towards a viable settlement of the conflict. The interests of other
actors, of Russia first of all, are in an obvious conflict with the sovereignty
principle and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova. This conflict
of interests, overlapped with the political processes from the Republic of
Moldova, Ukraine, etc can provoke situations that can result in serious
consequences. 
In this sense the situation of 2003 is significant, when President Vladimir
Voronin tried to solve the Transnistrian conflict by inviting the Russian
Federation to be the only mediator between Chiºinãu and Tiraspol. The
document known as the Kozak Memorandum was secretly drafted, without
informing the Moldovan society, OSCE, EU and the USA. The perspective
of signing it on the 25th of November 2005 provoked a wave of indignation
in the Moldovan society, alarmed the USA, OSCE and EU. 
Some experts consider that the signing of the Kozak memorandum would
have ended in a civil war in the Republic of Moldova and a serious
destabilisation of the situation in the region. Only thanks to rapid external
intervention, at the last moment, Vladimir Voronin renounced signing this
document. His relationship with Vladimir Putin was damaged. In return, the
Republic of Moldova was not involved in violent and destructive scenarios.
Nevertheless, in the interior of the Moldovan society, Vladimir Voronin,
after these events, created for himself the image of an unpredictable
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politician, that for the sake of reaching a political goal is ready to break
even the stipulations of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova. 
The extension of the EU and the geographical proximity of the
Transnistrian conflict to the eastern border of the EU represented a
justification of a more active involvement of the EU in the Transnistrian
issue, including in the negotiation process. As a result, after the
consultations from 25-26 of September 2005 in Odessa, the „pentagonal”
format was extended and was transformed in the 5+2. The USA and EU had
obtained the status of „observers” within the negotiation process. As a
result, EU had designated a special representative that spoke in the name of
EU, in the communication process with the other participants at the 5+2
format, and as well represented EU’s position. 
It is worth mentioning that the „pentagonal” format of the negotiation
process (the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria - „parties” in the
conflict; OSCE, Ukraine and Russia - „mediators”) does not reflect the
essence of the conflict and was imposed by Russia, after signing in
Moscow, on may 8th 1997, the Memorandum on the normalization of the
relations between the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria, not allowing
the settlement of the conflict. Or, when EU and USA obtained a status
within the 5+2 format, this format became a mutual control mechanism, a
mechanism of non admission of „surprises” such as the 2003 Kozak
Memorandum. 
In the summer of 2006, public opinion in the Republic of Moldova
observed, that the President of the Republic of Moldova, Vladimir Voronin,
managed to re-establish the direct dialogue with Vladimir Putin. Moreover,
in the lack of transparency circumstances, rumours started to circulate in
Chiºinãu that Vladimir Voronin once again wants to reach a solution to the
Transnistrian conflict based on a „package agreement” with Vladimir Putin.
This step made by Voronin meant that, in general, the situation of 2003 was
repeated, when, hidden from the public opinion of the Republic of Moldova
and neglecting the existence of the 5+2 negotiation format, a confusing
scenario had been plotted. 
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The following text is an analysis on the crisis of the civil society of the
Republic of Moldova and its government, represented by the president of
the PCRM (The Party of Communists from the Republic of Moldova)
Vladimir Voronin and the communist majority in the parliament. The
chronology, if this crisis is framed between August 2006 (re-launching the
dialogue between Vladimir Voronin and Vladimir Putin) and August 2008,
when the military operation of Russia in Georgia and the behaviour of the
Tiraspol regime destroyed all the illusions of the possibility of reaching the
„package agreement”. 
The created situation after this initiative of Vladimir Voronin and Russia’s
reaction, meets all three elements of a crisis situation. 
Uncertainty - the lack of any true information regarding the essence of the
negotiated issues; the mass propaganda campaign, initiated by the Chiºinãu
government, really a creation of illusions regarding the possibility of
reaching a rapid and miraculous settlement of the issue, the lack of any
univocal reaction of Russia towards Chiºinãu’s offer.
Limited time available - the civil society, being uninformed on the essence
of the negotiated issues, was in a situation when it was difficult to react
promptly to the threats that could come as a consequence of Chiºinãu’s
policy. 
Important values at stake - in the electoral campaign of 2005, the political
parties consolidated against the threat of intervention of the Russian
Federation in the political process. This temporary consolidation for
avoiding the risk of the intervention of the Russian Federation played its
role, also did the re-election of Vladimir Voronin, with the votes of the non-
communist MP’s, as a president of the Republic of Moldova. Or the re-
launching of the secret negotiations between Vladimir Voronin and
Vladimir Putin annihilated this partnership between the power and the
opposition and the civil society. Moreover, in the circumstances when the
Russian Federation did not give up the idea of creating a new state instead
of the Republic of Moldova, one composed of Transnistria and the rest that
is left from the Republic of Moldova, these secret negotiations had become
a real threat to the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova.
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2. Context
The analysis of the events that happened over the last couple of years
proves the existence of an interesting competition between the participants
of the 5+2 negotiation format. This set of interests differs substantially from
those declared by the participants of the negotiation process and this fact
determines the uncertainty regarding the unfolding of the events, as well as
the risks and challenges of a crisis situation. Or, in the situation where the
negotiation process in this format was stopped in February 2006, the
analysis of the crisis situation needs the evaluation of the interaction
between the actors involved the Transnistrian issue, depending on their
position towards the perspective of re-establishing the territorial integrity of
the Republic of Moldova. 
Domestic Evolution in the Republic of Moldova
After the parliamentary election on the 6th of March 2005, CPRM obtained
56 mandates (out of 101), which were not sufficient for the re-election of
Vladimir Voronin as President. Here we need to be mentione that during the
electoral campaign, Chiºinãu’s officials had shown nervousness in relation
with the Kremlin’s attempts to interfere in the development of the
campaign. On this background there took place the closeness between
CPRM and CDPP, which jointly had accused the „Democrat Moldova”
electoral block of collaboration with Russia.In the same manner,the threat
of destabilization of the situation because of Russia had served as a
justification for the voting of Vladimir Voronin as a president of the
Republic of Moldova, on April 4th , 2005. This change in the behaviour of
the political parties from the Republic of Moldova created an
unprecedented situation, when some of the decisions in the Parliament were
voted unanimously. First of all, this referred to the Transnistrian problems
as well. So, on June 10th 2005, the parliament of the Republic of Moldova
passed the Declaration through which the notions of „democratization” and
„demilitarization” of the Transnistrian region were defined. At the defining
of the draft law on the basic principles of the special legal status of the
localities from the left bank of Nistru, passed unanimously on July 22,
2005, participated not only opposition partie members but also experts
representing the civil society. 
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The Government formed by CPRM after the elections on the 6th of March
was supposed to come in front of the Parliament with a program of
reunification of the country.This program, after being passed by the
Parliament, and taking the political responsibilities of the CPRM, should
have become a law for the executive power, including for the president of
the country. In reality, the stipulations of the Parliament of Iushenko’s Plan,
were not critically analysed and the political responsibilities were not
assumed by the CPRM. 
The unanimity phase, as well as the illusion phase regarding the capacity of
the President Voronin to conform to the democratic rule of law norms were
over by the end of 2005. After this the CPRM fraction from the Parliament
had re-become a docile voting machine and the expectances of the
opposition and the civil society regarding correct dialogues with the power
vanished. 
After being reinstalled in power, in the situation when his personal power
was not threatened by anyone, Vladimir Voronin re-started the insistent
efforts to re-establish the direct dialogue with Russia’s President Vladimir
Putin.The idea of reaching a „package” agreement with the Russian
Federation regarding the settlement of the Transnistrian issue appeared on
this background. There is information that the leaders of a parliamentary
fraction were familiarized with the content of the presidential proposals. Or,
the society as a whole was totally uninformed and these opinions were not
faced with the opinion of the expert community. 
All ideas, initiatives and actions implicated in the relations with the
Transnistrian issues were monopolized by the president of the country and
his entourage. This means that presidents Vladimir Voronin took the entire
political responsibility for his initiatives. Only once, on April 11th, 2007,
President Vladimir Voronin tried to consult the opinion of the “constructive
opposition”, of the leaders of CDPP and DPM, regarding the key issues of
the “package” agreement. This step made by President Vladimir Voronin
was dictated from one side by his trust in the possibility of reaching rapid
solutions to the conflict. 
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From the other side, the scenario of a rapid settlement of the conflict
supposed including the anticipated dissolving of the Parliament. Initiating
these consultations, President Voronin wanted to prevent possible strong
reactions from the opposition, proving at the same time the absolute
incompetence regarding the essence of the conflict and especially the role
of Russia in these issues. Moreover, CPRM established rigid control over
the mass-media of the Republic of Moldova, especially the public TV
channels. Using this leverage, Vladimir Voronin maintains the myth of
settlement of the Transnistrian issue based on his efforts, amongst the
Moldovan society. 
As a consequence, the opposition, as well as the civil society, is totally
lacking the possibility of informing the citizens of the Republic of Moldova
regarding the idea of a “package agreement”. Moreover, all the critics are
called “unionists” etc. This means that the society in general is uniformed
and manipulated by the regime created by Vladimir Voronin. 
Ukraine’s behaviour
Ukraine is an extremely important actor in the Transnistrian issue. First of
all, this results from the geographical situation of the territory controlled by
the Tiraspol regime. Unlike Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Transnistria does
not have common borders with Russia and is situated between Ukraine and
the rest of the territory of the Republic of Moldova. In exchange, the
Tiraspol regime controls 452 km out of the 1222 km of the Moldo-Ukranian
border. For the economical survival of Transnistria, in both legal aspect as
well as the aspects regarding smuggling fluxes, Ukraine’s attitude is crucial.
Moreover, all external trips of the representatives of Tiraspol authorities
including those whose entries in EU member states and USA are banned,
are possible from the territory of Ukraine especially from the Odessa
airport. 
At the same time, a part of the political class from Ukraine does not lose the
opportunity to mention that Transnistria was part of the Autonomous Soviet
Socialist Republic of Moldova - ASSRM, created on the 12th of October,
1924 on the territory of the Soviet Ukraine. In the language of this category
of politicians, this means that “the Stalinist regime, arbitrarily tore apart
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Transnistria from the national territory of soviet Ukraine” when on August
2nd 1940, decided the creation of ASSRM, placed on the left bank of Nistru.
As a result, this segment of the political class from Ukraine is not
enthusiastic about the perspective of Chiºinãu’s authorities taking over
Transnistria. 
The new administration of Kiev, formed as a result of the events known as
the “orange revolution”, announced his intentions to play a more active role
as a regional power, including the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict.
On April 22nd 2005 in Chiºinãu, the GUAM meeting took place, occasion in
which Victor Iushenko announced “the seven steps” in the settlement of the
Transnistrian conflict. As a result, on May 16th, 2005 in Vinnitsa, the
document known as “the Iushenko plan” was presented. In general, this
Plan supposes the democratization of the Transnistrian region; unfolding of
the election in local public power under international control; creating in
this way local power bodies, recognized by the international community
and organising later negotiations between these bodies and the central
authorities in Chiºinãu, in order to reach a solution to the Transnistrian
conflict. 
It is necessary to mention that the Republic of Moldova conformed to the
stipulations of this plan in what was related to the adaptation of the law on
the basic principles of the legal status of the localities from the left bank of
Nistru (Transnistria) on the 22nd of July,2005. The later behaviour of the
Kiev officials, in their relations with the Transnistrian issue, proved that in
Kiev there were several power centres and, at the same time, this problem
was on the agenda of the dialogues between Russia and EU. 
The first acknowledgement can be exemplified by the evolution of the
situation in the customs controls issue of those 452 km of Moldovan-
Ukrainian border controlled by the Tiraspol regime. On 26th of May, the
Government of Ukraine adopted the Decision No. 400 and the Ordinances
no. 164r and 165r. After these official decisions of the Ukrainian
government, that were supposed to come into force within 45 days, the
economic entities of Transnistria should have conformed to the new
customs rules, formulated by Chiºinãu’s government. Otherwise, the
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Ukrainian customs officers would not have approved the passage of goods
from and into Transnistria, through the territory of Ukraine. 
But on the 14th of July 2005, the “official visit” of Igor Smirnov to Kiev
took place- here he met the president of Ukraine, Victor Iushenko.
Following this meeting, probably, the official decision of the Government
of Ukraine remained unapplied and the economic entities from Transnistria
continued to perform export/import operations through the Ukrainian
border, without being registered as economic entities of the Republic of
Moldova. It needs to be mentioned that the consolidation of an economic
group in Transnistria can be explained only by the fact that this region was
used for the realization of some illegal economical activities, smuggling,
first of all, at a large scale. 
The second ascertainment can be exemplified by the launching, on
December 15th, 2005, of the common declaration of the presidents of Russia
and Ukraine while, at first, the Kiev administration had taken the entire
initiative regarding the conflict settlement,the Common declaration of those
two presidents, stated, among other things, that “Russia and Ukraine will
coordinate their practical moves, oriented towards a faster and stepped of
the all inclusive and final settlement, by political and exclusively peaceful
means, through the negotiation between the Republic of Moldova and
Transnistria”. This means that President Iushenko was forced to accept the
“coordination of the practical moves” with Russia. 
Here we need to add that Ukraine, regardless of the evolution of the
negotiation process, consequently promoted the policy of consolidation of
the Ukrainian ethnic factor in Transnistria. This manifested including
through offering the Ukrainian citizenship to the Ukrainian ethnics from
Transnistria. In the circumstances when the Constitution of Ukraine does
not permit multiple citizenships, this category of persons will not be able to
be involved in the reintegration process of the Republic of Moldova, not
having the possibility to be citizens of the Republic of Moldova. .
The fact that Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova were included in the EU
vicinity policy had created a new situation for the political class of Ukraine.
Because, from this moment, the behaviour of Ukraine in relationship with
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Transnistria should take into account the position of EU. It is obvious that
this situation made possible the appearance, on June 3rd 2005, of the joint
letter of the presidents of Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, regarding
the creation of the international customs control in the Transnistrian
segment of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border. This step proved that the
position of EU, at that moment, became more important for Kiev’s
administration, than the position of Russia and different internal interest
groups.
We can conclude that the behaviour of Ukraine in relation with the
Transnistrian issue mostly depends of the evolution of the internal political
situation. Or, at this moment there exist several opinions that the quality of
this internal confrontation affects the perspective of approach of Ukraine to
NATO and EU. From this results that the Transnistrian issue is not a top
priority for the political class from Ukraine and it is not likely that Ukraine
will truly get involved in the settlement of the Transnistrian issue, based on
the common approaches with EU and the Republic of Moldova. 
Russia’s behaviour
The phase of the efforts made by the leadership of the Republic of Moldova
to reach a “package settlement” in the dialogue with Kremlin, coincide with
the end of the second mandate of president Putin and with the phase of
continuous growth of the prices of the energetic resources exported by
Russia and with the radicalization of the behaviour of the Russian
Federation on the international arena. 
The end of the second mandate of Vladimir Putin gave birth to a wave of
speculations regarding his behaviour. Some even considered that he would
follow the example of Alexander Lucashenko, to change the Constitution
and that he would accept the third mandate. Other considered that he will be
satisfied with the status of head of the GazProm Empire. It is obvious that
even at the end of the second mandate, Putin remains an important figure in
the power hierarchy of Russia. 
As it is known, Russia chose the path of sterilization of the rule of law
structures and of the political democracy, and the realization of the
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operation “The Successor”. For this, at the beginning, in Russia, the
conditions were created step by step, so that the function of ‘prime
minister’ would be as protected as possible. The trust of the population in
Vladimir Putin was used in this regard. In the beginning, conditions for the
consolidation of a mega party like “Edinaya Rossia” were created.Vladimir
Putin “accepted” becoming the president of this political group without
formally being its member. In parallel, in order to have a controlled
“pluralism”, he assured the creation of a political clone named
“Spravedlivaya Rossia”. 
Both of these political formations use the word “Rossia”, which reflects the
exploiting of patriotic feelings for political reasons. In reality, in a multi-
ethnic and multi-confessional society, with a fresh memory of those two
wars from Chechnya, with multiple existing problems in the Caucasus and
in the circumstances of the afflux of millions of immigrants for the Asian
zone of the former USSR, this policy of Kremlin generated xenophobic
feelings, street nationalism and the appearance of neo-fascist groups. In
Russia, tens of persons were killed on the streets because of their skin color
or their “Caucasian” look. In other words, Putin’s group fed with intention
the “velicorussian chauvinism” and the xenophobic feeling in order to
manipulate the society more effectively. 
Putin’s group reacted negatively to the events in Georgia and Ukraine
named “colored revolutions”. In their perception, these were operations of
the western secret services that plotted to surround Russia with political
enemy regimes, in order to later start the realization of a similar scenario in
the interior of Russia and its further destruction. This perception led to the
consolidation of the state’s control over nongovernmental organizations. 
In Russia, the number of the nongovernmental organizations financed from
abroad was dramatically reduced. In parallel, the power created some youth
organizations (“Nashi” - “Ours”) using the control of the power over this
social segment. In the perception of the authors of this scenario, the risk of
involvement of the youth from Russia in an eventual “colored revolution”
was annihilated. The Kremlin ideologists also used this youth organization
to create similar organizations in Crimea and in the Transnistrian region of
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the Republic of Moldova, in support of the local separatist and pro-Russian
authorities.
In the last instances, the realisation of the operation “The Successor”
proved that in the Russian Federation, the political liberties were
annihilated by the Putin regime and that in Russia was enthroned a political
regime where the political democracy elements and the rule of law plays a
purely decorative role and insures achieving the goals established by
Vladimir Putin’s group.
On the external level, Vladimir Putin’s Russia positioned itself more and
more openly against the “monopole world” headed by the US. The
enlargement of NATO provoked an extremely negative reaction in the
Kremlin. Russia could not oppose the integration to NATO of the Baltic
States and former Warsaw pact countries. The perspective of NATO
perspective for Georgia and especially for Ukraine represent for the Putin
administration accomplishing the surrounding of Russia with enemy and
aggressive countries. In this sense, Putin’s speech at the Conference on the
security issues in Munich, on February 11 2007, represented an element of
turn over - Putin’s Russia decided to counterattack towards the US. In this
context, Russia’s policy towards Iran can be also included. 
On July 14th 2007, Vladimir Putin signed the Decree regarding the
introduction of the moratorium over the respect of the provisions of the
Treaty on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. This step meant that
Russia perceives the behaviour of Boris Yeltsin’s Russia as a series of
shameful give-ups and humiliation in relations with the West and now,
when Russia became powerful, the moment for revenge appeared. 
The US and the EU
US showed interest towards the Transnistrian conflict over several years, in
its direct capacity but also in the collective organizations like OSCE, UN
and NATO. It is enough to mention that almost all the heads of OSCE
mission to the Republic of Moldova, which started its activity in 1993, were
Americans. The main preoccupation of the American diplomacy was related
to the illegal presence of Russian Federation troops on the territory of the
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Republic of Moldova. In this regards, US used several occasions to ask for
the evacuation of these troops. Other aspects of the Transnistrian issues,
such as the internal organization of the Republic of Moldova after the
settlement of the Transnistrian issue, preoccupied the American diplomacy
less. 
So, on the 2nd and the 3rd of July 2002 in Kiev, the idea of settlement of the
conflict by the “federalization” of the Republic of Moldova was launched.
The American diplomacy directly supported this idea, which in the last
instance could not be realised, but also was not supported by the society of
the Republic of Moldova. Anyway, an unofficially recognized information
tells that in the night of the 25th of November 2003, the US directly and
actively intervened in blocking the signature on the Kozak Memorandum. It
can be supposed that this firmness from the side of the US was determined
by the fact that this document was supposed to legalize, for at least 20
years, the Russian military presence in the Republic of Moldova. 
After the terrorist attacks of the 11th September 2001, and especially after
the begining of the military operation in Iraq, US became more distanced
from the Transnistrian issue. Nonetheless, after the consultation on 25-26
September 2005 in Odessa, the US became observer in the negotiation
process. Moreover, during 2008, US initiated the trials to extend over the
Transnistrian zone the “Millennium Challenge” program, wishing to
contribute, in this way, to the “opening” of the Transnistrian regime. 
But, these attempts of the US do not coincide with the vision of Chiºinãu’s
officials. They consider that these programs can be launched in Transnistria
only when obtaining some political concessions of the Tiraspol regime.
Moreover, since the US was involved in activities in Iraq and Afghanistan
and was counting on Russia’s collaboration in relation with Iran, there were
no reasons to place the Transnistrian issue in the top list of the problems
discussed with Russia. At the same time, Putin’s Russia sees the US as a
strategic adversary and promoter of the ideology of the “monopole world”.
As a result, any problem approached by the US automatically creates an
adversary reaction from Russia. That’s for saying that US, at least at this
moment, is not involved plenary in the Transnistrian issue.
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EU became an active actor in the Transnistrian issue in 2003, when Brussels
acknowledged that after the accension of Romania to the EU, the Republic
of Moldova will become a neighbour country of the EU and the
Transnistrian conflict will be at a distance of one hundred kilometres from
the eastern border of the EU. This meant that EU had more reasons to be
preoccupied with the Transnistrian conflict than Russia, which is several
thousand kilometres away from Transnistria, separated from it by the
territory of Ukraine. On February the 27th, 2003, EU and the US introduced
interdictions of circulation on their territory for a group of persons from the
Tiraspol administration. In May the 15th, 2003, after the visit of the “troika”
in Kiev, the Protocol between the State customs Committee of Ukraine and
the Customs Department of the Republic of Moldova was signed after the
application of the stipulations by which the economic entities from
Transnistria started to register in Chiºinãu. 
On February 22, 2005 the Action Plans between EU-Moldova and EU-
Ukraine were signed and EU started regional actions the Transnistrian issue.
These plans foresee coordinated actions in order to establish an efficient
control over the border between the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine
border. The EUBAM provoked furious reaction in Tiraspol and a
categorically negative one in Moscow. EU named its Special Representative
for the Transnistrian conflict. As a result of the policy promoted by the EU,
including the asymmetric trade regime offered to the Republic of Moldova,
the economic companies from Transnistria registered in Chiºinãu and
export more and more goods on the EU market. It can be concluded that EU
become more and more an efficient and important actor in the settlement of
the Transnistrian issue. 
3. Chronology of the Conflict 
21st -22nd of July 2006
Saint Petersburg Informal CIS Summit was a good occasion for Vladimir
Voronin to tell Vladimir Putin about his intention to relaunch the direct
dialog with Kremlin, on the Transnistrian issue. The interruption in
communications between Putin and Voronin was caused by Voronin’s last
minute refusal to sign the „Kozac Memorandum” on the 25th of November
2005. 
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08th of August 2006
At a bilateral meeting between Putin-Voronin, that took place in Moscow,
the President of the Republic of Moldova suggested Putin to find an idea to
bring the Transnistrian conflict to an end. Voronin’s idea was that Russia
would get much more from an agreement with Chiºinãu than supporting the
existent Transnistrian government. Mark Tkaciuk, president Voronin’s
adviser and Vasile ªova, Reintergation minister were assigned to do the
negotiations with Iuri Zubakov, the  deputy secretary of Russia Security
Council. 
13th of September 2006
A comment was launched by Russia’s Foreign Ministry in which Kiev and
Chiºinãu are accused of “blocking” Transnistria and recognizing the 17th
September “referendum”, although other states and international
organizations said they will not recognize the “referendum”.
17th of September 2006
The Tiraspol, the Central Electoral Comission, announced that 77.63%
“RMN” citizens took part at the “referendum” and almost 97% of them
answered “YES” at the first question. 
The questions suggested at the “referendum” were:
1. Do you support the Independence of Transnistria and its additional
annexation to Russian Federation? 
2. Do you consider renouncing at the independence and the reintegration
into the Republic of Moldova? 
19th of September 2006
The comment from Russian’s Foreign Ministry was released - in it the
“RM’s” “referendum” is qualified as an “act of direct democracy”. 
9-10th of November 2006
Moscow. Republic of Moldova-Russia consultations1 took place, regarding
Transnistrian issue resolution. Presidential counsellor Mark Tkaciuk, Vasile
1 During this analyses, there were at least seven departures of Reintegration minister,
Vasile ªova and presidential counselor, Mark Tkaciuk out of Mosocw, but most of them
were not presented to the press.
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ªova, the minister of Reintegration and V. Sturza, Ambassador of the
Republic of Moldova in Russia negotiate with the Russian special
Ambassadors V.Keneaikin and V.Nesteruºkin. They focused on issues about
the same theme held in Odessa on 17-18 October. They talked about the
perspective of seeking in the future, a model for a sustainable solution in
Transnistria.
10th of December 2006 
Igor Smirnov is declared winner (82.4%) of the 10-th of December 2006
presidential elections in the separatist region. His opponents gathered only
14.1% all-together. 
22nd of January 2007 
Vladimir Putin considers Kosovo to be a real precedent for the regional
conflicts in the CIS area.
09th of February 2007
Russian Defense minister Serghei Ivanov, said that Russia will not evacuate
its troops from Transnistria, despite the ”CFE Adapted Treaty”. This
statement was made during the Russia-NATO meeting, in Sevillia.
10th of February 2007
Putin’s speech at the Munich Conference, when he severely criticized the
US. 
05th of April 2007
Republic of Moldova does not want the Transnistrian issue to dominate its
bilateral relations with Russia, said Vladimir Voronin during his visit to
Moscow. The foreign minister, Andrei Stratan stated: „Our bilateral
meetings with the Russian President allowed us to progress in every acute
problems that we have”.
11th of April 2007
Vladimir Voronin presented to the leaders of CDPP and DPM the key
elements of the “package” agreement that should be reached in direct
dialogue with Vladimir Putin. They foresaw, inclusively the dissolval of
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both Parliaments, from Chiºinãu and Tiraspol and the call, in November
2007 for anticipated election on the entire territory of the Republic of
Moldova, under the circumstances of preliminary evacuation of the Russian
Federation troops. Iurie Rosca, the leader of CDPP published the
information about this meeting in the “Flux” newspaper. This was the first
“leak of information” for the public opinion from the Republic of Moldova
on the essence of the negotiations with the Kremlin. 
04th of May 2007
On the occasion of the 10th ‘anniversary’ of the ‘Memorandum regarding
the normalisation of the relations between Republic of Moldova and
Transnistria’ (8th of May 1997), Russian Foreign Ministry launches a
statement. Russia’s position is that the future solution will be decided, based
on a mutual understanding between „the parties”.
7th of June 2007
During a meeting with Andrei Stratan, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Moldova, Viktor Yuschenko, Ukraine’s President, stated that
Ukraine’s position was unchanged - Kyiv supports a peaceful solution
based on Republic of Moldova’s sovereignty and integrity. The Ukrainian
President underlined the necessity of bilateral discussions and Ukraine`s
interest in „development the cooperation between Republic of Moldova and
Ukraine, on the level of cultural and humanitarian issues. Yuschenko
suggested that the minority should be protected”. During the press
conference, after the meeting, Andrei Stratan denied the possibility of
signing separate documents between the Republic of Moldova and Russia at
the CIS summit on the 10th of June 2007 in Saint Petersburg. He mentioned
that, at the base of negotiation should be the „Yuschenko plan” and the
Moldavian Parliament’s laws from 2005. 
07th of June 2007
Consultations between the Republic of Moldova, EU and US
representatives regarding the Transnistrian problem. During the
conversation on the telephone with the EU High Representative for Security
policies, Vladimir Voronin told Javier Solana that „the accepted solution for
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Transnistrian settlement will be found in the framework of the 5+2 format
of negotiations”. Vladimir Voronin had also consultations with the US
ambassador in Chiºinãu, Michael Kirby and the chief of European
Commission delegation in Republic of Moldova, Cezare de Montis.
8th of June 2007
Igor Ivanov, secretary of Security Council of the Russian Federation, said
that „Kosovo sets out a dangerous precedent that will influence the future
conflict resolution”.
10th of June 2007
The presidents of Russian Federation and the Republic of Moldova meet in
Saint Petersburg and discuss about the development of the bilateral
cooperation and the perspective of Transnistrian settlement. They also
talked about the Moldovan wine industry on the Russian markets. 
13th of June 2007
Republic of Moldova requests the evacuation of Russian troops and the
modification of peacekeepers contingent in region, said the vice-minister
for Foreign Affairs, Eugenia Chistruga, in Vienna. She supports a
transparent and full evacuation of troops and weapons from the area and she
promised that the national procedures for ratification of the adapted CFE
Treaty will be concluded at this moment.
17th of June 2007
Transnistrian Militia occupied Corjova election centre (Dubassari suburb)
and thwarted the attempts to held the local elections in the East bank for the
Parliament in Chiºinãu (as in the rest of the territory of the Republic of
Moldova). The Reintegration minister of the RM expressed his regrets
through a statement. 
19th of June 2007
Luxembourg. Vladimir Voronin had a meeting with the EU Special
Representative for the Foreign and security policies, Javier Solana. The
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parties discussed about Transnistrian settlement on the eve of Vladmir
Voronin`s visit to Moscow, on the 22th June 2007. 
22th of June 2007
Moscow. At the Novo-Ogareovo residence, Vladimir Putin and Vladimir
Voronin discussed during three hours Chiºinãu’s proposals for the
Transnistrian „package deal”. Normally, if Russia would have accepted the
Republic of Moldova’s proposals, Moscow should have given a sign. 
26th of June 2007
Russia and NATO did not reach a compromise regarding the CFE Treaty,
said NATO General Secretary, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer. The impediment is
represented by Russia’s failure to evacuate its troops from Georgia and
Republic of Moldova. 
29th of June 2007
Vladimir Voronin had an informal meeting with Russian Ukrainian, EU,
US, European Commission Ambassadors, CoE and OSCE representatives
in Chiºinãu. The head of the state informed the diplomats about the current
situation of the Transnistrian settlement and his discussion with Vladimir
Putin on this theme and others. Vladimir Voronin stated again that the
negotiation in 5+2 must resume and he announced the future visit to
Republic of Moldova of the Russian Development and Commerce Minister,
Gherman Gref. 
14th of July 2007
Vladimir Putin signed the Decree on Russia’s retreat from the CFE Treaty.
19th of July 2007
Russian Foreign minister`s declaration on the 15th anniversary of the
Agreement on the peaceful settlement of the armed conflict in the
Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova. The peacekeeping
operation is a success and the mission`s format is the appropriate one and it
must not be modified. 
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23rd of July 2007
On local TV, Vladimir Voronin mentioned the fact that peacekeepers are not
necessary in the Security area. During the period of reintegration there
should not remain any person in uniform - neither Russian, Ukrainian, nor
European - in this region. He mentioned that the peacekeepers’ issue has
being discussed by Republic of Moldova and Russia. Also, Voronin
suggested that Transnistria should take part in the Executive of the country
as is the case with the Gagauz autonomy. 
31th August 2007
Igor Smirnov does not share the optimism of the Republic of Moldova
regarding the rapid perspective of the settlement of the Tansnistrian issue.
He says that Transnistria is ready to come to the negotiation table in the 5+2
format, if there are guarantees that Republic of Moldova will not exercise
any pressure. Smirnov underlined that Transnistria will fight for its
Independence.
01st of October 2007
The MFAEI of the Republic of Moldova issued a declaration, stating that
Moldova will ratify the CFE Treaty only after the full evacuation of the
Russian troops from its territory. In the press release was expressed the
regret on the fact that the calls for abstination from unilateral actions,
launched during the extraordinary conference on the CFE Treaty, held on
12-15 of June in Vienna, were ignored. 
02nd October 2007
Piotr Denisenko, the head of the Central Election Committee of Transnistria
met Igor Smirnov and told him the results of his visit to Moscow, where
issues related to the elections in Transnistria were discussed, as well about
the formation of the election committee.
04th October 2007
Vladimir Voronin gave an interview to the “Komsomoliskaia Pravda v
Moldove” newspaper, in which he presented his point of view regarding the
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Transnistrian problem. Voronin said that the Russian peacekeepers did their
job and now it’s time for them to be replaced with an international mission
of civil observers. He suggested demilitarisation and disarming and a set of
confidence building measures. Talking about Russia’s role he said that
Russia proposed the conflict’s resolution, but with the respect of Moldova`s
territorial integrity. In his meeting with Putin, the Russian president said
that his country is interested on a final resolution of the Transnistrian
conflict in an open and transparent atmosphere. Vladimir Voronin said that
he will talk more of this on 5 October on his meeting with Putin in CSI
summit at Dushanbe.
06th October 2007
Dushanbe. During CSI summit, Voronin had a meeting with Russian
president Putin. There is no information regarding the discussed issues. 
08th October 2007
The Ministry of Reintegration of the Republic of Moldova transmitted to
the Transnistrian MFA the proposal to start applying President Voronin’s
initiatives, exposed in the interview in the “Komsomolskaya Pravda v
Moldove” newspaper. The Ministry of Reintegration proposes the form of
the joint working group for the formation of the agenda and topics of the
meetings of the joint working groups of experts, in order to launch the
practical application of President Voronin initiatives. 
11th October 2007
Evghei Shevciuk, commenting the recent package deal launched by the
President Vladimir Voronin, proposed to the Parliament of the Republic of
Moldova to ratify the previously signed documents by the presidents of the
Republic of Moldova and Transnistria and afterwards, to monitor their
implementation. Inclusively, Evgheni Shevchiuk proposed to the Parliament
of the Republic of Moldova to change the Law of 22nd of July 2005 on the
basic principles of the special juridical status of the left bank of Nistru. 
18th of October 2007
During the working session of the Government of the Republic of Moldova,
in order to realize in practice the recent initiatives of President Voronin,
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working groups were established in order to write and to implement these
projects. 
2nd of November 2007
Piotr Denisenko, the head of the Central Election Committee of the
“Moldavina Transnistrian Republic”, declared that for the elections of
December the 2nd, for the State Duma of Russia 24 voting points will be
opened in the separatist region. The heads of the electoral committee will be
representatives from the Russian Embassy in the Republic of Moldova.
08th of November 2007
The Foreign Minister of the Republic of Moldova recommended the
Russian officials to abstain themselves from opening of the voting sections
in Transnistria for the State Duma elections from December the 2nd. 
12th of November 2007
Vladimir Voronin accused Romania of imperialist interests and interference
in internal affairs of his country, by financially supporting political parties
and the mass media. “Romania is Europe`s last empire that wants to change
the Moldovans into Romanians”, said Voronin.
26th of November 2007
Mosocow. Evgheni Shevciuk, „Obnovlenie” party president of the separatist
region, signed with the member of the General Council Presidium of the
“Edinaia Rossia” party, Konstantin Kosarev, the agreement on the interparty
collaboration. 
26th of November 2007
At the indication of the Prime Minister Vasile Tarlev, the working groups,
created to realize in practice the initiatives of the president Vladimir
Voronin regarding the Transnistrian issue, are schedule to present in 3 days
the drafts proposals to the Ministry of Economy and Commerce and to the
Ministry of Reintegration. The prime minister mentioned that the Ministry
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of Reintegration together with the representatives of Transnistria are to
elaborate the mechanisms of interaction in order to realize the projects. 
29th of November 2007
The Russian Embassy in the Republic of Moldova issued a press release on
the elections for the State Duma of the Russian Federation. It states that on
the territory of the Republic of Moldova, the voting will be organized in the
premises of the Embassy, but in Transnistria - on the territory of the Russian
military units. This categorically contravenes to the realities. The voting
sections were opened in buildings that have nothing in common with the
Russian military units. 
02th of December 2007
About 47, 7 thousand Russian citizens from the Republic of Moldova
participate in the elections for the State Duma of Russia. For “Edinaia
Rossia” voted 83,58% of them. The Transnistrian officials affirm that in
Transnistria in the elections participated about 45 thousand voters.
06th of December 2007
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration-MFAEI of the
Republic of Moldova issued a declaration regarding the declarations of the
Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Serghei Lavrov, made in an interview
for the German newspaper “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung”. Denying the
affirmations made by Lavrov, the MFAEI stated that “by the end of 2001
the Russian Federation had evacuated form the territory of the Republic of
Moldova only a part of the conventional armament, and especially the
weaponry regulated by the CFE Treaty”. “The other two components of the
conventional military forces, about 20 thousand tonnes of ammunitions and
more than a 1000 military, continue to stay without any official base on the
territory of the Republic of Moldova”. In this regard, “it is obvious the
inconsistence of the other affirmation, that is repeated for propaganda
reasons by some officials of the Russian Federation, according to which the
agreement signed on July 21, 1992 in Moscow serves as a legal basis for the
Russian military presence in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of
Moldova”. Moreover, the interdependence between the evacuation of the
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military troop process and the one of political regulation of the
Transnistrian issue, is groundless. 
06th of December 2007
Brussels. Vladimir Voronin and NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop
Scheffer, discussed the present status of the Transnistrian issue settlement
process, including the initiatives of the Chiºinãu leader regarding the
confidence building between Chiºinãu and Tiraspol. In this context,
Vladimir Voronin mentioned that there is an important necessity for making
important changes in the National Security Conception of the Republic of
Moldova, in order to reflect the initiatives of Chiºinãu regarding the united
future armed forces between Chiºinãu and Tiraspol.
12th of December 2007 
Russian Foreign Ministry released a statement of Russia’s self-suspension
from the CFE Treaty. 
18th of December 2007 
Evghei Shevciuk informed about the decision the Russian leadership to
offer 640 million Russian rubblesto the separatist region as an aid for “the
compatriots from abroad”. 
19th of December 2007
Vladimir Voronin declared that the Transnistrian issue is solved from the
economical point of view and practically, solved in the minds of the
participants to the process. “The following months will prove how much I
was right in this estimation” - declared Vladimir Voronin. 
15th of January 2008
Brusseles. Vladimir Voronin presented his plan for solving the Transnistrian
conflict and asked for an EU financial support. The president of the
European Commission, Jose Manuel Barosso assured Chiºinãu that EU will
grant all the financial help needed in order to solve the Transnistrian
“THE BREAKTHROUGH CRISIS” OF A QUICK SOLUTION IN TRANSNISTRIA 115
conflict. Vladimir Voronin mentioned that Tiraspol has not yet answer to his
initiatives regarding common problems. Voronin notified EU about
“tensions” between Moldova and Romania. 
21st of January 2008
After the meeting with Russian Patriarch, Alexii the II-nd, Vladimir
Voronin discribed as an aggressive activity “the intention of Romania to
create, in Moldova its own religious structures. The so called Bessarabia
Metropole and its structures is an aggressive Romanian policy against
sovereignty of Republic of Moldova”.
22nd of January 2008
Vladimir Voronin and Vladimir Putin have noticed positive changes in
bilateral relations.
25th of January 2008
At the traditional meeting with foreign diplomats, the President of the
Republic of Moldova announced that the Transnistrian issue is the main
concern for Chiºinãu in 2008. „Our dialogues in Brussels and our meetings
at the highest level shows about the fact that we manage to discover the
cardinal link for understanding the given situation” - said Vladimir Voronin.
25th of Janury 2008 
The Republic of Moldova Foreign Minister, Andrei Stratan, informed EU
Ambassadors in Chiºinãu about the results of Voronin`s visit to Moscow
and his meeting with Vladimir Putin. The subject was the Transnistrian
problem, about resuming the negotiation process in the 5+2 format and
Voronin`s initiative regarding confidence building between Chiºinãu and
Tiraspol. In Moscow it was underlined that the Transnistrian problem can
be solve only with respect of Republic of Moldova`s integrity and
sovereignty, and also its neutral status. 
31st of January - 01 of February 2008
The delegation composed by the Minister of Reintegration Vasile Sova,
President’s adviser on political matters, Mark Tkaciuk and the head of the
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International Treaties Department of the MFAEI, Dumitru Solcan, went to
Moscow. The reason was “the continuation of the consultations, regarding
the agreements reached by Vladimir Putin and Vladimir Voronin. They
discussed the perspectives of restarting the negotiation process in the 5+2
format. The Russian side was represented by the deputy secretary of the
Security Council, Iuri Zubakov, the Ambassadors with special missions V.
Nesteruskin and V.Keneaikin and the deputy director of the II-nd
Department for the CIS countries Nikolai Fomin. 
12th of February 2008
Moscow. During the negotiations between Vicktor Yushenko and Vladimir
Putin they decided that the collaboration between the two Foreign
Ministries should be more intense for the Transnistrian settlement. The
parties talked about the negotiation process in the 5+2 format. The expert
groups of those two countries will focus on the Transnistrian settlement
based on the common approaches. 
14th February 2008
The interview of the director of the IInd Department for the CIS countries of
the Russian MFA, V. Sorokin, appeared. It was dedicated to the bilateral
relations and the perspective of the Transnistrian settlement. The Russian
side guarantees the change of the tonality in Chiºinãu’s declarations,
regarding the “truly strategic partnership”. He expressed the dissatisfaction
regarding the new customs rules for the economic entities from Transnistria.
The existence of “systemic contradictions between the parts in conflict” and
the repeated formulas like “common state” and “special juridical status”,
are guaranteed with certainty”, says the official. It gives the hint that the
confidence building could be reached if Republic of Moldova would
recognize Transnistria as an equal part. 
Sorokin denied the existence of any plans of settlement of the conflict
prepared by Russia. At the same time, in the interview, the “Kozak
Memornadum” is mentioned as a document created jointly with the parts in
conflict and that takes into account the main ascertainment, made by the
OSCE in 1993, about the impossibility of finding a stabile formula of the
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conflict within the limits of the unitary state, without a special status,
coordinated for Transnistria. 
17th of February 2008
theIndependence of Kosovo is proclaimed. This act divided the
international community. The Republic of Moldova did not recognize the
independence of Kosovo. 
17th of February 2008
The Transnistrian Foreign Ministry announced an Action plan linked to the
proclamation of Kosovo’s Independence. 
21st of February 2008
“The self proclamation of Kosovo`s independence will influence many
European countries` situation, but the timing of Russia and Republic of
Moldova`s negotiations regarding Transnistria will not be changed”, said
the assistant of Russian president, talking about the meeting between Putin
and Voronin on the eve of the CIS summit. „Regarding the Transnistrian
settlement, Putin univocally stated his availability for a more honest relation
with leaders from Republic of Moldova and Transnistria in finding a
solution”. Prihodiko said that Putin was very pleased with the development
of the collaboration. 
21st of February 2008
“I think that we can move further with our bilateral relation in our common
problem of Transnistria” - said Vladimir Voronin at the beginning of his
meeting with Vladimir Putin. 
02nd of March 2008
The press service of the Russian Embassy to Moldova announced the
results of the elections for the President of Russia on the territory of the
Republic of Moldova. According to this data, 49 386 Russian citizens went
to polls, 87, 24% (43.086) of them for Dmitri Medvedev. 46 thousands of
the voters went to the 23 voting sectors opened in Transnistria. 
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06th of March 2008
Russia’s Foreign Ministry sent to the CIS Executive Committee an official
note in which it stated that the Russian Federation, due to changed
circumstances, does not feel forced to respect the CIS Council decisions,
„regarding regulation and measures for the Abkhazia - Georgia conflict”
from 19, January 1996. By this decision, the trade, transportation and any
other relations with Abkhazia were banned. 
12th of March 2008
In Moscow took place the working meeting between Abkhazia, Transnistria
and South Ossetia presidents. They talked about the international situation,
especially about the independence of Kosovo. They all agreed that the
recognition of Kosovo`s independence sets out a new situation in the matter
of international relations. The presidents of Abkhazia, Transnistria and
South Ossetia underlined that the acknowledgement of their independence
is a necessary step that marks the end of former URSS and the fair
settlement of all conflicts. 
13th of March 2008
In the State Duma of the Russian Federation took place some hearings “on
the status of settlement of the conflicts in the CIS area and the demand to
the Russian Federation regarding the recognition of the independence of the
Republic Abkhazia, Republic South Ossetia and of the Moldovan Nistrian
Republic”. The State Duma declared that after the unilateral proclamation
of the independence of Kosovo, there is necessary for the Russian
Federation to correct its policy towards Abkhazia, South Ossetia and
Transnistria, coming from the will expressed by the local population. 
The State Duma considers, that Georgia’s will to join NATO is its sovereign
right, but remarked that Russia has the right to respect the wish and to
protect its citizens that prevail in number in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Those citizens expressed their disapproval against Georgia’s intention to
join this organization. The deputies of the State Duma had an unanimous
opinion, that the direction of the Georgian officials towards full integration
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in NATO deprives Georgia of the possibility to consolidate its territorial
integrity. 
28th of March 2008
NATO issued the Declaration regarding the CFE Treaty. In response, Russia
said that its troops existing in Transnistria have nothing to do with the
Treaty and this situation will be solved following the internationally
accepted mechanisms for „frozen conflicts”. 
07th of April 2008
At the initiative of the Republic of Moldova, a phone conversation between
Vladimir Voronin and Igor Smirnov took place. They discussed about the
situation created by the Transnistrian settlement. The Transnistrian part
confirmed its willingness to continue the consultation based on equal status
of “the parts”, rejecting any pressure or unilateral decision that brings the
stability in the area. They also talked about the Treaty regarding possible
partnerships between Republic of Moldova and Transnistria and the
initiatives regarding the development and consolidation of confidence
building measures. 
11th of April 2008
Bender. The working meeting between President Voronin and Igor Smirnov
took place. They talked about the Transnistrian settlement. Smirnov handed
Voronin the draft Treaty regarding friendship and collaboration between
Transnistrian- Moldovan Republic and the Republic of Moldova. 
08th of May 2008
The Parliament of the Republic of Moldova voted in the first lecture, the
National Security Conception. The basic principle, which stands at the basis
of the entire Conception, is “the permanent neutrality of the R.M”. The
military contingent of the Republic of Moldova, formed on a contractual
basis, will have only the role to participate in different international
peacekeeping operations. 
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18th-20th of May 2008
A delegation of the Russian Federation visited Chiºinãu, led by Evgheni
Mironov, the head of the Supreme Chamber of Russian’s Parliament.
Mironov stated that the Transnistrian settlement depends on “the parts`
will” and that Russia is always ready to help in solving this problem.
Mironov also said that the evacuation of Russian troops will take place after
the settlement of the conflict. 
27th of May 2008
Vladimir Voronin had a meeting with EU Commissioner for Foreign
Affairs, Benita Ferrero-Waldner. He said that he intents to have an
important meeting with the Russian President about the Transnistrian issue
at the CIS summit on 6-7 June in Sankt-Petersburg.
29th of May 2008
Igor Smirnov had a meeting with the President of the Russian State Duma
Commission for CIS affairs, Alexei Ostrovski. „Our visit purpose is simple-
to find a compromise for reaching a positive result” - said Ostrovski. “We
think that the desire to solve the problem must be expressed by Chiºinãu
and Tiraspol, when „the important players”, like US and EU are not ready
to acknowledge Transnistria`s independence. In Tiraspol, Alexei Ostrovski
said that Vladimir Voronin is ready to agree with Moldova`s federalisation,
on the official status of the Russian language and on Transnistria`s veto
right regarding the Foreign Policy of the Republic of Moldova. Alexei
Ostrovski`s affirmations were afterwards denied by president Voronin’s
advisor, Mark Tkaciuk. 
6th June of 2008
During the informal CIS summit in Sankt-Petersburg, Vladimir Voronin had
a meeting with the Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev. They talked about
the development of the perspectives for the collaboration between the
Republic of Moldova and Russian Federation in different areas of interest.
The interest on bilateral interaction and traditional friendship relations was
reiterated. Dmitry Medvedev noticed the progress in bilateral relations and
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that opportunities in the bilateral collaboration could be identified. Vladimir
Voronin and Dmitry Medvedev talked about commercial, economic and
humanitarian collaborations and also about the Transnistrian issue. 
06th of June 2008
The President of the Republic of Moldova, Vladimir Voronin, had a meeting
in Sankt Petersburg with his homologue from Ukraine, Viktor Yushenko.
The president of the Republic of Moldova and the President of Ukraine
proved to be optimistic towards identifying solutions for all the existing
problems on the agenda. A separate subject was the Transnistrian issue
where both presidents agreed on the strong need to identify a sustainable
political solution to the conflict, based on the principles of sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova. 
10th of June 2008
The president of the Russian Federation, Dmitry Medvedev decorated with
the friendship medal Grigorii Maracutsa, the special representative of the
Supreme Soviet of the “Moldavian Nistrean Republic” for inter-
parliamentary relations. The decoration is handed for “the development of
the inter-parliamentary collaboration between the states participating in
“For friendship and rights of nations” inter-parliamentary General
Assembly”.
18th of June 2008
Iuri Zubakov invited Igor Smirnov to a meeting with the Russian president,
Dmitri Medvedev. „Both parties should prepare this meeting as an efficient
and useful one. It must become an impulse for solving all of our present
problems” - said Iuri Zubakov.
09th of July 2008
During the press conference in Tiraspol, Igor Smirnov confirmed the
information regarding his meeting with Dimitry Medvedev. “The questions
will not be new” - said Igor Sminov. Transnistria is ready to take part on the
negotiations but only as an equal part. The proposals for “Jukov-Smirnov”
protocol and Transnistria`s participation to national Russian programs will
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be discussed. Igor Smirnov also said that in present, in Transnistria live
about 120 thousands Russian citizens. “All decisions will be made
respecting the results of the referendum from September 2006, in which
Transnistrians vote for the Independence from the Republic of Moldova” -
said Igor Smirnov. 
23th of July 2008
On a press conference, President Voronin said that the „declaration of
neutrality is an internal problem that concerns each and every country and
not international organisations“. This means that Moldova abandons the
idea of a“package agreement” with Russia and international guarantees for
its neutrality. 
11th of August 2008
The Transnistrian MFA stated that the actions and the declarations of some
states and international organizations, participant at the 5+2 format, that
justify “the aggression and genocide of the entire nation” and accused
Russia with the responsibility for the war in Georgia, force the Transnistrian
side to think about their possibility to continue the function of “mediator”
and “observer”. “Regarding that fact, we ask Republic of Moldova to
immediately condemn Georgia`s aggression against South Ossetia” - said
the “Transnistrian Foreign Minister”.
12th of August 2008
Transnistrian Foreign Ministry issued a press release regarding the contacts
with Chiºinãu. The Republic of Moldova’s authorities were accused of
“diminished Russia`s importance” in the conflict settlement, following
Georgia`s example, and though creating the possibility for the use of force.
Transnistria disapproves the fact that Moldovan officials have not yet
condemn Georgia`s aggression towards South Ossetia. Under such these
circumstances, the Transnistrian part declares the introduction of a
moratorium on contacts between the officials of the “Moldovan Nistrian
Republic and of the Republic of Moldova, until the decisive and non
conditional condemnation of Georgian’s aggression in South Ossetia. 
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4. Decision Occasions
The specific of the described crisis consists in the fact that the leadership of
the Republic of Moldova initiated the policy of settlement of the
Transnistrian conflict based on a “package deal” with Russia, based on a
totally wrong approach and without informing the other participants to the
negotiation process - OSCE, EU, Ukraine and the US. In this context, the
modest the capacities of the civil society to react were totally annihilated. 
At the same time, the series of the events, related to this crisis unfolded on
several plans. From one side, several meetings took place at different level
within the bilateral dialogue with Russia. At the same time the Russian
Federation made official declarations that were contradictory to the
expectations of the Chiºinãu officials. More than that, the Russian
Federation during the period of the crisis performed a series of actions that
defieded the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Republic of
Moldova and contributed to strengthening the positions of the anti-
constitutional regime from Tiraspol. 
Moreover, during the analysed period, Russia made a series of actions that
proved, defying its own previous international commitments, as a regional
power that would fully control the CIS area and at the same time wish, first
of all, to eliminate the US and NATO influence in this zone. 
The bilateral dialogue took place at several levels. At the same time it is
obvious that in the Russian Federation take place the process of
concentration of power in the hands of a small group headed by Vladimir
Putin. From these considerations, Vladimir Voronin made a maximum effort
to dialogue directly with Vladimir Putin. After the meeting between the
presidents of the Republic of Moldova and Russia, on June 22, 2007 at
Novo-Ogarevo (Putin’s residence) that lasted over 3 hours, no one could
state that the President of Russia is misinformed by his entourage, corrupted
by the Tiraspol regime, for instance, about the essence of the Chiºinãu’s
position. 
As a result, the lack of a clear reaction from the Kremlin on the “package
agreement” represented a very clear signal for the leadership of the
Republic of Moldova that Russia does not intend to accept Chiºinãu’s
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proposal. The lack of a reaction from Moscow meant that Russia want at
least to annihilate the European and the Euro-Atlantic vector of the
Republic of Moldova. At the same time, the game played by Russia at the
highest level (Putin, Medvedev), in terms of an “interested dialogue”,
proved that Russia intended to realize its own scenario, related to the
Transnistrian issue, that has nothing in common with the expectations of
Chiºinãu. This warning signal (the lack of reaction) was ignored by the
leadership of the Republic of Moldova, a fact that contributed to the
aggravation of the crisis. 
A separate place in the chronology of the crisis is the position of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. So, by the comment of the Russia’s
MFA from May 4, 2007, on the occasion of 10th anniversary from the
signing in Moscow (May 8, 1997) of the Memorandum on the
normalization of the relations of the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria,
Russia reconfirmed its position that the “settlement” of the Transnistrian
conflict would be realized by the creation of a confederation (joint state)
between the Republic of Moldova(the region under the control of the
legitimate authorities) and Transnistria. 
On July 19, 2007, less than a month after the historical “meeting” in Novo-
Ogorevo the same MFA of Russia released a declaration on the occasion of
the occasion of 15th anniversary of the signature of the Agreement on the
stopping of the armed conflict in the eastern rayons of the Republic of
Moldova by the presidents of the Republic of Moldova and Russia, on July
21, 1992. Despite the fact that the “package deal” proposed the replacement
of the military peacekeepers with civilian observers, the MFA of Russia
declared that there are no premises for changing the format of the
peacekeeping operation, imposed by Russia in 1992. 
During the crisis, the Russian Federation organized a series of actions that
obviously challenged the sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova. It is
obvious that, for instance, the “referendum” of September 17, 2006,
organized in Transnistria, was inspired from Moscow. On the background of
aggressive hysteria, unleashed in Transnistria, the Tiraspol regime declared
that 97% out of those who participated in the “referendum” voted in favour
of the independence of Transnistria from the Republic of Moldova with the
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consecutive integration in Russia. Even thought that this “referendum” as
well as the announced results represents a flagrant false, on September 19,
2006, the MFA of Russia issued a commentary, through which this anti-
constitutional act was qualified as a “direct democratic act”. 
The Russian Federation challenged the International law, the norms and the
sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova, organizing in Transnistria the
elections for the State Duma of Russia (December 2, 2007) and the
presidential elections (March 2, 2008) like on the territory of the Russian
Federation. In both cases, according to the decision of the Central Election
Committee of Russia, on the territory of the eastern rayons of the Republic
of Moldova (Transnistria) were opened voting sections like if it was the
territory of Russia. If in the case of the elections for the State Duma, the
MFAEI of the Republic of Moldova had a negative reaction, then regarding
the organisation of the presidential elections from Russia in Transnistria, the
Chiºinãu officials preferred to keep the silence. 
The chronology of the conflict proves that both in Moscow as well in the
centers of other conflict zones several “summits” of the leaders of the
separatist regimes took place. These meetings, during several years were
synchronized with the GUAM meetings. Through them, Russia proved that
it is capable, manipulating the separatist regimes that it controlled, to create
obstacles for the efficient functioning of the GUAM. A totally special
signification had the letter of the Russian MFA of March 6, 2008, through
which the CIS member states were informed that Russia withdraws from
the decision of January 19, 1996 mentioning that the CIS member states
commit not to have relations with the Abkhazian separatist regime. 
These actions of Kremlin proved that the separatist regimes from Georgia
and the Republic of Moldova are perceived as efficient instruments of
reaching the geopolitical interests, that are incompatible with the
sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Georgia and the Republic of
Moldova, and that the so-called CIS in a dead organization, that has the
goal to cover the neo imperial ambitions of Kremlin. 
A separate place in the conflict chronology plays Russia’s actions from
which results that it perceives the international engagements taken during
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Boris Yeltsin’s presidency as univocal yielding, humiliating for Russia. The
aggressive anti American and anti occidental speech of Vladimir Putin
during the conference on security matters in Munich on February 10, 2007
was followed by Putin’s Decree of July 14, 2007, through which Russia
declares moratorium over respecting the provisions of the CFE Treaty
provisions. 
Despite the efforts of the Occident to save this treaty as a key element of the
security on the continent, Russia consequently followed the path of its
destruction. If we remember Russia’s commitment regarding this Treaty, it
referred exclusively to the evacuation of the military potential from the
territory of the Republic of Moldova (Transnistria), and then it is clear the
Russia’s policy of “overthrowing of the monopole world” categorically
contravenes the expectations of the leadership of the Republic of Moldova
for the reintegration of his country, based on a “package deal” with Russia. 
This series of events abundantly offered arguments for a change of the
attitude of the Chiºinãu officials vis a vis the idea of a solution based on the
“package deal”. The lack of competences of the government, as well the
lack of dialogue in the society, led to the fact that all the occasions of taking
the decision for changing the strategy of reintegration of the country were
missed by the leadership of the Republic of Moldova, under the
circumstances when the voice of the civil society was annihilated. 
5. Analytical Themes
The series of events related to the efforts of the leadership of the Republic
of Moldova for settling the Transnistrian conflict, in a direct dialogue with
Russia can be analysed through the following aspects: 
Preparation, prevention and limiting the effects
The capacity of the Republic of Moldova to prevent or diminish the
extraordinary negative effects related to the crisis of the Transnistrian
conflict is determined by the efficiency the state structures are functioning,
based on a coherent and exhaustive juridical framework and not the least,
by the mobilisation and consolidation of the society in front of the incoming
risks. Moreover, the society is capable to avoid negative effects only when
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the state’s actions are based on a correct perception of the problem and
correct appreciation of the interest and the role of each actor, involved in
the Transnistrian issue. Or, in the case of the Republic of Moldova none of
these conditions are met. 
The Tiraspol regime, in several instances proved that it is capable anytime
to use different provocations in the security zone. This happened during the
summer of 2004, when it tried to close the Romanian schools from the left
bank of Nistru that are subordinated the Chiºinãu Government. In the
summer of 2007, using brutal force, in several occasions the normal
election process held in the Corjova village was blocked. In this situation
the Republic of Moldova powerless appealed to the OSCE mission to
Moldova and the international community. 
More than that it was ascertained that the Tiraspol regime is more efficient
in obtaining confidential information from the state structures of the
Republic of Moldova than has the possibility Chiºinãu institutions in their
officially recognize territory. The Republic of Moldova is totally
unprepared to face provocations involving paramilitary troops from
Transnistria, realized based on some scenarios elaborated by the secret
services from Russia.
The Transnistrian issue is at the end of the list of problems of the public
opinion from the Republic of Moldova and is not perceived, at least before
the events in Georgia, as a direct threat to the security of the people. The
Public Opinion Barometer (POB) realized by the Institute for Public
Policies in April 2008 proved that only 1 % out of those polled are worried
about the perspective of a war in the region and only 3,6 % considers the
reintegration of the country a primary problem. 
The Leadership
In the case of the Republic of Moldova, after coming into power in
February 2001, the Communist Party-PCRM created a system of taking the
decisions that does not observe in essence the Constitutional provisions and
the general norms of a democratic rule of law. All the initiatives, decisions
and actions are monopolized by one power center - the President of the
Republic of Moldova, supported by his close entourage. With a docile and
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comfortable majority in the Parliament (71 seats out of those 101 in 2001-
2005 and after the 2005 elections - 56 ) Vladimir Voronin doesn’t take the
effort to play the separation of the competences, the consultation with the
parliamentary faction, the information of the Parliament on important issues
of the country of the consultation on issues on national importance,
including on the Transnistria issue ones. 
In the process of launching his initiatives, including the “package deal”,
President Voronin infringed the provisions of the Constitution of the
Republic of Moldova. He imposed an authoritarian and non transparent
style of management of the situations related to the Transnistrian issue. This
non transparent system of decision making does not allow the critical
evaluation of the problems and allows President Voronin to manipulate the
public opinion, avoiding any political responsibility for the lack of any
progress in the matter of the country reintegration. 
Decision units
At this moment, in the Republic of Moldova there exists just one institution
for taking the decisions. We are talking about the President of the Republic
of Moldova apparatus. The ministry of Reintegration has a purely executive
role. In the mass media of the Republic of Moldova in several occasions it
was stated that an important role is played by the presidential advisor Mark
Tkaciuk. The rest of the state structures, like the Parliament, the
Government, or the National Security Council etc, are isolated from the
Transnistrian conflict problem and are not prepared to face the crisis
situations that could occur. 
The framework of the crisis
In the Republic of Moldova there is a juridical framework that should grant
the coherent functioning of the state structures in the crisis situation and the
adequate decision making mechanisms. Despite the fact that the Russian
Federation committed an act of aggression towards the Republic of
Moldova, in the first half of 1992, and until nowadays refuses to withdraw
its military potential, in the Republic of Moldova the issue of adopting laws
on the siege or the war status is not discussed.
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The society in general is totally uniformed regarding the scenario and
solutions proposed by the negotiators on the Transnistrian issue. In
November 2003, when the signature of the Kozak Memorandum was
prepared, the civil society and the opposition political parties informed
themselves with regard to the content of this document from the Internet,
from the Russian sources some ten days before the date it was expected it
signature. This permitted the civil society and the opposition political
parties to react in order not to admit the signing of the Kozak Memorandum
which was harming the statehood of the Republic of Moldova. 
The prompt reaction of the society together with the external intervention
lead to the avoidance of a serious destabilization of the situation which
would have followed after the adoption of the Kozak Memorandum. Or, in
the case of the “package deal”, this was not published and there are no real
information regarding the essence of the issues discussed with the Kremlin.
In the society there are no public debates regarding the essence of the
conflict and the potential ways of its settlement. The society is not
psychologically ready for the crisis situations. In the situation when the
media and the public space of the Republic of Moldova is dominated by
Russia, amongst the ethnic minorities from the Republic of Moldova is
present a pro Russian and pro Transnistrian spirit. 
Summing up these key elements of the crisis chronology, we can conclude
that all of them were in evident contradiction with the expectations of the
Chiºinãu’s officials and, at the same time, there were enough arguments in
favour of renouncing of the dangerous idea of signing a “package deal”
with the Kremlin administration.
The conflict of values
In the case of the Transnistrian issue, there are three aspects of the conflict
of values. 
The first one refers to the conflict between the neo-imperial policy and the
policy of “tacit annexation” promoted by the Russian Federation and the
aspiration of the citizens of the Republic of Moldova from both banks of
Nistru, related to the perspective of existence of the state of Republic of
Moldova. 
130 Iulian CHIFU, Oazu NANTOI, Oleksandr SUSKHO
The second one is related to the incapacity of the Republic of Moldova
leadership, that declares the issue of the country reintegration a national
priority, to ensure such a level of respect for the human rights and
functioning of the rule of law, on the left bank of Nistru, that would make
the part of the Republic of Moldova controlled by its legal authorities
attractive for the population on the left bank of Nistru. 
The third aspect is related to the conflict of aspirations of the citizens of the
Republic of Moldova and the interests of the international network of the
organized crime who, in partnership with the corrupted politicians from the
Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, are interested in the conservation of the
status quo in the separatist region for the indefinite use of the Transnistrian
zone for smuggling. 
The communication crisis and credibility
The communication crisis and the lack of credibility is determined by the
fact that the Republic of Moldova fails to solve the issue at several
occasions, when in the local media these moments were presented as
decisive steps for the rapid an inevitable reintegration of the country. The
lack of communication between the factors of decision and the society from
the right bank of Nistru is amplified by the lack of dialogue with the
population from the zone controlled by the Tiraspol regime. None of the
governments from Chiºinãu acknowledged the importance of this dialogue
(through TV and Radio). 
As a result of this policy, the citizens of the Republic of Moldova from the
left bank of Nistru (about 60% of the total population of Transnistria) are
excluded from the process of finding a solution to the Transnistrian
problem. Since the first stages of the Trannsitrian issue, none of the
governments from Chiºinãu did not even try to tackle this problem that
enables the heads of the Tiraspol regime to present themselves as
“representatives of the entire population of Transnistria”.
Transnationalisation and internationalisation
The perseveration of the leadership of the Republic of Moldova to obtain a
“package deal” with the Kremlin and solving the Transnistrian issue,
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ignoring the 5+2 negotiation format, provoked suspicions and
dissatisfaction from the other interested actors. The President Vladimir
Voronin and the Minister of Reintegration were forced to demonstrate some
efforts that they inform the EU, the US and Ukraine regarding the essence
of the issues discussed with Kremlin. 
This strategy of Chiºinãu created an extremely dangerous situation for the
Republic of Moldova, in the circumstances when Kremlin started to insist
on the negotiation process, named 2 (Moscow-Tiraspol) + 1 (Chiºinãu).
Only after the acknowledgement of this risk, the leadership of the Republic
of Moldova hide back under the umbrella of the 5+2 negotiation format,
which represents a protection shield for the state. As a result, the
internationalization of the conflict settlement efforts, in spite of the fact that
it does not promise immediate results, represents and efficient instrument of
prevention of the crisis from a bad solution of the conflict and an important
protection of the Republic of Moldova’s interests in the negotiations
involving Russia. 
Lessons learnt
We can state that the society of the Republic of Moldova in general, as well
as the official bodies of the Republic of Moldova did not acknowledge the
risks related to the attempts of solving the Transnistrian issue through a
“package deal” with the Kremlin. The only exception represents a group of
independent experts that in several occasions made efforts to warn the
public opinion regarding the imminent risks of such a strategy. Since the
most efficient mass media are controlled by the government, these efforts
did not have a significant impact. 
The political opposition from the Republic of Moldova is divided and some
of the opposition parties look to obtain the support of Moscow in the
forthcoming parliamentary elections in 2009. As a result, the actual society
is incapable to learn from the events that took place between 2006 and
2008. Since the plans of Russia towards Ukraine are unknown, due to the
chronic political instability in this country, this incapability of the society of
the Republic of Moldova to learn from the crisis can have serious
consequences. 
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Since the Republic of Moldova cannot count on the NATO protection, the
multi-dimensional consolidation of the relations with EU represents an
acute need for the Republic of Moldova for diminishing of the risks related
to the Transnistrian issue and to avoid the crisis situations. Therefore, the
Europeanisation of the Republic of Moldova / in terms of reforms,
institution building and adopting EU legislation - should be the first priority
of any government, in front of the hypothetic quick solution over night in
Transnistrian issue.
6. Conclusions
- The crisis was provoked by the incompetence of the Republic of
Moldova leadership, that began with the wrong premises that it is
possible to solve the Transnistrian issue based on a “package agreement”
with the leadership of Russia;
- As a result of these efforts the other participants to the negotiation
process (OSCE, Ukraine, USA and EU) were marginalised, but the
Republic of Moldova remained unprotected towards Russia’s policy; 
- The crisis proved that the Moldovan state is totally unprepared to avoid,
or to react adequately to this type of crisis situations.The Republic of
Moldova does not function as a rule of law, in fact, the political
democracy is mostly mimed; 
- The Moldovan society is wrongly informed and manipulated as a result
of the disrespect,in the Republic of Moldova,of the Constitutional
stipulations regarding the freedom of the mass-media.The dialogue
between the oppositions and power, power and civil society is missing.
As a result, the Moldovan society is not capable of reacting adequately in
crisis situations; 
- The Transnistrian conflict, as well as the interests promoted through it,
represents an imminent threat to the statehood of the Republic of
Moldova. Without its settlement, it is useless to talk about the existence
of the Republic of Moldova as a sovereign and viable state, with firm
perspectives of existence;
- The Russian Federation, during the crisis, annihilated any collaboration
of the Republic of Moldova with NATO, obtained the sterilization of the
National Security Concept of the Republic of Moldova. The leadership of
the Republic of Moldova during this crisis promoted an anti-Romanian
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aggressive policy with the goal of demonstrating its loyalty to Russia,
which categorically contravene to the pro-European declarations of
Chiºinãu;
- The Russian Federation did not renounce on the idea of creating, instead
of the Republic of Moldova, within its present borders,a different pseudo-
state, constituted of two equal in right subjects - Transnistria and the rest
of the territory of the Republic of Moldova. By this, Russia want to block
any European and Euro Atlantic perspective for the Republic of Moldova,
to legalize for an indefinite period its illegal military presence on the
territory of the Republic of Moldova;
- Prevention of crisis situations in future and diminishing the risks is
possible only by the strengthening of the rule of law and political
democracy in the Republic of Moldova. The efficient partnership with
EU, NATO and the USA represent and efficient tool to avoid future crisis
situations, creation of the premises for a viable solution for the
Transnistrian conflict with the liquidation of the illegal foreign military
presence on the territory of the Republic of Moldova. 
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